Bailey v. State


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Docket Number: 2010-KA-00366-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-26-2012
Opinion Author: Presiding Justice Carlson
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Murder - Self-defense jury instructions - Exclusion of statement - M.R.E. 804(b)(3) - M.R.E. 402 - M.R.E. 802 - Peremptory challenges - Right to speedy trial - Right to fair trial - Recusal of judge
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Randolph, Lamar, Chandler, Pierce and King, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Dickinson, P.J.
Dissent Joined By : Kitchens, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-10-2009
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: W. Swan Yerger
Disposition: Convicted of deliberate-design murder and was sentenced to life in prison.
District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith
Case Number: 02-0-7170

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Deric Bailey




OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENDER: VIRGINIA LYNN WATKINS WILLIAM R. LABARRE ALISON OLIVER KELLY FRANK L. MCWILLIAMS



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BILLY L. GORE  

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Topic: Murder - Self-defense jury instructions - Exclusion of statement - M.R.E. 804(b)(3) - M.R.E. 402 - M.R.E. 802 - Peremptory challenges - Right to speedy trial - Right to fair trial - Recusal of judge

Summary of the Facts: Deric Bailey was convicted of deliberate-design murder and was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Bailey’s conviction and sentence were reversed by the Court of Appeals and the case was remanded for a new trial. At his second trial, Bailey again was convicted of deliberate-design murder and sentenced to life in prison. Bailey appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Jury instructions Bailey argues that the trial judge abused his discretion and deprived Bailey of his right to present his defense theory by denying Bailey’s proposed jury instructions and that the prejudice to the defense was extreme because the judge granted an instruction which required the State to show that Bailey had acted “not in necessary self-defense.” A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. The accused is entitled to a lesser offense instruction only where there is an evidentiary basis in the record therefor. Bailey argues that the decedent had a gun and that he was afraid for his life. However, no evidence was presented at Bailey’s second trial that the victim had a gun. Thus, this issue is without merit. Issue 2: Exclusion of statement Bailey argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by excluding from evidence Bailey’s statement to the police at the time of his arrest and thus denied Bailey the right to present a defense. The statement included an assertion from Bailey that the victim “was aiming a gun in my direction.” When asked why he shot the victim, Bailey responded that it was “out of fear for my own life.” Bailey argues that his statement qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule under M.R.E. 804(b)(3) as a statement against interest. There is no dispute that Bailey was an “unavailable witness” for purposes of the rule, since Bailey invoked his Fifth Amendment right and did not take the stand. Bailey’s statement that he shot the victim “out of fear for [his] own life” was admissible under M.R.E. 402, unless excluded by some other rule of evidence. In this case, the rule that excludes Bailey’s statement is M.R.E. 802, which provides that “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by law.” Rather than exposing him to criminal liability, Bailey’s statement, if true, was his defense to criminal liability. Thus, Rule 804(b)(3) does not apply. Issue 3: Peremptory challenges Bailey argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in not finding that Bailey had presented a prima facie case concerning his Batson challenge and that the judge failed to follow proper procedure once Bailey had made his prima facie showing. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Bailey had failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination. Bailey challenged the State’s striking of two African-American females, yet the majority of the jurors at the time of Bailey’s challenge were African-American females. Bailey also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not accepting the defense’s reason for striking a white male juror. The reasons the defense provide for striking the white male juror were not accepted by the trial judge as valid, race-neutral reasons for striking a juror. The defense seemed to infer from the juror’s response that because he used his guns for reasons other than self-defense, he would not relate to one who uses a gun for that reason. The defense also made the inference that, because the juror was an accountant, he would not be able to view the evidence presented as a whole. This was no more than an inference that was not supported by the questions and responses during voir dire. Issue 4: Speedy trial Bailey argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial. To determine if a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, the court consider length of the delay, reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Bailey was retried on December 7, 2009, a total of 991 days – or two years, eight months, and fifteen days – after the reversal. A delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial. The State claims that the reason for the delay was the confusion as to how a special prosecutor should be appointed. The defense counsel also moved for a ninety-day continuance to refamiliarize itself with the case after it was returned to the circuit court. This portion of the delay would be attributed to Bailey. The State, however, provided no reason for the 658-day delay between the mandate (March 22, 2007) and the district attorney’s recusal (January 9, 2009). Because the State failed to show good cause for the 658-day delay between the mandate and the district attorney’s recusal, this factor weighs in favor of Bailey. Bailey first moved to dismiss the case for failure to provide a speedy trial on October 8, 2009 – 931 days after the mandate was issued. He then filed a written motion asserting the same on October 26, 2009. Prior to October 8, 2009, Bailey made no attempt to demand a speedy trial or move for a dismissal. Because Bailey never demanded a speedy trial and waited 931 days until he moved to dismiss the case for failure to provide a speedy trial, this factor weighs in favor of the State. With regard to prejudice, Bailey is unable to offer any proof that the lost evidence or diminished memories have impaired his ability to mount a defense or have impaired a fair-trial outcome. When considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err by denying Bailey’s motion. Issue 5: Right to fair trial Bailey argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial and a fair and impartial judge because the trial court allowed the Hinds County district attorney to recuse himself for an undisclosed conflict of interest involving a potential witness, but refused to grant defense counsel’s motion to withdraw for a similar conflict of interest. In considering Bailey’s claim, he has failed to overcome the presumption that the trial judge in this case was impartial.


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