Clark v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., et al.
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00554-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-TS-00554-SCT ; 2009-CT-00554-SCT ; 2009-CA-00554-COA ; 2009-CT-00554-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-13-2011 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Motion for JNOV - Sufficiency of evidence - Jury observation of truck - Section 13-5-91 - Jury verdict sheets - Expert witness discovery - M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) - Closing argument Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Roberts, Carlton, Maxwell and Russell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Myers, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-21-2008 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Winston Kidd Disposition: JURY VERDICT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES Case Number: 251-01-1486CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Nancy Clark, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Shenandoah H. Clark, Deceased and Christie Clark |
HUNTER W. LUNDY
KRISTIE M. HIGHTOWER
WAYNE E. FERRELL JR.
J. ASHLEY OGDEN |
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| Appellee: | Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., Toyota Motor Co. Ltd., Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc. and Roper Toyota, Inc. | DAVID L. AYERS J. COLLINS WOHNER JR. JIMMY B. WILKINS JENNIFER A. ROGERS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Motion for JNOV - Sufficiency of evidence - Jury observation of truck - Section 13-5-91 - Jury verdict sheets - Expert witness discovery - M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) - Closing argument |
| Summary of the Facts: | Shenandoah Clark got behind the wheel of his friend’s 2000 Toyota Tundra TRD truck in Tupelo to drive them to a casino out of town. While driving, Clark crashed the truck. Thereafter, Clark suffered severe spinal injuries, causing him to become a quadriplegic. Clark and his then-wife, Christie Johnston Clark, sued Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., Toyota Motor Co. Ltd., Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc., and Roper Toyota, Inc. in Hinds County Circuit Court, claiming the truck was defective. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Toyota. Clark and Christie appeal. Toyota filed a counter-appeal claiming that Hinds County was not a proper venue and that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of Clark’s drinking and intoxication on the night of the incident. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion for JNOV Clark’s estate argues the motion for a JNOV or, alternatively, a new trial should have been granted due to numerous alleged errors made by the circuit court, including: allowing jurors to view Toyota’s exemplar truck, submitting jury-verdict sheets to the jury without the modified language requested by Clark’s counsel, refusing to strike Toyota’s expert witness’s testimony, and refusing to allow Clark to present a rebuttal expert witness. Clark’s estate also argues that Toyota’s closing remarks prejudiced the jury enough to require a JNOV or a new trial. The jury listened to arguments, heard testimony, and reviewed evidence submitted by both parties for two weeks before arriving at their verdict. Certainly, the parties’ versions of why Clark’s injuries occurred were markedly different. However, Clark’s negligence in steering the truck off of the road, up an embankment, and into the air initiated a series of radical events that were not within the expansive range of accidents against which any safety features could have protected Clark. Both during Clark’s case-in-chief and Toyota’s case-in-chief, Toyota provided witness testimony, documents, and various other types of evidence to contradict Clark’s case. Accordingly, the jury was privy to substantial evidence contesting Clark’s claim. The determination of whether or not the truck was defective and, if so, whether the defect caused Clark’s injuries was, by nature, a fact-intensive analysis. It is well settled that conclusions as to facts are within the sole discretion of the jury. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence warranted the circuit court’s denial of Clark’s motion for a JNOV or, alternatively, a new trial. Issue 2: Jury observation of truck During the trial, the circuit judge allowed the jury to observe the truck and an undamaged similar truck, an “exemplar,” at the street curb outside of the courtroom. Clark’s estate argues it was reversible error for the circuit court to have allowed the jurors and attorneys to observe the vehicles while unattended by the judge and other court personnel. Section 13-5-91 grants a circuit judge discretionary authority to allow parties and jurors the right to view or inspect property outside of the courtroom. The statute clearly provides that the entire court, including the judge, clerk, sheriff, and deputy sheriffs, “shall proceed, in a body” to the location of the property. As such, it was error for the circuit court to have refrained from accompanying the jurors, attorneys, and bailiffs and for the circuit court to fail to order that a witness be present to “point out and explain to the court and the jury” what they were viewing. However, no one was allowed to comment while viewing the vehicles. Because no one was permitted to discuss the vehicles while the viewing took place, there was no risk of the jurors becoming prejudiced against one party or the other. Thus, the error was harmless. Issue 3: Jury verdict sheets Clark’s estate argues the jury was confused by the omission of the adjective “enhanced” to describe Clark’s injuries in the jury verdict sheets and that the failure to include the word “enhanced” on the jury verdict sheets improperly caused the jury to believe that Toyota’s negligence was an “all-or-nothing determination,” compounded by the fact that Clark’s counsel indicated Clark knew he was responsible for the truck leaving the highway on the night of the accident. While Clark’s estate complains it petitioned the circuit court to change the language in the jury-verdict sheets to no avail, the record reflects that the jury-verdict sheets were created and tendered by Clark’s counsel at the objection of Toyota. Had Clark wished to include the word “enhanced,” there was ample opportunity to provide for such before offering the jury-verdict sheets to the circuit court. Additionally, the failure of the circuit court to add the word “enhanced” to describe Clark’s injuries on two special verdict sheets was erroneous. The jury-verdict sheets were explicitly clear that the jurors were to determine whether Toyota was liable in any way for Clark’s injuries. The mere addition of the word “enhanced” when describing Clark’s injuries would have made no further clarification as to Toyota’s potential negligence. Issue 4: Expert witness Clark’s counsel filed a motion in limine to strike the testimony and challenge the admission of Toyota’s expert accident reconstructionist, Carr. Clark’s counsel alleged Carr failed to respond to certain questions asked of him and Carr’s opinion on accident reconstruction was inaccurate, speculative, and unreliable. M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) governs expert-witness discovery. The circuit judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing Carr to testify. Carr’s tests and methodologies were provided to Clark well in advance of trial and within the allotted time frame. Clark had more than enough time to question Carr thoroughly as to the science behind his tests and gather information to contest Carr’s claims at trial. Furthermore, after a thorough review of the record, it is evident that Carr was qualified to testify as to the accident in question and the truck’s performance in the accident. Issue 5: Closing argument Prior to the start of the trial, Clark filed a motion in limine to exclude all evidence and any mention of Clark’s use of alcohol and subsequent DUI charge on the night of the accident. No mention of Clark’s use of alcohol was made during the trial. However, facts such as Clark’s decision to drive to Tunica, Mississippi, late at night, and Clark’s driving the vehicle off of the road were acknowledged by both parties and pointed out to the jury. Later, in closing arguments, Toyota’s counsel made reference to Clark’s “bad choices,” “bad decisions,” and “bad judgment.” Clark’s estate argues that during closing argument, opposing counsel intentionally drew the jury’s attention to aspects of the case that would suggest the use of alcohol and inferred alcohol was involved. However, the statements made by Toyota that Clark alleges made an inference to his alcohol use were well within the scope of permissible subject matter for a closing argument. The facts that Clark attended a pool hall with friends and then drove, late at night and while speeding, to another town are just that — facts. Furthermore, Toyota’s counsel immediately explained his reference to Clark’s “bad decisions.” He reminded the jury that it was Clark’s negligence, not Toyota’s, that drove the truck off the road and ultimately crashed it into the field. To restrict Toyota from mentioning Clark’s “bad choice” to drive the truck off of the road would have been manifest error on the part of the circuit judge, as it was an essential element of Toyota’s defense. |
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