Hooker v. Greer
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-01283-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-08-2012 Opinion Author: Waller, C.J. Holding: Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Vacated in Part; and Remanded |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Attorney’s fees - Lis pendens action - M.R.C.P. 11 - Section 11-55-3 - Bad-faith defense - Statute of limitations - Constructive trust - Section 15-1-39 - Equitable action Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson, P.J., Lamar, Chandler, Pierce and King, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Kitchens, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Dickinson, P.J., and Randolph, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-29-2010 Appealed from: Carroll County Chancery Court Judge: J. Max Kilpatrick Disposition: Granted motion for partial summary judgment. Case Number: 2009-0021K |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Lamar Hooker |
LINDA F. COOPER
JAMES L. ROBERTSON |
|
|
| Appellee: | Stephen C. Greer | ED L. BRUNINI, JR. LANE W. S TAINE S |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Real property - Attorney’s fees - Lis pendens action - M.R.C.P. 11 - Section 11-55-3 - Bad-faith defense - Statute of limitations - Constructive trust - Section 15-1-39 - Equitable action |
| Summary of the Facts: | Lamar Hooker and Stephen Greer knew each other for more than thirty years, having worked together in multiple business ventures. In early 2002, Greer and Hooker entered into an agreement for the purchase, development, and sale of two tracts of land – Prairie Point Towhead, located in Arkansas, and Lee Towhead Island, in Missouri. Each party made monetary contributions and participated in certain decisions regarding the development and marketing of the properties. In November 2002, Greer and Hooker executed agreements with T. Eugene Moss, a forester, and Gary Davidson, a logger, for the removal of timber from Lee Towhead Island. In the agreements, Hooker and Greer were referred to as “H/G,” and each signed the agreements as the “Owner” of Lee Towhead Island. In September 2003, Greer sent a letter to Hooker in which he cancelled their business arrangement. In this letter, he characterized the relationship as a “proposed joint venture” and declared such proposed venture “null and void.” Greer claimed the “proposed joint venture” was predicated on Hooker’s ability to put up one half of the initial capital investment to purchase the properties, and that Hooker had failed to do so. Hooker alleges that, after receiving this letter, he attempted to contact Greer both by phone and in person to seek repayment of his contributions. Hooker alleges that Greer stated he would not pay Hooker any money. In August 2005, Hooker, without counsel, filed a lis pendens notice with the Chancery Clerk of Carroll County. The notice said that Hooker was instituting a lawsuit against Greer in Madison County for $141,000. The lis pendens designated land that Greer owned in Carroll and Holmes Counties as the “subject property” of the suit. Greer became aware of the lis pendens while marketing his property in Carroll County. On May 28, 2009, Greer filed a Complaint to Remove Cloud on Title, seeking to have the lis pendens cancelled. In the complaint, Greer also sought recovery of his attorney’s fees. Hooker filed an Answer and Counter-Claim, admitting the lis pendens, but denying that it was improperly filed. In his counterclaim, Hooker alleged he and Greer had entered into an “equitable partnership.” Hooker alleged Greer had breached his fiduciary duties to Hooker by terminating the partnership. Hooker claimed Greer had been unjustly enriched at his expense by at least $141,000, and that he (Hooker) had suffered a $141,000 loss. Hooker asked the court to impose a constructive trust on nonspecific “funds or properties” held by Greer. Greer filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that he was entitled to cancellation of the lis pendens and an award of attorney’s fees. On the day scheduled for hearing on Greer’s motion for summary judgment, Hooker formally cancelled the lis pendens. The court issued a judgment granting Greer’s motion and awarding Greer attorney’s fees in the amount of $12, 794.88. The court held that Hooker, individually, should be assessed attorney’s fees. Greer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Hooker’s counterclaim which the court granted. Hooker appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Attorney’s fees Hooker filed a lis pendens in Carroll County but took no other action to pursue a claim against Greer. Filing a lis pendens is a preliminary action necessary to file a civil action to enforce an interest in property. It is undisputed that Hooker took no action with respect to the lis pendens from August 2005, when he filed the lis pendens, until after Greer filed his suit in May of 2009 to remove the cloud on title. There is further no issue that the lis pendens filing was without any legal or arguable basis, as Hooker had no alleged claim on Greer’s land in Carroll and Holmes Counties. Hooker argues that the Litigation Accountability Act does not authorize awarding attorney’s fees based on the filing of a lis pendens. While the filing of the lis pendens notice itself does not constitute an “action” subject to the LAA, a defense to an action to remove a lis pendens, filed without substantial justification, may form the basis of an award under the LAA. Section 11-55-3 defines an “action” as involving not only a claim, but also a defense. The provisions of the LAA are in harmony with those of M.R.C.P. 11, which allows for the awarding of attorney’s fees as a sanction. The LAA provides for attorney’s fees awards based on a frivolous or bad-faith defense. However, the trial court’s judgment is clear that the award was based on Hooker’s filing of the lis pendens. Since the LAA does not support a sanction based on Hooker’s filing of the lis pendens, the trial court’s award is vacated. On remand, the court should consider whether to award attorney’s fees for the defense to Greer’s action to remove the lis pendens. Issue 2: Statute of limitations Hooker argues that the trial court erred in finding his counterclaim time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations and granting Greer’s motion for summary judgment. Hooker argues that his claim is one for a constructive trust and that such claims are subject to the ten-year statute of limitations found in section 15-1-39. The ten-year statute of limitations, applicable to constructive trusts, applies only to claims which are “purely and exclusively equitable.” Claims which seek a legal remedy, on the other hand, are subject to the general three-year statute of limitations, unless otherwise provided. Hooker’s claim is not “purely and exclusively equitable.” In his counterclaim, Hooker alleged that Greer had been unjustly enriched and that “[t]he Court should impose a constructive trust or equitable lien on all funds or properties held by Counterdefendant.” However, these assertions notwithstanding, it is clear that Hooker seeks only a monetary judgment to compensate him for his alleged losses. A compensatory money damage award is a remedy at law. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
