Farris, et al. v. State
| Docket Number: | 2003-KA-01116-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-07-2004 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Conspiracy to facilitate escape - Admission of evidence - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 402 - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(c) - Best evidence rule - M.R.E. 1002 - Lay opinion testimony - M.R.E. 701 - Cross-examination - Jury deliberations - Prior crimes - M.R.E. 404(b) - Weight of evidence - Comment by judge Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Bridges and Lee, P.JJ., Irving, Myers, Chandler, Griffis and Barnes, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-16-2003 Appealed from: Leake County Circuit Court Judge: Vernon Cotten Disposition: CONVICTED OF CONSPIRACY AND SENTENCED TO FIVE YEARS EACH TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE SENTENCES APPELLANTS ARE CURRENTLY SERVING IN THE MDOC Case Number: 02-CR-092-LE-C |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Steven Farris and Thomas Frederick |
EDMUND J. PHILLIPS, JR. |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DEIRDRE MCCRORY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Conspiracy to facilitate escape - Admission of evidence - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 402 - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(c) - Best evidence rule - M.R.E. 1002 - Lay opinion testimony - M.R.E. 701 - Cross-examination - Jury deliberations - Prior crimes - M.R.E. 404(b) - Weight of evidence - Comment by judge |
| Summary of the Facts: | Steven Farris and Thomas Frederick were convicted for having conspired to secrete into a correctional facility an instrument useful to facilitating an escape. They appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Evidentiary rulings Farris and Frederick argue that the court made a number of evidentiary rulings in error during the course of the trial. They argue that the court erred in admitting a letter to Farris because it made no reference, either express or implied, to the crimes charged. The critical fact at issue during the prosecution was whether Farris was engaged in a conspiracy. The letter referenced Farris's nickname; the letter was from the same person who had written a letter with bomb-making instructions; and there was a short time frame between the two letters. The letter was evidence having a tendency to make the existence of that fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would have been without the evidence. Therefore, the court's decision to admit the letter into evidence was proper under M.R.E. 401 and 402. Farris and Frederick also argue that the prison warden's testimony regarding the bomb-making letter was inadmissible because it was hearsay and not the best evidence. The record shows that the significance of the letter was simply that a statement was made about a criminal act and there was no issue regarding the truth of that asserted matter in the trial court. Therefore, it was not hearsay under M.R.E. 801(c). With regard to their best evidence argument, M.R.E. 1002, the Best Evidence Rule, is implicated only when attempting to prove the contents of a writing. It is not implicated here because the contents of the letter were not at issue in the trial court. Farris and Frederick argue that the court erred in allowing testimony from a warden regarding a telephone conversation between Farris and a woman, because nothing was said in the telephone conversation to identify the woman to whom Farris was speaking at the time. The Comment to M.R.E. 701 provides that the rules of evidence favor lay witness opinion testimony when the witness has first-hand knowledge or observation, and the witness's opinion is helpful in resolving the issues. The warden had first-hand knowledge of the telephone conversation as it was electronically recorded at the prison and then transcribed into a transcript which he had read prior to trial. Furthermore, the identity of the parties to the telephone call was a fact at issue for the conspiracy prosecution, and the testimony would have been helpful to the jury in resolving that issue. Issue 2: Cross-examination Farris and Frederick argue that the court erred in allowing the State to exceed the scope of cross-examination during their redirect examination of the warden. The record shows that after the court overruled the defense objection, the court allowed each defense counsel another opportunity to cross-examine the warden regarding the letter. In addition, Farris and Frederick have failed to demonstrate how they were prejudiced by the court's ruling. Issue 3: Jury deliberations Farris and Frederick argue that the court erred in allowing several transcripts of telephone conversations between the defendants to be taken into the jury room during the deliberations. If the transcripts have been admitted into evidence, the jury may take them, along with all other exhibits, into the jury room when they retire to deliberate. In addition, admission of a recording and a transcript of a recording by a trial court is proper so long as the court instructs the jury that the tape is the primary evidence and any conflicts should fall in favor of the recording, which the court did in this case. Issue 4: Prior crimes The indictment specifically stated that Farris was incarcerated for murder. Farris and Frederick argue that there was no requirement for the indictment to recite the specific crime or for the court to read aloud to the jury that Farris had been convicted of murder. The record shows that not only did defense counsel fail to object, but also during voir dire, Frederick's counsel repeated to the venire that Farris was incarcerated for murder. In addition, the statute under which Farris and Frederick were indicted required proof of an underlying conviction, and the judge instructed the jury that their decision was not to be based on prior criminal activity. M.R.E. 404(b) provides that evidence of prior crimes may be admissible to show motive and intent. Farris's life sentence for murder was relevant and probative as to the issue of his motive and intent to conspire to facilitate his escape. Issue 5: Weight of evidence Farris and Frederick argue that the weight of the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, because the alleged conspiracy had not yet ripened into a criminal act. However, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is not required to show that the offense is complete. Accepting as true the evidence which supports the verdict, the record reflects that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable, hypothetical juror to infer an agreement between the defendants, based on their acts and conduct, to enter into a common plan to further the common scheme of conveying articles useful for escape to felons. Issue 6: Comment by judge Frederick argues that he was denied a fair trial because the judge misstated to the venire the universally accepted standard that the presumption of innocence remains with the defendant until he has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The record shows that the State appropriately bore the burden of proof and offered sufficient, credible evidence as to each element of the offenses charged, and the court properly instructed the jury, prior to their deliberations, on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. |
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