Greenwood v. Young
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-01154-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-07-2012 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Motion in limine - Exclusion of evidence - Adverse possession - Section 15-1-13(1) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Maxwell and Russell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Fair, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Irving, P.J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-15-2010 Appealed from: Winston County Chancery Court Judge: J. Max Kilpatrick Disposition: APPELLEES OBTAINED OWNERSHIP OF DISPUTED PROPERTY BY ADVERSE POSSESSION Case Number: 2009-40 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Donald Greenwood and Carol Greenwood |
CHRISTOPHER MORGAN POSEY |
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| Appellee: | Gerald Allen Young, Sr. and Melody Ann Young | CALEB ELIAS MAY | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Motion in limine - Exclusion of evidence - Adverse possession - Section 15-1-13(1) |
| Summary of the Facts: | In 1984, Donald Greenwood purchased a thirty-one acre tract of land in Winston County from his siblings, Charles W. “Dan” Greenwood, Barbara G. Jones, Sue G. Livington, and Tessie G. Higginbotham, but reserved unto the siblings and their heirs the first right of refusal to purchase the property should it be offered for sale. In 1996, Donald executed a warranty deed conveying two of the thirty-one acres to the Gerald Allen Young Sr. and Melody Young, unbeknownst to his siblings. Tessie testified that upon discovering that in 2006 Donald had conveyed the property to the Youngs without offering the right of first refusal to his siblings, she employed Taylor Tucker, an attorney. Tucker drafted a letter to the Youngs on August 30, 2006, notifying them of the “right of first refusal” and asking them to convey the property back to Donald. Barbara, Sue, and Tessie filed a complaint against the Youngs to set aside the 1996 warranty deed. The court filed an “Agreed Judgment Voiding Warranty Deed and Other Relief,” wherein the chancery court set aside the 1996 warranty deed from Donald to the Youngs as void for lack of spousal signature on homestead property. In 2009, the Youngs, now grantees of a void deed, filed suit against the Greenwoods and the Sisters to quiet and confirm title of the two acres, claiming an interest in the subject property through adverse possession. On the morning of the trial, the court approved the parties’ agreement to dismiss, with prejudice, the Sisters from the suit; and in return, the Sisters received a right of first refusal by the prevailing party in the Youngs’ suit to quiet and confirm title, leaving the Greenwoods as the only defendants in the case. The chancellor found the Youngs owned the two acres of property in dispute through adverse possession. The Greenwoods appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion in limine The Greenwoods argue the chancellor erred in denying their motion in limine and standing objection which requested the exclusion of evidence or testimony offered to prove adverse possession through the Youngs’ acts occurring prior to December 5, 2007, the date on which the chancellor declared the 1996 warranty deed void. The Greenwoods allege adverse possession cannot be established for any time prior to the voiding of the warranty deed because a claim of adverse possession cannot begin unless the landowner has actual or constructive knowledge that there is an adverse claim against his property, and Donald was never on notice that the Youngs were claiming the land in some method hostile or adverse to the warranty deed. The chancellor set aside the 1996 warranty deed as void, meaning the warranty deed conveying the two acres to the Youngs in 1996 was void from the beginning, and the Youngs received no rights to the property from the warranty deed. With no rights to the property passing under the void warranty deed, all of the Youngs’ actions affecting the two acres at issue from 1996 forward were adverse and hostile to the Greenwoods’ ownership of the property and color of title. Accordingly, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by denying the Greenwoods’ motion in limine. Issue 2: Adverse possession The Greenwoods argue that the Youngs failed to prove by clear-and-convincing evidence that, by their specific actions, they are entitled to title of the disputed property through adverse possession, pursuant to section 15-1-13(1). In order to establish a claim of adverse possession, the party claiming to have adversely possessed the property must show, by clear-and-convincing evidence, that his possession was under a claim of right or ownership; actual or hostile; open, notorious, and visible; continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years; exclusive; and peaceful. In finding the Youngs established a claim of adverse possession, the chancellor relied on evidence of the survey markers on the property, the bulldozer work, and the bushhogging, which were all done by the Youngs or at the direction of the Youngs. The chancellor recognized that the Youngs also paid the taxes on the property for the ten-year period, and the Youngs obtained an E-911 address for the property in 1999. Furthermore, testimony was presented at trial showing that the Greenwoods claimed no ownership of the property until 2006 when the Sisters initiated litigation. Therefore, the Youngs’ claim of ownership of the disputed property is sufficient to establish their claim of adverse possession. While testimony was presented on behalf of the defense claiming the Youngs were never seen using the disputed property during the relevant time, Melody and Ray presented testimony to the contrary. The Youngs paid the taxes on the property for the ten-year period. Additionally, the testimony showed the survey markers were visible on the two acres for an extended period of time. Clearly, their actions were sufficient to put others on notice that their possession of the two acres was adverse to the true owner. The Youngs never tried to hide or conceal their use of the property. The Youngs acquired the two acres in 1996 pursuant to the later-voided warranty deed. Based on the record, the Greenwoods did not assert their claim of ownership of the property until 2006. Thus, the Youngs’ possession of the property was continuous and uninterrupted from 1996 until 2006, in excess of the ten-year period statutorily required. The record shows that the Youngs remained in possession of the property from July 1996 forward unchallenged by any other party, until the initiation of litigation in August 2006. Given this evidence, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in finding that the Youngs claimed title to the two acres through adverse possession. |
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