Hemeter Properties, LLC, et al. v. Clark
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-02000-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-02000-COA ; 2010-CT-02000-SCT ; 2010-CT-02000-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-17-2012 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Wills & estates - Property ownership - Illegal condition - Unreasonable restraint on alienation of land - Charitable organization - Mortmain Statute - Bona fide purchaser Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Carlton, Maxwell and Russell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Fair, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes and Roberts, JJ., concur in part and in the result without separate written opinion Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-27-2010 Appealed from: Wayne County Chancery Court Judge: Franklin C. McKenzie, Jr. Disposition: FOUND IN FAVOR IN APPELLEE ON TITLE DISPUTE Case Number: 2008-441 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Hemeter Properties, LLC, Peachtree Properties, LLC, Gardner Clark Family, LLC, TR Clark, LLC, Charles M. Hamilton, James Steven Gardner, Adrian Cody Clark, Franklin D. Hemeter, Jr., Stephanie A. Barefoot and James Scott Hemeter |
JAMES L. QUINN |
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| Appellee: | Reynolds Clark | JOHN L. JEFFRIES J. ROBERT SULLIVAN | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Wills & estates - Property ownership - Illegal condition - Unreasonable restraint on alienation of land - Charitable organization - Mortmain Statute - Bona fide purchaser |
| Summary of the Facts: | Reynolds Clark filed a complaint against Hemeter Properties, LLC; Peachtree Properties, LLC; Gardner Clark Family, LLC; TR Clark, LLC; Charles M. Hamilton; James Steven Gardner; Adrian Cody Clark; Franklin D. Hemeter Jr.; Stephanie A. Barefoot; and James Scott Hemeter (collectively Hemeter) to remove a cloud on the title to royalty interests and proceeds from the production of hydrocarbon from oil wells located on property in Wayne County. Clark asserts the property was conveyed to him through a chain of title originating with the will of Ben Meador. Hemeter argues the property was conveyed to it through a chain of title originating with Ben’s wife, Martha Meador. The chancery court concluded the property’s chain of title favored Clark. Therefore, Clark was deemed the owner of the mineral interests in question. Hemeter appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The parties acknowledged the primary issue at hand involves ownership of a 45% mineral interest, 45% of 1/8 overriding royalty, and 45% of 5916/61667 of 1/8 royalty on property located in the SE 1/4 of NE 1/4 Section 20, Township 8 North, Range 6 West (the property) near Waynesboro. The property originally belonged to the United States Government, but it was granted to Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company (Mobile) in 1853. Mobile eventually conveyed the land to J.G. Meador by deed in 1890. After Meador passed away in 1946, his heirs, including Ben, filed a partition suit in the chancery court asking the court to divide the land and all rights therein. The chancery court awarded Ben all of the land, including all rights to any oil, gas, and other minerals underneath the land. The chancery court also granted Ben and the other heirs the right to an outstanding 1/8 nonparticipating royalty interest with each heir’s share of the interest determined on a person-by-person basis. Ben eventually married Martha. In 1962, Ben died testate. In Ben’s will he left Martha everything he possessed, including the property in question, in a life estate, but the property was to be conveyed to Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home (FFBH) upon Martha’s passing on the condition the property never be sold (the condition). Martha failed to probate Ben’s will. Instead, she wrote letters recorded by her attorney, G.B. Cole, one month prior to her passing in 1973 that granted herself a life estate in the property but upon her death conveyed the property to her brother, Charles Cole IV, through G.B. Five years after Martha died, FFBH offered Ben’s will for probate in the chancery court to prove Ben had left the property in question to FFBH. In August 1978, prior to the chancery court’s review of Ben’s will, FFBH conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to Clark and Robert T. Comerio but reserved all mineral rights. In December 1978, FFBH again conveyed the property by quitclaim deed but eliminated all reservations and gave the land and all mineral rights solely to Clark. Shortly thereafter, the chancery court reviewed Ben’s will and entered an order in 1979, which determined Ben’s intent was to leave the property in question and all mineral rights to Martha in a life estate and to FFBH upon her death. However, the chancery