In re the Guardianship of B.A.D., et al. v. Finnegan


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Docket Number: 2010-CA-01690-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-15-2012
Opinion Author: King, J.
Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Child custody - Transfer of case - Subject matter jurisdiction - Section 43-21-301 - Section 43-21-151(2) - Dismissal with prejudice - Natural-parent presumption - On-the-record findings
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph, Chandler and Pierce, JJ.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Kitchens, J.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result Joined By 1: Dickinson, P.J., and Lamar, J.
Procedural History: Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CUSTODY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-19-2010
Appealed from: Rankin County Chancery Court
Judge: Dan Fairly
Disposition: Dismissed the action.
Case Number: 69,131

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: In the Matter of the Guardianship of B.A.D., Wanda Bell and Jane Dennis a/k/a Jane Dennis Morse




ERNEST W. STEWART



 

Appellee: Frances Cathryn (Dennis) Finnegan MARK C. BAKER, SR.  

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Topic: Child custody - Transfer of case - Subject matter jurisdiction - Section 43-21-301 - Section 43-21-151(2) - Dismissal with prejudice - Natural-parent presumption - On-the-record findings

Summary of the Facts: Baby Dennis was born on September 14, 2004. One month later, the youth court held a shelter hearing based on evidence that Baby Dennis had tested positive for marijuana at birth. The youth court adjudicated that Baby Dennis was neglected and awarded custody of the child to Richard Dennis, the maternal grandfather. The youth court granted Richard durable legal custody on December 13, 2005. Richard died in 2009. At the time, Wanda Bell was Richard’s live-in companion. Frances Finnegan, the child’s natural mother, agreed that Bell could have temporary custody of Baby Dennis. The youth court set a review hearing to occur after one year. In preparation for the review hearing, Finnegan filed in the youth court a “Written Request for Release of Custody.” On advice of counsel, Bell and Jane Morse, the maternal great-aunt, filed a petition for co-guardianship in chancery court on July 26, 2010. The chancery-court filing did not mention the pending youth-court matter. Bell and Morse appeared at the youth-court hearing and informed the youth court of their chancery-court filing. Bell and Morse then requested that the case be transferred to chancery court. The youth court determined that it would be in the child’s best interest if the matter were transferred to chancery court. Bell’s and Morse’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel in the chancery-court proceeding. The chancellor granted the motion. Days later, Bell and Morse, assisted by new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss their petition for co-guardianship. In their petition, Bell and Morse argued that the youth court had exclusive and priority jurisdiction over the matter; thus, the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The chancellor dismissed the petition for co-guardianship with prejudice. In his judgment, the chancellor stated that the youth-court orders were no longer in effect, he deprived Bell of any “authority” over Baby Dennis, and he vested full custody of Baby Dennis in Finnegan as the natural mother. The chancellor also ordered Bell and Morse to pay sanctions in the amount of $750 to Finnegan for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Bell and Morse appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Transfer of case Bell and Morse argue that the youth court had exclusive and priority jurisdiction over their case; thus, the youth court erred by transferring the case to chancery court. Finnegan argues that Bell and Morse are judicially estopped from appealing the chancellor’s dismissal and that the youth court had properly relinquished its jurisdiction of the matter. Section 43-21-301 provides that “[n]o court other than the youth court shall issue an arrest warrant or custody order for a child in a matter in which the youth court has exclusive original jurisdiction but shall refer the matter to the youth court.” Section 43-21-151(2) provides that the youth court’s jurisdiction of a case continues until the child’s twentieth birthday, “unless sooner terminated by order of the youth court.” Although the negligence action concerning Baby Dennis initially was brought in youth court, the youth court voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction of the custody matter. During the youth-court hearing, Bell and Morse informed the youth court of their chancery-court filing and requested that the custody matter be transferred to chancery court. The youth court very well could have denied Bell’s and Morse’s request and retained jurisdiction of the case. Pursuant to section 43-21-151(2), the youth court terminated its jurisdiction of the case. While there is a lack of caselaw in which a youth court voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction and transferred a custody hearing to the chancery court for resolution, the Youth Court Act does not specifically prohibit the action. The plain language of the Act does allow the youth court to terminate its jurisdiction of a case. The matter transferred is purely custody. Thus, the chancery court’s retention of this case would not run afoul of the youth court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the case was properly before the chancellor. Issue 2: Custody Bell and Morse argue that the chancellor erred by awarding custody to Finnegan because he dismissed the action and, thus, cannot rule on the merits of the case; and he failed to make any findings of fact. The chancellor erred by dismissing the action and then ruling on the merits of the case. The chancellor should have proceeded with a full custody hearing, determining the best interest of the child. A dismissal with prejudice indicates a ruling on the merits, which is not appropriate for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Under the natural-parent presumption, it is presumed that it is in the best interest of a child to remain with the natural parent as opposed to a third party. But that presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the parent relinquished the right through abandonment, desertion, or other unfitness, and if it is otherwise overcome by an overriding concern for the best interest and welfare of a child. Finnegan is not automatically entitled to custody without some on-the-record findings. The hearing transcript shows that the chancellor neither reviewed the youth-court record nor Finnegan’s “Written Request for Release of Custody” before rendering judgment. Because the chancellor had not seen the youth court file, it was impossible for him to give any consideration to its contents in making his decision. The chancellor abused his discretion. Several years have elapsed since Finnegan has had custody of Baby Dennis, and it was inappropriate for the chancellor to grant Finnegan custody without evidence that she has rehabilitated herself and other relevant factors.


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