Boone v. Boone


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Docket Number: 2010-CA-01268-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 02-07-2012
Opinion Author: Carlton, J.
Holding: Vacated

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contempt - Enforceability of agreed judgment - Section 93-5-2(3) - Notice - M.R.C.P. 5 - M.R.C.P. 81 - Void judgment
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Ishee and Russell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Fair, J.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., and Maxwell, J.
Concurs in Result Only: Barnes and Roberts, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-11-2010
Appealed from: Hancock County Chancery Court
Judge: Carter Bise
Disposition: JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF SUSAN LADETTE BOONE AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDED
Case Number: C2301-08-00526(4)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Blake Boone




DAMON SCOTT GIBSON



 

Appellee: Susan Ladette Boone HERBERT J. STELLY  

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Topic: Contempt - Enforceability of agreed judgment - Section 93-5-2(3) - Notice - M.R.C.P. 5 - M.R.C.P. 81 - Void judgment

Summary of the Facts: The Hancock County Chancery Court entered an Agreed Judgment of Divorce between Blake and Susan Boone on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Shortly thereafter, Susan filed a “Complaint to Cite for Contempt and for Other Relief” based on the Agreed Judgment of Divorce entered between the parties. The court entered a “Judgment on Complaint to Cite for Contempt and for Other Relief,” in favor of Susan against her former husband, Blake, and the court awarded Susan attorney’s fees. Blake appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Enforceability of agreed judgment Blake argues that the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief should be set aside as void because the Agreed Judgment of Divorce is void due to the failure of the parties and the chancery court to comply with the substantive requirements of section 93-5-2(3). Blake first contends that the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief is void because the parties did not agree or acknowledge in writing or otherwise that the decision of the chancery court on the issues left to be decided in the Settlement Agreement would be a binding and lawful judgment as required by section 93-5-2(3). The Settlement Agreement is an enforceable contract as to the terms and conditions agreed to therein by the parties. The Settlement Agreement on its face shows Blake’s understanding that he became contractually bound to the agreement upon executing it. The Settlement Agreement also reflects that both parties read the terms and conditions which stated that they were contractually bound by the signed agreement. Thus, there is no merit to this argument. Blake also argues that the Agreed Judgment of Divorce is void due to the chancellor’s failure to adjudicate all issues prior to the entry of divorce in accordance with section 93-5-2(3). Blake’s claims, regarding the validity of the Agreed Judgment of Divorce, pertain to the chancery court’s failure to complete the statutory requirements as set forth in section 93-5-2(3) prior to its entry of the divorce. A judgment of divorce constitutes a non-final order where that judgment fails to adjudicate all matters attendant to the divorce. Only final judgments are appealable. The chancellor’s order styled Agreed Judgment of Divorce is a non-final order, not a void judgment as asserted by Blake. Since the Agreed Judgment fails to constitute an appealable judgment, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Issue 2: Contempt In this case, there is prejudice arising from the procedural error resulting from the chancellor’s failure to comply with the statutory requirement to resolve all matters attendant to the divorce prior to entry of the divorce and from the comingling of the chancellor’s contempt findings and the resolution of the seven pending divorce matters. Prejudice occurred by Susan’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of M.R.C.P. 5. Notice was issued instead pursuant to M.R.C.P. 81. A Rule 81 summons provides sufficient notice to appear and defend in contempt proceedings. Rule 81 service of process, however, fails to provide sufficient notice, as required by Rule 5(b), to further litigate unresolved matters of a pending divorce, including property division. As evidenced in the Judgment of Contempt and Other Relief, the chancellor clearly comingled the resolution of the contempt matters with the seven unresolved matters pending in the underlying divorce. Thus, the Judgment on Contempt and Other Relief is void.


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