Easter v. State


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Docket Number: 2002-KA-01344-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2002-KA-01344-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-06-2004
Opinion Author: Easley, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Sale of cocaine - Comments by judge - Other transactions - M.R.E. 404 (b) - Sufficiency of evidence - Peremptory challenges - Ineffective assistance of counsel
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Carlson, Graves and Dickinson, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Randolph, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-18-2002
Appealed from: Lauderdale County Circuit Court
Judge: Robert Bailey
Disposition: Appellant was found guilty of the sale of cocaine and sentenced as a habitual offender.
District Attorney: Bilbo Mitchell
Case Number: 554-01

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Baron L. Easter




JAMES A. WILLIAMS



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. GLENN WATTS  

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Topic: Sale of cocaine - Comments by judge - Other transactions - M.R.E. 404 (b) - Sufficiency of evidence - Peremptory challenges - Ineffective assistance of counsel

Summary of the Facts: Baron Easter was convicted of the sale of cocaine and was sentenced as a habitual offender to forty years not to be reduced or suspended. Easter appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Comments by judge Easter argues he was denied a fair trial based on comments made by the court during voir dire to "presumption of innocence," the agent’s testimony which supplied an expert opinion without the agent being qualified as an expert, and the confidential informant’s testimony. The judge’s comment during voir dire explaining that “every defendant at this stage of the proceedings are presumed to be innocent until they're convicted by a jury” did not constitute reversible error. With regard to the agent’s testimony, the court did not commit reversible error in allowing him to testify, based on his experience as a narcotics agent for the MBN transactions, that it was not uncommon for there to be use of code to disguise the drug transaction. With regard to the court’s comment during the testimony of the confidential information, "Let's just get on to this transaction, please," the court was only acting to limit testimony to one transaction in question and did not offer a finding that a drug deal had definitely occurred. Easter also argues that the court committed reversible error when it commented on the quality of the tape recording of the telephone conversation. However, the comment did not indicate a leaning toward the State's witness nor was it likely to influence the jury's verdict. Issue 2: Other transactions Easter argues that the court should have granted a mistrial based on the confidential informant's testimony that mentioned other transactions. The court should grant a limiting instruction if M.R.E. 404 (b) evidence is admitted unless the party objecting to the evidence refuses the limiting instruction. Here, the defense refused to allow the court to grant the limiting instruction. In addition, the court immediately sustained the defense’s objection. Issue 3: Sufficiency of evidence Easter argues that the State did not prove that Easter sold cocaine to the agent. Both the agent and the confidential informant identified Easter as the person from whom they purchased the powder cocaine. Easter did not testify or present any witnesses in his behalf. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the sale of cocaine. Issue 4: Peremptory challenges Easter argues that the State's use of its peremptory challenges violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). However, there was no objection to any of the State's peremptory strikes. Failure to object waives this issue on appeal. Issue 5: Ineffective assistance of counsel Easter argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that his attorney, during voir dire, instructed the prospective jury that it would require the jury to find some technicality to find Easter not guilty. However, the question taken as a whole and in the proper context did not instruct the jury as claimed by Easter. He also argues that his attorney lent credibility to the State's case by stating in his first sentence on opening statement that, "Well, Mr. Davis pretty much laid out the facts as I understand them from discovery." Placing the statement in the proper context of the complete opening statement, the attorney clearly does not concede Easter's guilt. The opening statement focused on reasonable doubt and raised possible conflicts and questions in the evidence. Easter also argues that counsel failed to aggressively defend him at trial. However, none of his claims amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Easter also argues that counsel should have requested a pretrial hearing on whether Easter's 2 prior drug convictions could be used for impeachment if he took the stand to testify. However, Easter did not testify at trial so his prior convictions were not introduced to the jury.


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