court found the condition violated several Mississippi statutes. Nonetheless, the chancery court concluded the will was valid but for the illegal condition and struck the condition from the will, but allowed FFBH to retain the property pursuant to FFBH’s conveyance within ten years. If FFBH failed to make a proper conveyance of the land within the allotted time, it would be forced to surrender all rights to the property. In February 1979, after the chancery court entered its order in favor of FFBH, Clark obtained a final decree on the property due to FFBH’s December 1978 quitclaim deed in favor of him. Nonetheless, four years later, Charles executed a mineral deed on the property in favor of Nolan Clark. In 1996, Nolan died testate leaving his alleged interests in the property to Hemeter. A series of events then took place between 2006 and the present wherein Hemeter and Clark separately executed various mineral leases with reservations to third parties. Regardless of what transpired after 2006, the central question is which chain of title is valid — the title descending from Ben to FFBH to Clark or the title descending from Martha to Charles to Nolan. Hemeter argues that the chancery court erred because the condition in Ben’s will rendered the will void. It further argues even if the land legally passed to FFBH, it should have been divested within ten years of Ben’s passing or by 1972. As such, Hemeter argues the property legally passed to Martha without restriction, and her conveyance of the property to Charles through G.B. was valid. The chancery court correctly determined in 1979 that the condition in question constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation of land. However, the language used in a single clause or sentence does not control against the purpose and intention as shown by the whole will. The doctrine of equitable approximation provides a means by which courts may give effect to the intention of the testator to the extent the law permits. Furthermore, in the context of testators granting property to charitable organizations, the law of this state recognizes, where the will shows the testator’s general intention that his or her property be applied to a given charitable purpose, the court can and generally must make such supplementary and administrative provisions as may be necessary to effect the testator’s purpose. As such, there is no error in the chancery court’s decision to render the condition void and strike it from the will instead of deeming the will void in its entirety. Hemeter argues that even if the property legally passed to FFBH, the Mortmain Statute required FFBH to divest itself of the property within ten years from the date it legally owned and held the property. The Mortmain Statute was ultimately repealed in 1993. However, it was in effect at all pertinent times prior to and during the chancery court’s analysis in 1979 and was, therefore, considered by the chancery court in its 1979 order. Hemeter argues the Mortmain Statute’s ten-year time frame began to run on the day of Ben’s death — February 16, 1962. Accordingly, Hemeter asserts FFBH’s failure to divest itself of the property by February 16, 1972, eliminated all rights FFBH might have had to the property and caused the property to revert back to Charles through Martha’s 1973 letters of intent. FFBH was required to divest itself of the property by 1983, and its conveyance of the property to Clark in December 1978 would have adhered to the Mortmain Statute’s ten-year provision. Hemeter’s attacks on the chancery court’s 1979 order are without merit. Hemeter also argues that the chancery court erred in its determination that Charles was not a bona fide purchaser of the property. To defeat Ben’s will conveying the property to FFBH and later to Clark, Hemeter must show Charles was a bona fide purchaser, that is, a purchaser for a valuable consideration without actual or constructive notice of the unrecorded option. There is no indication Charles knew of Ben’s will or should have known of Ben’s will at the time the property was conveyed to him by Martha. However, five years later, FFBH offered Ben’s will for probate to prove its ownership of the property. At that time, Charles was on notice that he may not have been the true owner of the property in question. The record further reflects Charles was aware of the chancery court’s ruling in favor of FFBH in 1979 but nonetheless conveyed the property to Nolan in 1983. Furthermore, the record is silent as to any consideration Charles may have paid to Martha for the land. Charles would appear to have simply inherited the land and ignored the chancery court’s original 1979 order confirming title to Clark. Thus, the chancery court was not manifestly wrong in its determination that Charles was not a bona fide purchaser of the property at hand. |
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