Smith v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-00491-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-00491-COA |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-28-2012 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery - Right to remain silent - Admission of evidence - M.R.E. 901 - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Peremptory challenges - Jury instruction Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Russell and Fair, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-30-2008 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Winston Kidd Disposition: CONVICTED OF ARMED ROBBERY AND SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN YEARS, WITH FIVE YEARS SUSPENDED AND TEN YEARS TO SERVE, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Case Number: 07-0-189 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Antonio Smith a/k/a Antonia Smith |
WILLIAM R. LABARRE
VIRGINIA LYNN WATKINS
JACINTA ANDREANNA HALL |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: W. GLENN WATTS SCOTT STUART |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Armed robbery - Right to remain silent - Admission of evidence - M.R.E. 901 - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Peremptory challenges - Jury instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | Antonio Smith was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to fifteen years, with ten to serve and five suspended. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Right to remain silent Smith argues the State improperly commented on his post-Miranda silence, first during an officer’s testimony and later during closing argument. Smith did not seek a mistrial after the officer’s comment was made. Thus, Smith failed to preserve this issue for appeal. A criminal defendant’s post-Miranda silence may not be used by the government to impeach the defendant’s exculpatory testimony. Because it is implicit in Miranda warnings that silence will carry no penalty, it would be fundamentally unfair to allow a defendant’s post-arrest silence to be used to impeach his subsequent trial testimony. However, the mere mention of a defendant’s refusal to give a statement does not, in all instances, require reversal. The proper test for determining if a comment on a defendant’s post-Miranda silence amounts to reversible error is whether the natural and probable effect of the statement is to create an unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice. Here, the natural and probable effect of the officer’s comment was not to unjustly prejudice Smith. The challenged testimony, while legally improper, appears to be the officer’s mere recitation of the facts about his contact with Smith. Further, this comment was the sole reference, over the course of Smith’s trial, to his post-Miranda silence. Smith also failed to raise a specific and contemporaneous objection during closing arguments. In addition, the prosecutor’s closing focused on Smith’s trial testimony and the fact that it did not square with other evidence. Such arguments have been deemed permissible. Issue 2: Admission of evidence Smith argues that the trial court’s admission of evidence of a “green leafy substance” recovered from his vehicle violates M.R.E. 901 and 404(b). Rule 404(b) prevents the State from raising the inference that the accused has committed other crimes and is therefore likely to be guilty of the offense charged. But the rule permits admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for other relevant purposes. For a judge to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), the evidence must be relevant to prove a material issue other than the defendant’s character, and the probative value of the evidence must outweigh the prejudicial effect under M.R.E. 403. Under certain circumstances, evidence of a defendant’s drug activity is relevant and admissible to show motive for a robbery. But there must be a close connection showing that the defendant’s specific monetary objective for committing the robbery is to finance drug activity. There are also other circumstances, such as a robbery from a drug distributor or purchaser, that may support admission of other-acts evidence. Here, the State’s proffered reason for admission of the drug evidence was to show Smith’s motive for committing the robbery. But the trial judge apparently failed to recognize the nature of the State’s request and did not perform the two-prong 404(b) inquiry. And inexplicably, after the evidence was admitted, the State apparently abandoned this theory. Instead, both sides haggled over whether the substance was indeed marijuana. The State offered no proof showing that Smith’s motive for committing robbery was to finance drug activity. Therefore, the trial judge erred in admitting evidence concerning the green-leafy substance seized from Smith’s Yukon. However, the eyewitness’s testimony was clear, detailed, consistent with her statement to investigators, and corroborated by other evidence. Several of Smith’s own admissions were also highly condemning evidence. Under the specific facts of this particular case, the State’s proof was sufficient to render harmless the trial court’s erroneous admission of the substance found in Smith’s vehicle. Issue 3: Peremptory challenges Smith, an African American male, argues that the State exercised its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. The State argues Smith’s Batson claim necessarily fails because all jurors selected were African Americans—the same race as Smith. Although the record does not indicate the racial composition of the jury, Smith does not dispute the State’s allegation that the seated jury was solely comprised of African Americans. Smith’s counsel had the burden to ensure the record indicated the facts supporting the State’s alleged discriminatory use of its peremptory strikes, and to show the ultimate racial composition of the jury. Without sufficient facts and record evidence to assess the alleged pretextual nature of the State’s challenges, the trial judge cannot be held in error for striking the challenged jurors. Issue 4: Jury instruction A criminal defendant is entitled to jury instructions that present his theory of the case even if the supporting evidence is weak, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility. However, the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Smith argues the jury was not properly instructed on his defense of misidentification. However, both the refused instruction and one that was given instruct the jury that the State is required to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt. And each contains a list of factors for assessing whether the State has done so. Because the jury was properly instructed on misidentification, and the refused instruction was cumulative of the instruction given, there is no error on this issue. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
