Brown v. Wiley
| Docket Number: | 2003-CA-00719-COA Linked Case(s): 2003-CA-00719-COA ; 2003-CT-00719-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-23-2004 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Child custody - Natural parent - Otherwise unfit - Section 93-15-103(3) Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Bridges and Lee, P.JJ., Myers, Griffis, Barnes and Ishee, JJ. Dissenting Author : Irving, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CUSTODY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-28-2003 Appealed from: Grenada County Chancery Court Judge: Percy L. Lynchard, Jr. Disposition: CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN AWARDED TO MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER. FATHER GRANTED VISITATION AND ORDERED TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT. Case Number: 02-10-286L |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | In Re: Guardianship of Rickie Jamal Brown, Jr., and Ebony Cierra Brown, Minors: Rickie Brown |
ARNOLD D. DYRE
DONNY MEEKS |
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| Appellee: | Elizabeth Wiley | CARLOS EUGENE MOORE A. E. (RUSTY) HARLO |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Child custody - Natural parent - Otherwise unfit - Section 93-15-103(3) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Following the death of her daughter, Elizabeth Wiley filed a petition to appoint a guardian and sought custody of her daughter’s children. The court awarded custody of the children to Elizabeth. The children’s father, Rickie Brown, was granted visitation and was ordered to pay child support. Rickie appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Rickie argues that the court erred in granting custody to Elizabeth. In a child custody case between a natural parent and a third party, it is presumed that the best interest of the child will be preserved by being in the custody of the natural parent. In order to overcome this presumption there must be a clear showing that the parent has abandoned the child, the conduct of the parent is so immoral as to be detrimental to the child, or the parent is mentally or otherwise unfit to have custody of the child. The chancellor decided that Rickie was not entitled to custody on the grounds that he was otherwise unfit. In determining what grounds of “otherwise unfitness” a court can consider in denying custody, section 93-15-103(3) dealing with termination of parental rights is helpful. The factors the statute lists includes abandonment; lack of contact with a child under the age of three for a period of six months or a child three years or older for a period of one year; episodes of abusive incidents towards the child; substance addiction, severe mental deficiencies or mental illness, or extreme physical incapacitation making the parent unable to assume minimally acceptable care of the child; extreme and deep-seated antipathy by the child toward the parent or when there is some other substantial erosion of the relationship between the parent and child caused at least in part by the parent; and the parent’s conviction of rape or other sexual misconduct against any child. The legislature intended to create a strong presumption in favor of the natural parent retaining his parental rights, including the right to custody. Denial of custody to a natural parent in favor of a third party should be granted only when there is a clear showing that the natural parent has relinquished his parental rights, that he has no meaningful relationship with his children, or that the parent’s conduct is clearly detrimental to his children. The chancellor was in error in deciding that Rickie had not abandoned his children but then deciding that he was unfit to care for his children in part because of his failure to stay current on his child support. A failure to stay current on child support goes to whether a natural parent has abandoned his child and cannot be a factor in determining whether a natural parent is otherwise unfit. The chancellor also decided that Rickie was unfit to care for his children because he saw them only once in the four years that they had lived in Mississippi. Again, the chancellor misapplied the abandonment standard. Rickie’s infrequent physical visits cannot be used as a factor in deciding that he was otherwise unfit to care for his children. His frequent telephone calls to his children show the closeness of the relationship he had with his children. He simply did not have the time or money to make frequent visits from Pennsylvania to Mississippi. The chancellor also held that Rickie failed to show proper emotional support for his children as their mother suffered through her illness and died. This holding is erroneous as a matter of fact. Rickie’s failure to provide emotional support did not affect his relationship with his children in any way. |
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