Jones v. State
| Docket Number: | 2003-KA-00470-COA Linked Case(s): 2003-CT-00470-SCT |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-02-2004 Opinion Author: Irving, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Robbery - Habitual offender status - Amendment of indictment - Mental competency hearing - UCCCR 9.06 - Peremptory challenges - UCCCR 10.01 - In-court identification - Right to speedy trial - Disproportionate sentence - Lesser-included jury instruction Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Bridges and Lee, P.JJ., Myers, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes and Ishee, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY Writ of Certiorari: Denied Appealed from Court of Appeals |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-26-2002 Appealed from: Lowndes County Circuit Court Judge: Lee J. Howard Disposition: CONVICTED OF ROBBERY AND SENTENCED TO LIFE, AS AN HABITUAL OFFENDER, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MDOC. District Attorney: Forrest Allgood Case Number: 1999-0542-CR1 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Jack Jones, Jr. |
MARK KEVIN HORAN
JOSEPH JOSHUA STEVENS |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Robbery - Habitual offender status - Amendment of indictment - Mental competency hearing - UCCCR 9.06 - Peremptory challenges - UCCCR 10.01 - In-court identification - Right to speedy trial - Disproportionate sentence - Lesser-included jury instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jack Jones, Jr. was convicted of robbery and sentenced as an habitual offender to life imprisonment. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Habitual offender status Jones argues that the court erred in failing to quash the habitual offender portion of the indictment as void, because the original indictment failed to include the language of “against the peace and dignity of the state.” There is no case addressing the exact question presented here, that is, whether an indictment - which has been amended by a court order but which order does not conclude with the language, "against the peace and dignity of the state" - comports with the requirement of Section 169 of the Mississippi Constitution. However, the issue need not be decided in this case, since Jones never objected to the amended indictment on the ground upon which he now objects in his appellate brief. Issue 2: Amendment of indictment Jones argues that the court’s amendment caught him by surprise, prejudiced his ability to negotiate with the State regarding his potential sentence, and did not allow him sufficient time to prepare his defense concerning his prior convictions. Since Jones had more than six months notice of the State's intention, it is hard to understand how he did not have sufficient time to investigate the predicate offenses or prepare his defense. Issue 3: Mental competency hearing Jones argues that the court erred when it failed to conduct a mental competency hearing after ordering him to undergo a competency examination at the Mississippi State Hospital. The trial court is obligated under UCCCR 9.06 to order a competency hearing if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused was insane. The trial judge was in the best position to make a determination whether there existed a reasonable ground for the court to order a competency hearing on its own initiative. After observing Jones’s actions and demeanor both before and during the trial, the judge did not find it necessary to order a competency hearing. Nothing in the record indicates that the decision was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Issue 4: Peremptory challenges Jones argues that the court erred in refusing the defendant twelve peremptory challenges pursuant to UCCCR 10.01. The special challenges to the jury allowed a defendant charged with a capital crime are not necessitated when the principal offense is noncapital. Here, a jury found Jones guilty of robbery, a non-capital offense. Therefore, Jones was entitled only to the regular number of six peremptory challenges. Issue 5: In-court identification Jones argues that the court erred in overruling his motion to suppress an in-court identification of him because the in-court identification was tainted by the initial out-of-court identification. Jones’s contention is wholly without merit as he failed to present any evidence of an improperly suggestive pre-trial identification that would taint any subsequent identification at trial. Jones also argues that the court erred by overruling his motion to prevent the witness from referring to any previous identifications of him during trial. However, Jones opened the door for the admission of the testimony about which he now complains. Issue 6: Right to speedy trial Jones argues that he was denied both his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial. In a constitutional challenge, the court must consider length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and any resulting prejudice. The length of the delay was approximate 37 months which was presumptively prejudicial. The court entered a series of continuances which appear to have overwhelmingly resulted from Jones’s failure to provide necessary documentation to the hospital for his mental examination, his preparation for trial, and the illness of his counsel. There is no indication from the docket that Jones filed a motion asserting his right to a speedy trial. Because Jones was responsible for the extraordinary lapse of time between his arrest and his trial, he cannot here complain about any prejudice borne by his own actions. Therefore, there is no violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Since the State was responsible for a mere 117 days of the total delay, Jones's statutory right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Issue 7: Disproportionate sentence Jones argues that the court erred in invoking a sentence grossly disproportionate to the crime of which he was charged. While the sentence Jones received is indeed harsh for the offense he committed, the Mississippi Legislature has determined that the sentence Jones received is a proper sentence for an habitual offender. Issue 8: Jury instruction Jones argues that the court committed plain error in refusing one of his lesser-included instructions of petit larceny. Jones offered two lesser-included instructions of petit larceny. The record clearly indicates that one of the instructions was given, and one was refused at the request of defense counsel. Therefore, Jones may not now complain concerning his own jury instructions. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
