McKnight v. Jenkins
| Docket Number: | 2011-CA-00206-COA Linked Case(s): 2011-CA-00206-COA ; 2011-CT-00206-SCT ; 2011-CT-00206-SCT ; 2011-CT-00206-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-14-2013 |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-13-2012 Opinion Author: Lee, C.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Modification of custody - Material change in circumstances - Contempt - Attorney’s fees - Section 93-5-23 - Child support - Exclusion of evidence - Limitation of testimony Judge(s) Concurring: Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Maxwell, Russell and Fair, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-22-2008 Appealed from: DeSoto County Chancery Court Judge: Percy L. Lynchard, Jr. Disposition: FOUND MOTHER IN CONTEMPT AND ORDERED HER TO PAY $19,956.67 IN ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND $4,012.50 IN GUARDIAN AD LITEM FEES AND DENIED MOTHER’S MOTION TO MODIFY CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT Case Number: 03-06-0968 |
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| Note: | The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part this judgment on 2/14/2013. The SCT opinion can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO82814.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Holly Kathleen Jenkins McKnight |
JAMES ROGER FRANKS JR.
JERRY WESLEY HISAW
WILLIAM RUFUS WHEELER JR. |
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| Appellee: | Walter Calvin Jenkins | MALENDA HARRIS MEACHAM JOY W. GRAVES | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Modification of custody - Material change in circumstances - Contempt - Attorney’s fees - Section 93-5-23 - Child support - Exclusion of evidence - Limitation of testimony |
| Summary of the Facts: | Holly Jenkins McKnight and Walter Jenkins were married in 1972 and divorced in 2004. Holly and Walter were initially awarded joint legal custody of their daughter, with Holly having physical custody. Holly eventually remarried and moved with the daughter to Tennessee. In June 2008, Walter filed a petition for contempt, modification of custody, and temporary relief. The chancellor issued an order, finding a material change in circumstances that had adversely affected the daughter. The chancellor found it was in the daughter’s best interest to live with Walter; thus, Walter was awarded legal and physical custody of her. The chancellor also found Holly to be in contempt for interfering with Walter’s visitation and ordered her to pay $1,500 toward Walter’s attorneys’ fees. Holly did not appeal this ruling. A couple of months later, Walter filed a petition for contempt, modification of visitation, and temporary relief. Walter alleged Holly had failed to return some of the daughter’s belongings as previously ordered by the chancellor. Walter also asked the chancellor to require Holly to have supervised visitation with their daughter. Ultimately, a temporary restraining order was entered ordering Holly to return the daughter to Walter. Around this time, Holly signed a preliminary injunction giving up her visitation rights. Holly did not see her daughter for approximately twenty months. Holly filed a counter-petition for contempt, modification of visitation, modification of custody, and temporary relief. Holly also alleged Walter was abusing and neglecting the daughter. The chancellor subsequently appointed a guardian ad litem, Kimberly Jones, to investigate the matter. Holly was ordered to pay Jones’s $1,500 retainer fee. The chancellor also ordered the Mississippi Department of Human Services to conduct an investigation into Holly’s allegations of abuse and neglect. Neither Jones nor the DHS found evidence of abuse or neglect. The chancellor found Holly to be in contempt for failure to pay a portion of her daughter’s medical bill, and ordered her to pay $1,200. Upon the recommendation of the GAL, the chancellor ordered the parties to restart Holly’s visitation with the aid of counseling sessions. The chancellor also ordered Holly to pay Walter’s attorneys’ fees in the amount of $19, 956.67 as well as the GAL’s fees of $4,012.50. The chancellor found Holly’s request for modification of custody was without merit. Holly appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Modification of custody Holly argues that the chancellor erred in failing to award custody of the couple’s daughter to her. In order for a chancellor to modify a child-custody decree, the non-custodial parent must prove that a material change of circumstances has occurred in the custodial home since the most recent custody decree, that the change adversely affects the child, and that modification is in the best interest of the child. During trial, Holly made several allegations. However, Holly produced no evidence to support her assertions, and the report by the GAL did not support Holly’s allegations. Many of Holly’s assertions relate to the period prior to her relinquishing her visitation rights, approximately twenty months prior to trial. Holly offered no evidence of any material change in circumstances during those twenty months she did not see her daughter. Issue 2: Contempt Holly argues the chancellor erred in finding her in contempt as well as finding that Walter was not in contempt. The failure of a party to comply with a divorce decree is prima facie evidence of contempt. When the moving party has shown that the respondent has failed to comply with the judgment, the burden shifts to the respondent to show that his failure to comply with a court’s decree was not willful or intentional and without fault. Holly admitted that she intentionally did not pay a $1,200 medical bill for her daughter and was clearly in contempt for failing to pay this bill. In regard to whether the chancellor erred in failing to find Walter in contempt, the chancellor noted Holly failed to prove that Walter was in contempt of any court order. Issue 3: Attorney’s fees Holly argues the chancellor erred in ordering her to pay Walter’s attorneys’ fees and the GAL fees. A chancellor is justified in awarding attorney’s fees that are incurred in pursuing a contempt motion. In regard to Walter’s defense of the abuse allegations, the chancellor relied upon section 93-5-23, which requires a party alleging child abuse to pay court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by the defending party if the allegations are found to be without merit. In regard to the GAL fees, the chancellor determined Holly’s unfounded abuse allegations were the reason he appointed a GAL. Section 93-5-23 also requires the party alleging child abuse to pay court costs in addition to attorneys’ fees. GAL fees have been considered court costs. Thus, it was proper for the chancellor to order Holly to pay the GAL fees. Holly also argues that the chancellor should have awarded her attorneys’ fees. Holly contends Walter alleged child abuse. However, the record shows Holly initiated the DHS investigation and the appointment of the GAL, not Walter. Issue 4: Child support Holly argues the chancellor erred in refusing to modify her child support. Holly had lost her job and was having trouble paying her child support. The chancellor determined Holly was in contempt of the court’s previous orders; thus, the clean-hands doctrine applied to prevent Holly from obtaining relief. The clean-hands doctrine prevents a complaining party from obtaining equitable relief in court when he is guilty of willful misconduct in the transaction at issue. Holly intentionally failed to pay certain court-ordered medical expenses; thus, the chancellor properly denied her request. In addition, Holly failed to demonstrate she was entitled to a reduction. Issue 5: Exclusion of evidence Holly argues the chancellor erred in excluding evidence of events occurring prior to the date of the chancellor’s order modifying custody in favor of Walter. Any material change in circumstances necessitating a custody change from Walter to Holly would have occurred after Walter was granted custody. Thus, there is no error. Issue 6: Limitation of testimony Holly argues the chancellor erred in limiting the testimony of three witnesses. The chancellor limited the testimony of several of Holly’s witnesses to those areas identified in her discovery responses. Discovery matters are within the chancellor’s discretion. |
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