City of Jackson v. Thornton
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00910-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00910-COA ; 2010-CT-00910-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-06-2011 Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Reckless disregard - Section 11-46-9(1)(c) - Police chase - Apportionment - Proximate causation - Damages Judge(s) Concurring: Irving, P.J., Barnes, Roberts, Maxwell and Russell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Myers, J. Dissenting Author : Ishee, J. Dissent Joined By : Lee, C.J., and Carlton, J. Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-05-2010 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: $300,000 JUDGMENT AWARDED IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE Case Number: 251-06-626CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | City of Jackson, Mississippi |
PIETER TEEUWISSEN
CLAIRE BARKER HAWKINS |
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| Appellee: | Basil Thornton | J. CHRISTOPHER KLOTZ | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Reckless disregard - Section 11-46-9(1)(c) - Police chase - Apportionment - Proximate causation - Damages |
| Summary of the Facts: | Isaiah Robertson, a minor, stole a Ford Expedition sports-utility vehicle belonging to Michael Fowler. After a high-speed chase between officers with the Jackson Police Department and Robertson, Robertson collided with Kewania Lewis and Basil Thornton. Thornton suffered numerous injuries and filed suit against the City of Jackson for the JPD officers’ actions. The circuit judge issued a lengthy order that awarded $300,000 to Thornton and apportioned 80% liability to the City and 20% liability to Robertson. The City appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Reckless disregard In order for a municipality to waive governmental immunity from suit under section 11-46-9(1)(c), the state actor in question or its employee must be found to have acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. Factors that must be considered in determining whether a police chase constitutes reckless disregard include length of chase, type of neighborhood, characteristics of the streets, the presence of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, weather conditions and visibility, the seriousness of the offense for which the police are pursuing the vehicle, whether the officer proceeded with sirens and blue lights, whether the officer had available alternatives which would lead to the apprehension of the suspect besides pursuit, existence of a police policy which prohibits pursuit under the circumstances, and rate of speed of the officer in comparison to the posted speed limit. The record shows the chase at hand lasted approximately five minutes. The circuit court also noted that the pursuit spanned approximately four and one-half miles. While overall there was a mix of commercial and residential areas, Robertson and the pursuing officers sped by “residences, a church daycare and a Head Start program[,] . . . A residential neighborhood [that] contained narrow streets which were in generally poor condition[,] . . . The main entrance to Tougaloo College,” as well as numerous medical-care facilities. The circuit court reiterated the JPD officers’ view of Robertson was blocked or hindered in numerous locations due to “rises in the streets and also railroad embankments.” The record shows the chase occurred at approximately 8:30 a.m. on a weekday during the school year, such that children were present in the school and daycare surrounding the area. The weather on the day of the incident, December 15, 2004, was “real cold and cloudy,” and visibility was good. There is no indication in the record that Robertson displayed or possessed any type of weapon at any point during the incident. The circuit court noted the JPD officers maintained their emergency lights and sirens before, during, and after the crash. In its opinion, the circuit court questioned whether the JPD officers knew the suspect’s identity and if apprehension would have been feasible at a later date. JPD officers have a duty to report any unsafe driving conduct of the suspect. This was not done in the present case. Witnesses to the chase testified that Robertson was traveling at least fifty-five miles per hour in a forty-mile-per-hour speed zone, where he passed a daycare, a church, and numerous residences. Officer Talton testified that Robertson never exceeded three car lengths in front of the JPD officers at any time during the chase. As such, the JPD officers were traveling at speeds anywhere from fifty-five miles per hour up to eighty miles per hour in forty-mile-per-hour speed zones. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court did not err in its determination that the JPD officers had acted with reckless disregard. Issue 2: Apportionment Robertson clearly ran a red traffic light after being followed by Officer Talton. The high-speed chase that occurred thereafter would not have continued but for the JPD officers’ pursuit of Robertson. The resulting crash, and therefore Thornton’s injuries, would not have taken place if Robertson were not attempting to escape from the JPD officers. The injuries Thornton suffered are within the category of those the JPD officers should have reasonably anticipated to have occurred due to their negligence. Accordingly, the City was a proximate cause of Thornton’s injuries resulting from the crash. The City argues the circuit court failed to allocate fault to Lewis as prescribed by law. While the circuit court did not specifically state that Lewis had 0% liability, there is no ambiguity in the circuit court’s order that Lewis was not to be apportioned any percentage of fault. The court did not err in finding that Lewis “acted reasonably under the circumstances.” The circuit court apportioned 20% of the damages to Robertson. However, there was not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s final assessment of fault at 80% to the City and 20% to Robertson, the thief and driver of the stolen vehicle. Robertson was “the” proximate cause of the accident and Thornton’s damages. He stole the car, he ran from the police, he ran the red light, and he crashed into Lewis and Thornton. There can be no doubt that Robertson was the primary tortfeasor. The City was a substantial contributing cause to the accident, and as a result, it should be assessed a percentage of damages through the allocation of fault. However, the City was not “the proximate cause” of the accident. But for Robertson’s driving, the accident would not have occurred. The evidence does not support an apportionment of a greater percentage of fault to the City than to the criminal who actually made the decision to drive the vehicle through the red light and collide with other vehicles, which ultimately caused the injuries and damages to Thornton. Thus, the case is remanded for a new trial on the apportionment of damages. Issue 3: Damages The City argues the circuit court erred in its finding of damages, and the amount of damages awarded is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. A plaintiff will be allowed to recover for all injuries and damages reasonably expected to result from automobile accidents. It is clear from Thornton’s testimony that his life changed dramatically after the crash. Thornton’s wife also testified about Thornton’s physical and emotional difficulties following the crash. It is undeniable that Thornton experienced, and continues to experience, significant and debilitating pain and suffering both physically and emotionally. Thornton’s economic losses alone totaled over $76,000. Thus, the circuit court’s calculation of damages was not erroneous. |
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