Arrington v. Arrington
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00782-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-07-2012 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Withdrawal of consent - Rehabilitative alimony - Judicial notice - Child support - Section 43-19-101 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Maxwell and Fair, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Russell, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-25-2009 Appealed from: Clarke County Chancery Court Judge: Lawrence "Larry" Primeaux Disposition: GRANTED IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES DIVORCE; ANDREW ORDERED TO PAY $656 PER MONTH IN CHILD SUPPORT; MARITAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTED; SHANNON AWARDED PRIMARY CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN AND REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY AT $450 PER MONTH FOR FORTY-EIGHT MONTHS Case Number: 09-027-P |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Andrew F. Arrington |
JAMES A. WILLIAMS
LESLIE C. GATES |
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| Appellee: | Shannon Arrington | THOMAS L. TULLOS |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Withdrawal of consent - Rehabilitative alimony - Judicial notice - Child support - Section 43-19-101 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Shannon and Andrew Arrington were granted a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. Andrew agreed to pay $656 per month in child support for the couple’s two children. Shannon received possession of the marital home and responsibility for paying the mortgage. The chancery court awarded Shannon rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $450 per month for forty-eight months. Andrew appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Irreconcilable differences Andrew argues that the chancellor should have granted him the opportunity to withdraw his consent to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences because the chancellor, in effect, changed the terms of the consent divorce in his final judgment. Andrew maintains his agreement for a no-fault divorce was based on the premise that the chancery court would approve the $656 per month in child support, the parties’ distribution of the marital property, and would then consider alimony. Relatedly, Andrew raises a separate issue that he was deprived of due process of law in violation of the United States and Mississippi constitutions because he was not given notice that his agreement to an irreconcilable-differences divorce was not binding on the chancery court. A divorce decree is quasi-contractual: the chancellor always has the discretion to modify the decree’s terms, and all such decrees are subject to the court’s approval. However, the chancellor did not modify any of the agreed-upon matters in the parties’ consent to divorce; the chancellor merely stated Andrew was at fault for the breakdown of the marriage in his analysis of the Armstrong factors for alimony. In doing so, the chancellor did not change the irreconcilable-differences divorce to one of fault. The terms of the parties’ consent to divorce were not altered by the chancery court. Andrew and Shannon entered into a consent divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, which covered all issues of property division, child support, and responsibility for other future expenses. The chancellor then determined the amount of alimony, taking into account the child-support obligation and the evidence of Andrew’s uncondoned adultery. Issue 2: Alimony Andrew argues that Shannon’s award of rehabilitative alimony was in error. He claims the chancellor misapplied the Armstrong factors which resulted in an inequitable and unjustified award of alimony – an award he basically views as a “fault penalty” for his alleged adultery. He also claims Shannon was awarded alimony to compensate for the agreed-upon child-support payments, which the chancellor found insufficient under the guidelines. Rehabilitative periodic alimony is an equitable mechanism which allows a party needing assistance to become self-supporting without becoming destitute in the interim. At trial, Shannon requested rehabilitative alimony for ten years. The chancellor properly analyzed the Armstrong factors in determining whether alimony was appropriate, and he found that Andrew had a net monthly income after taxes of $4,057 per month, with expenses of $3,405. The chancellor noted the amount of child support agreed to by the parties was $155.58 less than the statutory guidelines; thus, Shannon would be shouldering most of the expenses for the two children. The chancellor found Shannon needed assistance to meet her household needs, even though the chancellor thought she had overstated her monthly expenses. Shannon’s take-home pay is $2,285 per month less than Andrew’s. The chancellor concluded that even though Shannon was completing her junior college education, with the lagging economy, it may be difficult for her to earn more money; thus, she was financially challenged and needed support for an interim period. All property division, lump sum or periodic alimony payment, and mutual obligations for child support should be considered together to determine that they are equitable and fair. The award of rehabilitative alimony was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Issue 3: Judicial notice Andrew claims that the chancellor took improper judicial notice by finding “the housing market was depressed,” but Andrew fails to relate it to any specific complaint he has regarding the chancellor’s judgment. In the parties’ consent to divorce, Andrew agreed that he would convey to Shannon an undivided interest in the marital home. Shannon received use of the marital home and agreed to pay the mortgage debt, which was $218 per month. At the time of trial, the debt on the marital residence was approximately $6,950. The appraisal of the marital home was submitted to the chancery court at trial. The record does not indicate that the chancellor took judicial notice of a depressed housing market. The comments made by the chancellor are references about the appraisal, and they are accurate. Issue 4: Child support Andrew argues that the chancellor erred in approving the consent divorce which called for child support in an amount less than the guideline amount and in adjusting this deficiency by awarding alimony and that the child-support amount stated in the consent agreement was sufficient. Section 43-19-101(2) requires that a deviation from the statutory child-support guidelines must be supported by specific findings of fact; however, such findings are not necessary when the child-support order is based upon the parties’ agreement. The guidelines should shape a decision, allowing for the needs of the child and financial ability of the parent. The amount of child support agreed upon by the parties was $656 per month, which is $155.58 per month less than the child-support guidelines section 43-19-101(1) provides. The chancellor did not exceed his authority in approving the child-support amount below the statutory guidelines, nor does Shannon complain of the lesser amount. There was no need for the chancellor to provide specific findings of fact, as required by section 43-19-101(2), as to why the guidelines were deviated from, because the parties agreed to the child support amount. Andrew has no complaint about the child-support obligation being less than the statutory amount; rather, he complains it was used to justify an award of alimony. However, there are no specific findings that the chancellor awarded rehabilitative alimony to Shannon in order to compensate for a shortfall in child support. |
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