Jones v. Jones
| Docket Number: | 2003-CA-00516-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-19-2004 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: On direct appeal and affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part on cross-appeal |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Adultery - Equitable distribution - Marital property - 401K account - Post-judgment interest - Section 75-17-7 Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Bridges and Lee, P.JJ., Irving, Myers, Griffis and Barnes, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Ishee, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-20-2003 Appealed from: Perry County Chancery Court Judge: James H.C. Thomas, Jr. Disposition: CHANCELLOR GRANTED DIVORCE AND AWARDED 1/2 OF REAL PROPERTY TO EACH PARTY, 2/3 OF BANK ACCOUNTS DIVIDED TO WIFE, 1/3 TO HUSBAND, PERSONAL PROPERTY TO REMAIN IN PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF EACH PARTY, DEBTS TO REMAIN IN THE NAME IN WHICH THEY WERE CONTRACTED. Case Number: 2000-0093-TH |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Sheila Jones |
JAMES R. HAYDEN |
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| Appellee: | Jay Jones | GLENN LOUIS WHITE SHEILA HAVARD SMALLWOOD |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Adultery - Equitable distribution - Marital property - 401K account - Post-judgment interest - Section 75-17-7 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Sheila Jones and Jay Jones were granted a divorce on the grounds of Jay’s adultery. The property dissolution arrangement granted a one-half interest of the marital home to each party, two-thirds of the value of the bank accounts as of the date of separation to Sheila and one-third of the value to Jay, personal property to remain in the possession of the party with possession at the time of the divorce judgment, and each party to assume the debts in his or her name as contracted. Sheila appeals, and Jay cross-appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Equitable distribution Sheila argues that the court erred in distributing property because she brought more than $23,600 of assets into the marriage while Jay brought no assets into the marriage, and she worked full time while the parties were married. There is no evidence to support Sheila’s position that Jay financially contributed nothing to the marital estate. Two of the four accounts the chancellor divided were in Jay’s name, and Jay made substantial payments towards the mortgages on Sheila’s real property. Sheila expended money from her retirement account in excess of $17,000 in contradiction of the court’s temporary order requiring neither party to encumber any assets of the marriage. Sheila argues that she should receive credit for spending this money for marital purposes. However, the chancellor did not err in finding that she should not be compensated for these withdrawals since she used the money to pay her divorce attorney, redecorate a house in which her husband was no longer living, and finance a Christmas that was celebrated without her husband. Although Jay’s personal property has a higher value than Sheila’s, the chancellor took this fact into consideration when he decided to award two-thirds of the marital property accounts to Sheila. Sheila earns a substantial income as a programmer, earning an income of approximately $5,000 per month, and she lives in a house that is currently free of any mortgages. Jay, on the other hand, became disabled in April 2001, and is currently not working. At this time, his only sources of income are Social Security payments and private disability, totaling $1,951 per month. Some of this money must go to child support for his other children. Since Jay has shown himself to be the needier party, the chancellor’s division of marital property was fair and reasonable. Issue 2: Marital property The chancellor decided that 25.7 acres of Sheila’s 26.7 acre tract of property was not marital property and granted full ownership of the tract to Sheila. Jay argues that although the property was purchased by Sheila before the marriage, the property converted from separate property to marital property under the transmutation theory. Property brought into the marriage by one partner and used by the family becomes a marital asset, losing its identity as a separate estate. There is evidence that Sheila’s property remained separate property. The land has always been titled in Sheila’s maiden name and was debt free at the time of the marriage. Sheila purchased the land from her great-grandmother’s estate and had a great emotional attachment to that particular piece of property. There is no evidence that Jay used the 25.7 acres of Sheila’s property for farming or for any other purpose. Therefore, the chancellor’s finding that 25.7 of Sheila’s 26.7 acres is separate property to be supported by the record. Issue 3: 401K account The chancellor divided the parties’ marital property using the property value at the time of the separation date, November 13, 1999. Jay argues that the value of his 401K on November 13, 1999, was $703.45 instead of $4,019.39. Because the 401K statement as of November 13, 1999, proves that his balance was $703.45 at that time, this part of the judgment is reversed and rendered. For Jay to receive one-third of the financial assets, he shall receive $10,601.07, or an additional $2,210.63, from Sheila. Jay also seeks interest at the legal rate of 8% on the amount of the judgment pursuant to section 75-17-7. There is no authority to award interest on judgments based on an unliquidated claim until the judgment is entered. Jay’s entitlement to an additional payment from Sheila remains an unliquidated claim until the date of this judgment. Therefore, he is not entitled to post-judgment interest. |
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