Adams, et al. v. Miss. State Oil & Gas Bd., et al.


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Docket Number: 2010-CA-00598-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 02-21-2012
Opinion Author: Maxwell, J.
Holding: Reversed and remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Oil & Gas Board - Failure to prosecute - M.R.C.P. 41(d) - M.R.A.P. 2(a)(2) - Dismissal of appeal - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) - Void judgment - Jurisdiction
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Russell and Fair, JJ.
Procedural History: Admin or Agency Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-11-2010
Appealed from: Lincoln County Chancery Court
Judge: William H. Singletary
Disposition: DENIED MOT ION TO RE INS TAT E DISMISSED APPEAL
Case Number: 2000-100

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Sherley Adams, et al.




STACEY L. SIMS



 

Appellee: Mississippi State Oil & Gas Board, U.S. Oil and Gas Association, Murphy Oil USA, Inc. d/b/a Spur Oil and Gas Corporation, Fina Oil & Chemical Company, Union Pacific Resources, Exxon, Mobil, Amoco Corporation, Marathon Oil Company, Successor to TXO Production Company JEFFERY P. REYNOLDS, HOWARD O. LEACH  

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Topic: Oil & Gas Board - Failure to prosecute - M.R.C.P. 41(d) - M.R.A.P. 2(a)(2) - Dismissal of appeal - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) - Void judgment - Jurisdiction

Summary of the Facts: The Landowners filed an appeal in Lincoln County Chancery Court of the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board’s decision to approve Statewide Rule 68. The Oil and Gas Board, along with oil and gas companies that had intervened in this case (Intervenors), filed a motion to dismiss for the Landowners’ failure to comply with section 53-1-39(a), the statute governing appeals from the Oil and Gas Board to the chancery court. The chancery court granted dismissal. The Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the appeal to the chancery court for further proceedings. After remand, the special chancellor appointed to hear the appeal recused, and a new special chancellor was appointed. In August 2007, the Landowners finally filed the Oil and Gas Board record with the chancery court. The Landowners filed their brief in September 2007; the Intervenors filed their brief in October 2007; and the Oil and Gas Board filed its brief in November 2007. The next recorded action in the chancery court was an order of dismissal signed by the special chancellor and entered April 2, 2009. The order stated the matter was brought by the clerk’s motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under M.R.C.P. 41(d)(1). On January 20, 2010, the Landowners filed a “Motion to Reinstitute Appeal,” citing the chancery clerk’s failure to give them notice prior to dismissal. On March 24, 2001, the special chancellor denied the motion. The Landowners appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: It is understandable that a diligent chancery clerk, trying to shed stale cases from the docket, would erroneously conclude M.R.C.P. 41(d)’s failure-to-prosecute procedures, versus M.R.A.P. 2(a)(2)’s appeal-dismissal procedures, applied to this appeal. But even Rule 41(d), like Rule 2(a)(2), requires the clerk of the court to give notice to the delinquent party and an opportunity to correct the deficiency before the case is dismissed. The record contains no evidence the prior notice was given in compliance with Rule 2(a)(2). Further, it is not clear from the record what deficiencies existed. The special chancellor held the Landowners’ motion to reinstate, filed nine months after the entry of the order of dismissal, was untimely filed because M.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) required a post-judgment motion based on a mistake to be brought within six months. However, the failure to give the Landowners notice prior to dismissing the appeal rendered the April 2009 order of dismissal void. A judgment is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. No amount of time or delay may cure a void judgment. The special chancellor also held he lacked jurisdiction to hear the Landowners’ post-dismissal motion because his order of appointment had ended with the dismissal. However, the order of appointment was to hear the Landowners’ appeal. So the special chancellor did have authority to reconsider the dismissal of the appeal. And because the order of dismissal is void, the special chancellor’s appointment to hear the appeal never properly ended. Thus, on remand, the special chancellor is authorized to consider the record and briefs before him and is instructed to rule on the Landowners’ appeal.


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