Riddick v. Riddick
| Docket Number: | 2003-CA-00323-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-14-2004 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part, and reversed and remanded in part on direct appeal and affirmed on cross-appeal. |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contempt - Child support - Section 43-19-101 - Marital dissolution agreement - College expenses - Morals clause - Transportation - Attorney’s fees - Mortgage payments Non Participating Judge(s): Irving, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-23-2003 Appealed from: Rankin County Chancery Court Judge: William H. Singletary Disposition: INCREASED HUSBAND’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION FROM $1,000 PER MONTH TO $1,250 PER MONTH; ORDERED HUSBAND TO PAY FULL CHILD SUPPORT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE CHILDREN ARE IN COLLEGE; DECLINED TO HOLD WIFE IN CONTEMPT FOR ALLEGEDLY ALIENATING CHILDREN FROM HUSBAND; DECLINED TO HOLD WIFE IN CONTEMPT FOR ALLOWING BOYFRIEND TO SPEND THE NIGHT WITH WIFE, IN TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT; HELD HUSBAND IN CONTEMPT FOR REFUSING TO PAY COLLEGE TUITION; ORDERED HUSBAND TO PAY WIFE’S ATTORNEY’S FEES, IN PART; AFFIRMED AGREEMENT BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE ALLOWING HUSBAND’S MORTGAGE PAYMENTS ON MARITAL HOME TO CEASE UPON WIFE’S REMARRIAGE Case Number: 45,297 |
|
| Note: | As to Issues I, II, III, IV and V, Chandler, J., for the Court: Bridges and Lee, P.JJ., Myers, Griffis, Barnes and Ishee, JJ., concur. King, C.J., concurs in result only. As to Issue VI, Chandler, J., for the Court: Bridges, P.J., Myers and Barnes, JJ., concur. King, C.J., concurs in result only. Griffis, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by Lee, P.J., and Ishee, J. As to Issue VII pertaining to the award of attorney's fees at trial, Chandler, J., for the Court: Bridges and Lee, P.JJ., Myers, Griffis, Barnes and Ishee, JJ., concur. King, C.J., concurs in result only. As to Issue VII pertaining to appellee's motion for attorney's fees on appeal, Griffis, J., for the Court: Lee, P.J., Barnes and Ishee, JJ., concur. King, C.J., concurs in result only. Chandler, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by Bridges, P.J., and Myers, J. As to Cross-Appeal, Chandler, J., for the Court: Bridges and Lee, P.JJ., Myers, Griffis, Barnes and Ishee, JJ., concur. King, C.J., not participating. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Roger Cole Riddick |
|||
| Appellee: | Patricia Waddell Riddick |
|
||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Contempt - Child support - Section 43-19-101 - Marital dissolution agreement - College expenses - Morals clause - Transportation - Attorney’s fees - Mortgage payments |
| Summary of the Facts: | Patricia Koestler filed a motion to increase child support payments. She also sought to invalidate the part of her marital dissolution agreement that reduced child support payments when the children began college as well as the portion of the agreement which allowed her former husband to cease making mortgage payments on the former marital home upon her remarriage. She charged her former husband with contempt for refusing to pay medical bills and refusing to pay their daughter’s college tuition and asked the court to order her former husband to make the car payments on their daughter’s car. Her former husband, Roger Riddick, counter-claimed, seeking to hold Patricia in contempt for alienating their children from him and for violating the morals clause of their marital dissolution agreement. He also sought custody of their minor children. The chancellor granted Patricia’s motion to increase child support payments, held that the agreement for Roger to pay reduced child support was void against public policy, ordered Roger to make the automobile payments on their daughter’s car, and held Roger in contempt for not paying the daughter’s tuition but declined to hold him in contempt for not paying the medical bills. The chancellor denied Roger’s counterclaim. Roger appeals, and Patricia cross-appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Child support The chancellor ordered a twenty-five percent increase in Roger’s child support payments, from $1,000 per month to $1,250 per month, per child. Roger argues that the court erred in considering only his increased income and the increased needs of the children when deciding to award increased child support. Although a chancellor is not required to consider every conceivable element in deciding to adjust child support, the modification of support shall not be taken lightly. The agreement can be modified only if a party can show a substantial or material change in the circumstances of one or more of the interested parties: the father, the mother, and the children, arising subsequent to the entry of the decree to be modified. Patricia argues that the increase in child support is justified because it is within the child support guidelines of section 43-19-101. However, these child support guidelines ask the court to consider the parent’s adjusted gross income, rather than his net income. Since Roger’s gross income increased only slightly, his modest increase in adjusted gross income does not justify a twenty-five percent increase in child support payments. Patricia has not documented any of the increased expenses. General allegations of increased needs or expenses will not suffice. The evidence also shows that most of Patricia’s expenses actually decreased between the final decree of divorce and the hearing before the