Grant v. Donelson
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-01776-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-07-2012 Opinion Author: Russell, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Jurisdiction - M.R.C.P. 59 - M.R.A.P. 4 - Oral agreement - Statute of frauds - Section 15-3-1 - Constructive trust Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Ishee, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Fair, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J. Concurs in Result Only: Roberts, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-28-2010 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: Denise Owens Disposition: FOUND AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN DONELSON AND GRANT REGARDING THE TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY Case Number: G-2008-433-O/3 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Cathy M. Grant |
JAMES A. BOBO |
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| Appellee: | Willie Donelson | PAUL E. ROGERS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Jurisdiction - M.R.C.P. 59 - M.R.A.P. 4 - Oral agreement - Statute of frauds - Section 15-3-1 - Constructive trust |
| Summary of the Facts: | Cathy Grant purchased a house and property she had been renting for approximately six years. Grant used $35,543.43 in cash to purchase the cashier’s check that would pay off the mortgage on the house. At closing, Grant placed the warranty deed to the house in her name. According to Willie Donelson, he gave Grant $40,600 in cash to purchase the house. In exchange, Grant agreed to place the warranty deed in Donelson’s name at closing and to rent the house from him for $425 per month. Donelson testified that he had gone with Grant to her real estate attorney’s office for the closing transaction. But Donelson had become ill, so Grant took Donelson to his house. Thus, Donelson was not present when the closing was completed. Donelson stated that he asked Grant on three occasions after the closing to convey the house to him or to return his money. When she would not do either, he filed a complaint with the chancery court, which requested ownership of the house and an award of unpaid rent. Grant, however, denied she and Donelson had any agreement that would have given Donelson an ownership interest in her house. Instead, Grant testified that Donelson had loaned her $5,000 in cash, which she had agreed to repay in $400 monthly payments. Grant stated that she used Donelson’s $5,000 loan to her and $30,000 in personal funds to purchase the house and property. The chancery court issued an order and opinion granting Donelson’s request for ownership of the house. The chancery court found that Donelson and Grant had an oral contract with two parts. The chancery court ordered Grant to execute a warranty deed to convey the property to Donelson. Grant filed a post-trial motion under M.R.C.P. 60. Before the chancery court decided the motion, Grant filed a notice of appeal. After a hearing on Grant’s post-trial motion, the chancery court issued an amended order and opinion that ordered a $40,600 lien be placed against Grant’s house in favor of Donelson. Donelson later filed a post-trial motion under Rule 60, requesting the chancery court to reinstate its previous order which awarded him ownership of the house. The chancery court issued a second amended order and opinion that ordered Grant to convey the property to Donelson by warranty deed. Grant appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jurisdiction Under M.R.C.P. 59, a motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be filed not later than ten days after entry of the judgment. The final judgment was filed on September 28, 2010. On October 11, 2010, Grant filed her motion to reconsider and amend and alter judgment. Therefore, Grant’s motion was untimely filed. As such, appellate jurisdiction is proper as the notice of appeal was filed on October 28, 2010. Under M.R.A.P. 4, the Court’s jurisdiction became effective on March 1, 2011, when the chancery court issued its second amended order and opinion. Issue 2: Oral agreement Grant argues that the evidence does not support an oral agreement. According to Grant, the evidence shows that she used personal funds and an unsecured loan from Donelson to purchase her long-time residence. Grant further argues that the statute of frauds, section 15-3-1, renders the alleged oral agreement between her and Donelson unenforceable. Substantial evidence supported the chancellor’s finding of an oral contract between Grant and Donelson, which required Grant to title the house in Donelson’s name in exchange for receiving $40,600 from him to purchase the house. At trial, Grant admitted that she needed financial help to purchase the house and that she received help from Donelson. Although Grant and Donelson had an oral agreement, the statute of frauds does not render their agreement unenforceable. In Mississippi, the statute of frauds does require that all contracts involving the sale of land be in writing. In this case, the agreement between Grant and Donelson did not involve the sale of land and did not have to be in writing in order to be enforceable. Instead, Grant’s role in the sale of the house was as Donelson’s agent, not as the conveyor of the real property. Issue 3: Constructive trust Grant argues that Donelson failed to prove the existence of a constructive trust by clear and convincing evidence. Grant contends that there was no wrongful conduct that would justify the imposition of a constructive trust. A constructive trust is a means recognized in our law where under one who unfairly holds a property interest may be compelled to convey that interest to another to whom it justly belongs. Abusing a confidential relationship is one type of wrongful conduct that may justify the imposition of a constructive trust. The record shows that Grant and Donelson were neighbors who had become friends and had maintained an amiable relationship up to the filing of this claim. And each had helped the other as needed during their friendship. The record also shows that Grant abused her friendship with Donelson. Donelson suffered from health problems when he and Grant initially entered their oral agreement. Donelson repeatedly testified that based on his previous friendship with Grant, he trusted her to place the warranty deed in his name as she had promised. Therefore, Donelson had not required a written agreement from her. The chancellor’s finding that Grant had abused Donelson’s confidence in their friendship to gain ownership of the house is fully supported by the record. |
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