Williamson v. Williamson
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00400-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-10-2012 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Division of marital estate - Alimony - Contempt - Sanctions for discovery violations - M.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) - Notice of appeal - M.R.A.P. 3(c) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Maxwell and Russell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Fair, J. Procedural History: Motion for Rehearing Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-27-2010 Appealed from: Tate County Chancery Court Judge: Vicki Cobb Disposition: MARITAL ESTATE DIVIDED; MONTHLY ALIMONY AWARDED TO APPELLEE; APPELLANT HELD IN CONTEMPT, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDED TO APPELLEE Case Number: 09-2-52-(VC) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Wilbur Harold Williamson, Sr. |
BOBBY T. VANCE
JOHN L. BAILEY |
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| Appellee: | Mary Jean (Waddell) Williamson | MALENDA HARRIS MEACHAM JOY W. GRAVES CHARLES E. WINFIELD | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Division of marital estate - Alimony - Contempt - Sanctions for discovery violations - M.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) - Notice of appeal - M.R.A.P. 3(c) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Wilbur Williamson Sr. (Will) and Mary Williamson were granted an irreconcilable differences divorce. At the beginning of the trial, the parties stipulated that they had agreed to a division of their personal property. After hearing testimony from both parties, the chancellor announced an oral ruling, which was memorialized into the divorce decree and filed by the chancery court on February 9, 2010. Both parties then filed motions for reconsideration, which the chancellor denied. Will filed a notice of appeal. While this case was on appeal, Mary filed a petition for contempt, alleging that Will failed to abide by the court’s divorce decree, and she claimed Will owed her $4,824.81. Mary also sought compensation for attorney’s fees and costs incurred in bringing the petition for contempt. Will filed a response alleging, among other things, impossibility to perform and insufficiency of process and service of process. The chancellor held a hearing on the matter, and the chancellor entered an order finding Will in contempt for his failure to abide by the divorce decree and awarding Mary attorney’s fees. The chancellor found that even though Will had paid Mary the sum of $4,824.81 since she filed her petition on April 6, 2010, Mary had still incurred costs in retaining an attorney to bring the action to obtain Will’s compliance with the court’s orders. The chancellor concluded Mary was entitled to compensation for her attorney’s fees. Will appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Division of marital estate Will argues the chancellor erred by (1) failing to consider the value of the personal property divided by the parties pursuant to their agreement; (2) assigning incorrect values to the parties’ “401-K” accounts, using the value date of his 401-K account as the date of trial, but using the value date of Mary’s 401-K account as the date of the filing for the divorce; (3) failing to assign a value to Mary’s occupation and use of the marital home until sold and the additional costs of a separate residence for him; (4) not assigning a value to the parties’ vehicles; (5) not assigning a value to Mary’s First Tennessee Retirement account where Mary stood to receive approximately $300 per month upon reaching age sixty-five; and (6) not giving him credit for the amounts he had paid under the temporary order or the sums ordered to be paid pursuant to the chancellor’s contempt findings prior to the division of the parties’ 401-K accounts. If there are sufficient marital assets which, when equitably divided and considered with each spouse's non-marital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, no more need be done. If the situation is such that an equitable division of marital property, considered with each party's non-marital assets, leaves a deficit for one party, then alimony based on the value of nonmarital assets should be considered. Here, the chancellor considered alimony before completing the equitable division of the property. Even though the chancellor equitably divided the marital home, she used periodic alimony to accomplish such division. Accomplishing the equitable division of the marital property by use of periodic alimony confused the issue of the equitable division of the marital home and the issue of whether, after an equitable division of the marital property, this case warrants alimony. Furthermore, the chancellor ordered a money payment of $594 to Mary to accomplish an equitable division of property, but no sale of the house appears in sight. However, there is no merit to Will’s claim that the chancellor erred by not providing him “credit” for the amounts the chancery court had ordered him to pay pursuant to the court’s contempt findings prior to dividing the parties’ 401-K accounts. As acknowledged by Mary in her appellate brief, the effect of such an interpretation penalizes Mary for paying the amounts the court ordered her to pay under the temporary agreed order from other funds while allowing Will to deplete his 401-K account, thereby reducing the amount available to Mary. Such an application of payments, in terms of practical effect, charges Mary with a portion of the payments and penalties assessed to Will. Issue 2: Alimony Will argues that the chancellor provided insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding her award of alimony to Mary. Will also argues that the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard because the facts of this case fail to support an award of permanent periodic alimony. Again, an award of alimony should only be considered if one party will suffer a deficit after the marital property has been equitably divided. The equitable division of the marital property must be completed prior to determining if either spouse suffers a deficit in the division of the marital estate warranting an award of alimony. Thus, the award of alimony, along with the division of the marital property, is reversed and remanded. Issue 3: Contempt Will argues that the chancellor erred by finding him in contempt and in awarding Mary attorney’s fees. Will claims that he was unable to pay the amounts in the temporary agreed order because the temporary order resulted in his 401-K accounts being frozen by a Qualified Domestic-Relations Order (QDRO) until further order from the court. Will further asserts inability to pay is a defense to a case of contempt. The chancellor did not err in finding Will in contempt of court for his failure to abide by the temporary agreed order and in awarding Mary attorney’s fees for the cost she incurred in bringing the contempt action regarding the temporary order. As acknowledged by the chancellor, the record shows Will admitted to being in contempt of the chancery court’s order for his failure to pay the amounts agreed upon in the temporary agreed order. The record further reveals that even if the court froze Will’s 401-K accounts by the temporary order until further order of the court, testimony presented at trial demonstrated that Will possessed sufficient income to pay Mary the amounts agreed upon in the temporary agreed order when the payments were due. In addition, Will waived his claim of insufficiency of evidence in support of such award by the chancellor because he failed to object timely. As to Will’s argument that the chancellor erred by awarding Mary attorney’s fees for her costs in filing the motion to compel, the chancellor possesses sole discretion as to whether sanctions should be imposed for discovery violations under M.R.C.P. 37(a)(4). The record shows that Will failed to provide complete and timely responses to Mary’s requests for discovery prior to Mary filing her motion to compel. The record also shows that Will provided no adequate reason for his failure to comply. Issue 4: Appeal Will argues that the chancellor erred in finding him in contempt of the divorce decree after he filed his notice of appeal and in awarding attorney’s fees to Mary for costs incurred in bringing the petition for contempt. This issue is not properly before the Court for consideration. M.R.A.P. 3(c) requires the notice of appeal to designate as a whole or in part the judgment or order from which appealed. Will filed his notice of appeal on March 5, 2010, appealing the divorce decree and the chancellor’s order denying his motion for reconsideration. Particularly, Will’s notice of appeal contains no reference to the chancellor’s order finding him in contempt of the divorce decree as required. |
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