chancellor. Some of Patricia’s other bills did increase, but they are expenses which cannot be used in adjusting child support. Therefore, Roger’s obligation of $1,000 per month, per child, is reinstated, and the excess payments he made will apply to his future monthly child support obligations. Issue 2: Marital dissolution agreement The chancellor held that the provision in the marital dissolution agreement concerning college for the children was invalid. The chancellor’s characterization of Roger’s reduced obligations as an attempt by Roger to contract away his obligation to support his daughter was manifest error. Roger agreed to pay for her college expenses, including full expenses for her room and board. Any reduction in child support would therefore not adversely affect her. It is also noteworthy that Roger is not relieved of paying the full amount of his child support during any month that either child is not enrolled in college. Roger pays generous child support payments to Patricia each month. These payments are inconsistent with a chancellor’s finding that Roger attempted to contract away his obligations to support his children. Issue 3: Contempt Roger argues that through Patricia’s actions, she has attempted to eliminate any significant parental rule, influence, or guidance from Roger and to injure the children’s opinion of Roger. Even though Patricia clearly has much disdain for her ex-husband, and this disdain influences the children’s opinions of Roger, the chancellor was within his discretion to decide not to hold Patricia in contempt. There was testimony showing that Patricia actually encouraged her daughter to cultivate a relationship with her father. The evidence also shows that Patricia has done nothing to alienate her son from his father. Issue 4: Morals clause In the marital dissolution agreement, the parties contractually agreed to a morals clause. Roger argues that Patricia violated the morals clause by allowing her boyfriend to stay overnight while both children were present. A chancellor does not have to hold a party in contempt even if he or she technically violated the law. Since Patricia is now married and is not currently violating the morals clause, there is no legitimate purpose of finding Patricia in contempt. In addition, the evidence shows that Roger was also in violation of the morals clause. No person as a complaining party can have the aid of a court of equity when his conduct with respect to the transaction in question has been characterized by wilful inequity. Issue 5: College expenses In their marital dissolution agreement, Roger agreed to pay the educational expenses for his children. Roger argues that the court erred in finding him in contempt for refusing to pay for expenses incurred by his daughter. A citation of contempt is proper only when the contemnor has willfully and deliberately ignored an order of the court. The evidence does not show any willful refusals of Roger to comply with his agreement to pay college expenses. Therefore, the chancellor’s decision to hold Roger in contempt was manifestly erroneous. Issue 6: Transportation In the marital dissolution agreement, Roger is obligated to provide reasonable means of transportation to the child while in college. Roger agreed to pay for a 2000 Oldsmobile Alero for his daughter provided that she comply with certain conditions. Based on her failure to live up to the agreement, Roger sent the payment booklet back to his daughter, and she began paying the car note. The chancellor nullified this agreement and ordered Roger to make the payments on the Alero. Roger argues it is error for the chancellor to require him to provide a specific vehicle and to make payments on that vehicle. While the chancellor is correct in stating that Roger is not allowed to contract away his obligation to provide transportation for his daughter, an order requiring Roger to make payments on a specific car goes beyond the terms of the marital dissolution agreement. This issue is remanded for a determination as to whether another car is sufficiently safe for the daughter to drive. Issue 7: Attorney’s fees Roger argues that the court erred in awarding Patricia attorney’s fees. The evidence supports the chancellor’s finding that Patricia is unable to pay her attorney’s fees. At the time of the hearing, Patricia’s adjusted gross income, excluding child support payments, was $1,258.86 per month. She did not work during most of the period of her marriage to Roger, and at age forty-four, her employment opportunities are relatively limited. Patricia requests an award of attorney’s fee for this appeal. The award of $12,500 for attorney's fees to Patricia was sufficient to compensate her attorneys for this appeal. Issue 8: Mortgage payments The chancellor held that Roger’s obligation to make the mortgage payments on the former marital home is a non-modifiable property settlement pursuant to the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Patricia argues this is error because the payment of the house note was intended to be a form of child support for the minor children. However, the parties’ agreement on the division of real property is outlined in part III of the marital dissolution agreement, whereas the parties’ agreement on child support is outlined in part VI of the marital dissolution agreement. After the marital home is sold and the mortgage is paid in full, there remains no obligation to pay the mortgage because the debt has been extinguished. Roger’s obligation to pay the mortgage ended when the marital home was sold. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
