In Re: Hooker


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Docket Number: 2012-IA-00166-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2012-IA-00166-SCT2012-IA-00166-SCT2012-IA-00166-SCT
Oral Argument: 02-09-2012
 

 

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Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-08-2012
Opinion Author: Dickinson, P.J.
Holding: Reversed and rendered.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Executive clemency - Separation of powers - Miss.Const. sec 124 - Section 124 publication - Power of governor
Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson, P.J., Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and King, JJ.
Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Carlson, P.J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Dickinson, P.J., Lamar and Chandler, JJ. Chandler, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., and Lamar, J.
Dissenting Author : Waller, C.J.
Dissent Joined By : Randolph and Pierce, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Randolph, J.
Dissent Joined By : Waller, C.J., and Pierce, J.
Dissenting Author : Pierce, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion
Dissent Joined By : Waller, C.J., and Randolph, J.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 01-24-2012
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Tomie Green
Disposition: Issued a TRO.
Case Number: 251-12-00033CIV

Note: Motion for Entry of Appearance and Joinder in Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus, or Alternatively, for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Orders filed by Joshua L. Howard is granted. Motion for Entry of Appearance and Joinder in Petition for Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus, or Alternatively, for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Orders filed by Azikiwe Kambule is granted. Petition to Protect the Civil Rights, of All Former Prisoners, Who Received a Pardon, from Governor Haley Barbour is denied as moot.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Charles Hooker, David Gatlin, Nathan Kern, Anthony McCray, Kirby Tate, Katherine Robertson, Aaron Brown, Joshua Howard, and Azikiwe Kambule




THOMAS M. FORTNER, ERIK M. LOWREY, RICHARD ANTHONY FILCE, SYLVIA S. OWEN, LUTHER T. MUNFORD, ROBERT GREGG MAYER, FRED L. BANKS, JR., CHARLES WILLIS PICKERING, JOHN M. COLETTE, EDWARD BLACKMON, JR., CYNTHIA ANN STEWART, AAFRAM YAPHET SELLERS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #2 Brief
  • Appellant #3 Brief
  • Appellant #4 Brief

  • Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JIM HOOD, ALEXANDER KASSOFF, MEREDITH MCCOLLUM ALDRIDGE, BRIDGETTE WILLIAMS WIGGINS, DAVID K. SCOTT  

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    Topic: Executive clemency - Separation of powers - Miss.Const. sec 124 - Section 124 publication - Power of governor

    Summary of the Facts: During his last days in office, Governor Haley Barbour granted executive clemency to 215 persons, most of whom were no longer in custody. Of the twenty-six persons in custody, Governor Barbour granted ten full pardons; thirteen medical releases; one suspension of sentence; one conditional, indefinite suspension of sentence; and one conditional clemency. Attorney General Jim Hood filed a civil action in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, alleging he had “reason to believe that former Governor Barbour’s attempted pardons . . . were in violation of Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution.” Section 124 requires an applicant for a pardon to publish a petition stating why the pardon should be granted. The attorney general initially named five defendants, but then requested the circuit judge to declare all pardons it found to be in violation of Section 124 null, void, and unenforceable. The circuit judge issued a temporary restraining order, prohibiting the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ releasing any person pardoned by Governor Barbour, until the Department had provided the court sufficient proof of acceptable Section 124 publication. The circuit judge extended the TRO and ordered the defendants to appear at a preliminary injunction hearing. The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: While the judiciary does possess the power to review legislative or executive action exceeding constitutional limits, the Court cannot review or interpret a constitutional procedure that has been textually committed to another branch. Some actions are of “a purely political nature,” and “no writ of injunction or mandamus or other judicial remedial writ will run against the governor” unless personal or private property rights are interfered with. Here, the attorney general argues that the notice provision is a right reserved to the people. But even if the attorney general is correct that the publication provision confers a right to notice on the public, that right inures to the benefit of the public in general, and not to any particular private person. No party claims a violation of his or her personal or private property rights. The attorney general brings this claim on behalf of the State of Mississippi, and no particular individual. So, the exercise of the pardon power – vested solely with the governor – is of “a purely political nature.” The issue in this case is not whether the thirty-day-notice provision must be complied with – it must. Instead, the question to be resolved today is which branch has the final reviewing authority over whether the publication procedure was met. Under § 124 of the Constitution of 1890, the power to grant pardons and to otherwise extend clemency, after the judicial process whereby one has been convicted of a crime has come to an end, is vested in the governor alone. Thus, a facially valid pardon, issued by the governor – in whom our Constitution vests the chief-executive power of this state, and who is the head of the coequal executive branch of government – may not be set aside or voided by the judicial branch, based solely on a claim that the procedural publication requirement of Section 124 was not met, or that the publication was insufficient.


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