Lynch v. State
| Docket Number: | 1998-DP-01149-SCT Linked Case(s): 1998-DP-01149-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-27-2004 Opinion Author: Smith, C.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty direct appeal - Two theory instruction - Circumstantial evidence instructions - Section 99-19-101(7) - Aggravating circumstance - Peremptory challenges - Sufficiency of evidence - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(24) - Death penalty Judge(s) Concurring: Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - DEATH PENALTY - DIRECT APPEAL |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-05-1998 Appealed from: Bolivar County Circuit Court Judge: Kenneth L. Thomas Disposition: Convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. District Attorney: Laurence Y. Mellen Case Number: 8338 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Leroy Lynch |
CHERYL ANN WEBSTER
AZKI SHAH |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JUDY T. MARTIN MARVIN L. WHITE, JR |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty direct appeal - Two theory instruction - Circumstantial evidence instructions - Section 99-19-101(7) - Aggravating circumstance - Peremptory challenges - Sufficiency of evidence - Hearsay - M.R.E. 803(24) - Death penalty |
| Summary of the Facts: | Leroy Lynch was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Two theory instruction Lynch argues that the court erred in failing to submit his instruction which is approximately the “two theory” instruction that has been adopted in Mississippi. Not only is the issue waived since the instruction was offered late, but the instruction is not a two-theory instruction. In addition, this is not a purely circumstantial case because Lynch made an admission on a significant element of the offense, i.e., his statement in response to an officer’s question is an admission against interest as to the underlying felony. Issue 2: Circumstantial evidence instructions Lynch argues that the court erred by failing to submit circumstantial evidence language in the sentencing instructions. Not only has Lynch failed to cite any authority for his contention, but circumstantial evidence language is not required in charging the jury as to the requirements of section 99-19-101(7). Issue 3: Aggravating circumstance Lynch argues that there was absolutely no evidence to support the “avoiding or preventing lawful arrest” aggravating factor. If there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to 'cover their tracks' so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. In this case, there is sufficient evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to “cover their tracks” so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities. Issue 4: Peremptory challenges Lynch argues that the jury panel was methodically purged of all African Americans. However, the record shows that there were two jurors who were African American serving on this jury. Lynch also argues that peremptory challenges were improperly exercised against five of the potential jurors. The reasons offered, a juror’s desire to avoid jury service, concern regarding a potential juror’s employment, the prosecutor’s professional difficulties with the potential juror in the past, physical disability, and unemployment, were race-neutral reasons. Issue 5: Sufficiency of evidence Lynch argues that the evidence at trial did not support the verdict, because there are no eyewitnesses and no confessions. Where a defendant is charged with aiding and abetting a felony, the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis that the crime charged was committed by another and that the accused was present, consenting, aiding, and abetting such person in the commission of the crime charged. There is in the record substantial evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions. Issue 6: Hearsay Lynch argues that the court erred in excluding as hearsay portions of his testimony on direct examination. However, Lynch's counsel failed to argue that such testimony was not hearsay nor did he preserve for the record the testimony he was attempting to elicit from Lynch. In addition, the statements Lynch made do not qualify as an exception under M.R.E. 803(24) because they do not possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Issue 7: Death penalty Lynch argues the evidence was insufficient to impose the death penalty. The death penalty cannot be given to an aider and abettor who has not killed, attempted to kill, or contemplated that life would be taken. The record indicates that Lynch provided Scott with the gun used to commit the murder and that he had several opportunities to walk away and discourage the crime while it was in progress. The jury's conclusion that Lynch intended the victim's death and contemplated the use of lethal force is substantiated by the record. In addition, the sentence is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. |
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