Broome v. Broome


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Docket Number: 2010-CA-00300-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-13-2011
Opinion Author: Barnes, J.
Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Modification of alimony - Interest credit - Credit for arrearages
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Roberts and Maxwell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Myers and Ishee, JJ.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Russell, J.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result Joined By 1: Carlton, J.
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-12-2009
Appealed from: Jackson County Chancery Court
Judge: Jaye A. Bradley, Sr.
Disposition: T.C.’S ALIMONY MODIFIED TO $1,500 PER MONTH, RENDERED JUDGMENT FOR ARREARAGE IN THE AMOUNT OF $275,831.35, SHEILA’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DENIED
Case Number: 61,522(JB)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: T. C. Broome




MARK H. WATTS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Sheila Broome WILLIAM T. REED  

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    Topic: Modification of alimony - Interest credit - Credit for arrearages

    Summary of the Facts: For approximately eighteen years, T.C. and Sheila Broome have litigated over the issues of property settlement and alimony. The case has spanned the tenure of three chancellors and included three prior appeals to the Mississippi Supreme Court. This appeal is of the chancellor’s detailed thirty-six page Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of October 12, 2009, which also served as the final judgment. The matters before the chancery court at the time, which relate to much of the case’s lengthy history, were T.C.’s motion for modification of alimony, and Sheila’s motions to strike modification and for sanctions against T.C. for violation of discovery requests. The chancellor ruled T.C. was not barred by the doctrine of unclean hands and granted his motion to modify alimony, decreasing his alimony payment to Shelia from $3,000 to $1,500 per month. T.C. was also ordered to pay the arrearages for alimony that had accumulated from the date of the motion to this final judgment, or ninety-two months. T.C. also had to rectify the arrearages on pre-modification alimony and prior judgments, plus interest. Finally, Sheila’s motion for sanctions was denied. T.C. appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Alimony T.C. claims he was never able to pay the amount of alimony awarded. He now argues the chancellor erred in merely decreasing his alimony from $3,000 per month to $1,500 per month; instead, T.C. contends the chancellor should have terminated his alimony obligation due to T.C.’s inability to pay. Periodic alimony is subject to modification by increasing, decreasing, or terminating the award due to a material change in circumstances. The material change must not be anticipated at the time of the original decree. Downward modification of alimony was found appropriate by the chancellor due to T.C.’s material change in circumstances. The chancellor found T.C.’s standard of living dramatically decreased over the years since the divorce decree due to his poor health and advanced age. At the time of the divorce, T.C. was earning between $100,000 to $150,000 annually through his business; however, in 2002 he sold his business and retired due to his health. Yet, because of T.C.’s bad-faith dealings with Sheila in the past, the chancellor did not completely eliminate T.C.’s alimony obligation. The chancellor noted that a financial disparity remains between the parties, with Sheila still in a worse financial position than T.C. and nearing retirement age. The chancellor carefully considered the parties’ financial and other material changes over the years and fully analyzed each of the Armstrong factors. Further, the record fully supports the chancellor’s decision. Issue 2: Interest credit T.C. argues that when the chancellor calculated the amount T.C. was in arrearage on various judgments and alimony payments, she did not properly credit him with interest on his $165,140 payment to Sheila for various marital assets. He states the payment satisfied Sheila’s thirty-percent interest in Broome Construction, the M&W settlement, and the Merrill Lynch account. T.C. claims the amount of interest that accumulated from June 1995, when he paid Sheila $165,140, until June 30, 2000, when the chancery court accepted Special Master Sheffield’s valuation of the company of $962,000, amounted to $77,858.65. T.C. claims he should be credited this “award of interest” toward any outstanding arrearage. However, this argument is misplaced. T.C.’s credit for interest merely offset the accrual of interest to Sheila on her share of the business. Sheila would, therefore, have been entitled to $35,580 plus interest on that amount but for the agreed order. It is only because of the agreed order executed by both parties that Sheila is not entitled to interest on the $35,580. Even if T.C. had been entitled to any credit for interest on the amount he paid, the agreed order would have barred his claim, the same as it barred Sheila’s. The agreed order expressly stated that upon payment of $35,580 by T.C. to Sheila, all issues surrounding her share of the business would be resolved. Because the agreed order did not reference any interest that had or would accrue, the chancellor, in her final judgment, found the issue of interest was eliminated by agreement of the parties. Issue 3: Credit for arrearages T.C. argues that his payment of $319,339.06 in March 2002 satisfied all alimony arrearages and outstanding judgments that existed at the time. T.C. also argues that he should have received credit for two garnishments in 1996 which resulted in the release of funds totaling $13,050. Finally, T.C. argues that his payment of child support after the children were emancipated, totaling $40,000, should be credited to his alimony arrearages. A court cannot give relief from civil liability for any payments that have already accrued. A payment vests and becomes a judgment against the payor. Past-due payments of alimony bear interest from the date each became due by prior decree. There is one error in the chancellor’s computations. In her findings of fact, the chancellor found a total of $295,841.11 due as of February 2001. This number is comprised of “$267,735.58 (in alimony and interest) and $28,105.53 (remaining Judgment balance).” In her conclusions of law, however, in calculating the amount of T.C.’s arrearages, the chancellor stated: “As of February 18, 2001, $26,339.06 remained on the Judgments and $294,074.64 remained on the alimony.” The chancellor had, however, already included the $26,339.06 “remaining in Judgments” to obtain the $294,074.64 figure. The amount of “alimony and interest” as of February 2001 was found to be only $267,735.58. The chancellor included the $26,339.06 twice in her calculations. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the chancery court for calculation of this amount and correction of the $2,050.70 error in favor of T.C. previously identified. It was not until December 2000 that T.C. agreed to pay Sheila the $35,580 to resolve the issue surrounding her share of the business. There was, therefore, a valid order dated June 16, 1995, requiring T.C. to pay alimony in the amount of $3,000 per month. Interest could run on the nonpayment of the alimony from and after the date each payment was due. T.C. argues he should receive credit for two garnishments issued in 1996. The reason these two payments were not credited in the chancellor’s findings is because these funds went toward the payment of Sheila’s attorney’s fees and appeal costs related to the initial trial, as awarded in prior judgments. This fact is plainly stated in the August 1997 order. T.C. argues that $40,000 in child support payments should be credited toward his alimony arrearages. Absent an agreement to the contrary, a parent is not required to provide for the care and maintenance of his child after that child reaches the age of majority. In her findings of fact, the chancellor stated that T.C. had presented no evidence of these added child-support payments, and even if he had, there was no evidence Sheila had agreed to accept these payments as partial payment of alimony. Once T.C.’s daughter turned twenty-one years old, under the original order of child support in the divorce decree of June 1995 ($500 per month per child), child support should have been reduced by $500. If T.C. did continue to pay $1,000 per month for child support, he is correct that he should be credited for the amount of his overpayments. There is documentation that T.C. continued to pay this child-support amount at least from September 2001 until January 2002. T.C. would be entitled to a credit against his alimony obligations for this period of time. T.C. also claims that once his son reached eighteen years of age, his payments of $500 per month child support terminated, because his son discontinued full-time enrollment in school and entered the work force in January 2003. Sheila’s testimony is, however, that T.C. made no payments of any nature after March 2002. Taking Sheila’s testimony as true, as the chancellor apparently did, any credit to which T.C. would have been entitled by virtue of his payment of an extra $500 per month from September 2001 until January 2002 would be more than offset by the amount he owed Sheila in child support for their son, even if the son were emancipated in January 2003. Thus, there is no error in the chancery court’s refusal to give T.C. credit for “extra” child support paid.


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