Marbra v. State
| Docket Number: | 2003-KA-02142-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-02-2004 Opinion Author: Bridges, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Discovery violation - Prior bad acts - M.R.E. 403 - M.R.E. 404(b) - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 701 - Reasonable doubt instruction - Sufficiency of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, P.J., Myers and Chandler, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Ishee, J. Dissenting Author : King, C.J. Dissent Joined By : Irving, Griffis and Barnes, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-17-2003 Appealed from: Jackson County Circuit Court Judge: Robert P. Krebs Disposition: CONVICTED OF MURDER AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. Case Number: 01-10,262(1) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Ernest D. Marbra a/k/a David Earnest Marbra a/k/a David Ernest Marbra |
GEORGE S. SHADDOCK |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. GLENN WATTS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Murder - Discovery violation - Prior bad acts - M.R.E. 403 - M.R.E. 404(b) - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 701 - Reasonable doubt instruction - Sufficiency of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | David Marbra was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Expert witness Marbra argues that the court erred because a firearms specialist employed by the Mississippi Crime Lab was allowed to testify as an expert witness although the State did not timely disclose his expert status in discovery. The witness was not qualified by the court as an expert. He could only submit opinion testimony under M.R.E. 701 which provides for limited admissibility of lay opinion testimony. Such evidence is limited to those opinions or inferences which are rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to the clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Here, the testimony was properly allowed. The witness did not testify to an expert opinion, nor did he enter an opinion at any point. Issue 2: Prior bad acts Marbra’s son testified that Marbra engaged in a ten-year pattern of violence against Marbra’s wife. Marbra argues that the court should not have allowed this testimony on his character based on M.R.E. 403 and 404(b). Although evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is generally not admissible under M.R.E. 404, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The testimony in this case was not introduced to prove Marbra's character, but to show the escalating level of violence, culminating in the murder of Marbra’s wife. Rule 403 requires the consideration of whether the probative value of proposed evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Although this evidence was prejudicial to Marbra, the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect since it contradicted Marbra's defense by showing lack of accident and a common scheme of physical violence. Issue 3: Expert testimony Marbra argues that the court should not have allowed testimony from the forensic pathologist regarding his medical conclusions as to how the victim died, because the State failed to disclose this information prior to trial. However, an examination of the record does not show any differences in the expert's autopsy report and his trial testimony. Marbra also argues that court erred in allowing a sergeant who took part in the investigation to testify as an expert witness. Because the witness was not qualified by the court as an expert, his opinion is only admissible, if at all, under M.R.E. 701. Such evidence is limited to those opinions or inferences which are rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to the clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Here, the sergeant testified that if the barrel of a handgun is held on or near one's hand, gunpowder residue would be present on one's hand after discharge. This testimony was based on his experience and perception as a law enforcement officer and helped the jury to determine a fact in issue, i.e., whether the murder weapon fired accidentally. Issue 4: Reasonable doubt instruction Marbra argues that the court erred in refusing his jury instruction which attempted to instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt. Because reasonable doubt defines itself, it needs no definition by the court. In addition, Marbra’s instruction was cumulative to other instructions which required that the State prove Marbra guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury would be authorized to convict. Issue 5: Sufficiency of evidence Marbra argues that the evidence is insufficient because it points to accident. The only dispute is whether the pistol in Marbra’s hand went off accidentally. Matters regarding the weight and credibility of the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. Even if the jury believed Marbra’s story, they could have found him responsible for the victim’s murder by using a deadly weapon in a manner likely to kill or seriously injure his victim. Hitting a person in the head with a loaded gun is enough to indicate an intent to act in an extremely dangerous manner. |
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