Johnson v. State


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Docket Number: 2010-CP-01335-COA
Linked Case(s): 2010-CT-01335-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-17-2012
Opinion Author: Roberts, J.
Holding: Reversed and remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Post-conviction relief - Illegal sentence - Conditional sentence - Section 47-7-34 - Retention of sentencing jurisdiction - Section 47-7-47(2)(a) - Authority to suspend sentence - Revocation hearing
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Carlton and Russell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Fair, J.
Dissenting Author : Barnes, J.
Dissent Joined By : Irving, P.J., and Ishee, J.
Concurs in Result Only: Maxwell, J.
Procedural History: PCR
Nature of the Case: PCR

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 08-26-2010
Appealed from: Forrest County Circuit Court
Judge: Robert Helfrich
Disposition: SUMMARILY DISMISSED MOTION
Case Number: CI090214

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Eldridge Johnson




PRO SE



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: DEIRDRE MCCRORY  

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Topic: Post-conviction relief - Illegal sentence - Conditional sentence - Section 47-7-34 - Retention of sentencing jurisdiction - Section 47-7-47(2)(a) - Authority to suspend sentence - Revocation hearing

Summary of the Facts: Eldridge Johnson pled guilty to false pretense. He was sentenced to ten years. The circuit court also added the following language to Johnson’s order of conviction: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant shall serve two (2) years(s) in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections Intensive Supervision House Arrest Program. Should the Defendant fail to successfully complete the service of said two (2) year(s) in the Intensive House Arrest Program, then this Court directs that the Defendant shall serve the entire ten (10) year sentence with the Mississippi Department of Corrections in the Department’s general population. Should the Defendant successfully complete the service of said two (2) year(s) in the Intensive House Arrest Program, the remaining eight (8) years of his ten (10) year sentence be and the same are hereby suspended pursuant to and in conformity with the Post-Release Supervision set out and authorized in Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-34 (1972), as amended, and Defendant shall be placed on Post-Release Supervision.” Johnson filed a motion to correct/modify sentencing order, arguing that the circuit court impermissibly required that he complete the ISP as a condition of his term of post-release supervision. The court dismissed the motion, and Johnson appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Johnson does not attack the MDOC Classification Committee’s decision to remove him from the ISP. Instead, Johnson attacks the sentence imposed by the circuit court. He argues that the circuit court's sentence was illegally vague and indeterminate. Johnson argues that his re-classification from ISP status to custody status by the MDOC classification hearing officer effectively terminated the circuit court’s eight-year conditional sentence to post-release supervision under section 47-7-34. There are two reasonable but mutually exclusive ways to interpret the circuit court's sentence: (A) at the time the circuit court sentenced Johnson, it sentenced him to ten years with the possibility of later having eight years suspended if the MDOC found that Johnson had satisfactorily completed the ISP; or (B) at the time the circuit court sentenced Johnson, it suspended eight years of Johnson’s ten-year sentence and made Johnson’s successful completion of the ISP one of the conditions of Johnson’s suspended sentence. The uncertainty is based on the circuit court’s conditional suspension of Johnson’s sentence based on the undetermined – at least at the time Johnson was sentenced – outcome of whether he completed two years in the ISP. The circuit court did not retain sentencing authority over Johnson, and even if it had attempted to retain sentencing authority over him, it could have only done so for one year pursuant to section 47-7-47(2)(a). Without retention of sentencing jurisdiction pursuant to section 47-7-47, the circuit court's authority to modify Johnson’s sentence terminated at the expiration of the term of court. Accordingly, the circuit court lacked the authority to defer the question of suspension of part of Johnson’s sentence to a later date past the term of court and conditioned on an event that may or may not occur in the future. Additionally, allowing suspension of Johnson’s sentence after the circuit court no longer had the authority to do so would permit the circuit court to impermissibly attempt to delegate its authority to suspend part of Johnson’s sentence. Circuit courts have exclusive authority regarding the sentencing of individuals who have been convicted of a felony. The circuit court may not delegate its sentencing authority, including the authority to suspend a sentence, to the MDOC. Furthermore, by operation of the circuit court's sentence, Johnson was denied his constitutional rights incident to revocation of a suspended sentence. Johnson has constitutionally protected due-process rights to a hearing before the circuit court prior to the revocation of his suspended sentence. The MDOC effectively revoked Graham's suspended sentence without affording him his due process rights to a revocation hearing and required that he serve his entire ten-year sentence, including the eight-year term that may or may not have been suspended. Based on the circuit court's failure to retain sentencing jurisdiction pursuant to section 47-7-47, its implied attempt to impermissibly delegate its authority to suspend part of Johnson’s ten-year sentence, and the fact that Johnson did not have a revocation hearing, the circuit court's sentence is impermissibly indeterminate.


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