Laurel Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Blakeney


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Docket Number: 2011-IA-00273-SCT
Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-08-2012
Opinion Author: Kitchens, J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded
Additional Case Information: Topic: Products liability - Venue - Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i)
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Chandler, Pierce and King, JJ.
Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-08-2011
Appealed from: Smith County Circuit Court
Judge: Eddie Bowen
Disposition: Denied motion to transfer venue.
Case Number: 2010-305
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Laurel Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. a/k/a Laurel Ford and Kia and Kia Motors America, Inc.




 JOSEPH WALTER GILL REBECCA B. COWAN JEREMY SCOTT GADDY



  
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief
    		•
    Appellee: Larry Blakeney EUGENE COURSEY TULLOS  
    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Products liability - Venue - Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i)
    Summary of the Facts: Larry Blakeney, a resident of Smith County, filed a lawsuit in the Smith County Circuit Court against Laurel Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. and Kia Motors America, Inc., alleging that the 2008 Kia Optima which Blakeney purchased from Laurel Ford was defective. Laurel Ford’s principal place of business is in Jones County, and Kia, the manufacturer, is a nonresident corporation. Laurel Ford and Kia filed separate motions, both seeking a change of venue from Smith County to Jones County. The court denied the motions, and the Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: There is no dispute that Laurel Ford’s principal place of business is in Jones County or that Blakeney bought the vehicle in Jones County. Therefore, venue is proper in Smith County only in the event that county is where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred as provided in Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i). Blakeney argues in his brief that “a substantial event occurred [in Smith County] which caused the injury,” but he does not specify what event occurred in Smith County, only that “the defects became apparent to [him] in Smith County.” Blakeney has not identified “a substantial alleged act or omission” or “a substantial event” that occurred in Smith County, and merely experiencing unspecified problems or damages while the vehicle in question is situated in a particular county does not make that county the proper place to litigate his claim. Therefore, the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the defendants’ motions to transfer venue.


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