Williams v. State


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Docket Number: 2010-KP-00859-COA
Linked Case(s): 2010-KP-00859-COA ; 2010-CT-00859-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-06-2011
Opinion Author: Roberts, J.
Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Capital murder, Armed robbery, & Theft of motor vehicle - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Defective indictment - Double jeopardy - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-3-19(2)(e) - Jury instructions - Sentencing - Section 47-7-3(1)(f)
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Carlton, Maxwell and Russell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Myers, J.
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 01-26-2010
Appealed from: Lauderdale County Circuit Court
Judge: Robert Bailey
Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, ARMED ROBBERY, AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS; COUNT II, CAPITAL MURDER, AND SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCE IN COUNT II; AND COUNT III, THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, AND SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCES IN COUNTS I AND II, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
District Attorney: Bilbo Mitchell
Case Number: 664-08

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Derrick T. Williams




PRO SE



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND  

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Topic: Capital murder, Armed robbery, & Theft of motor vehicle - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Defective indictment - Double jeopardy - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-3-19(2)(e) - Jury instructions - Sentencing - Section 47-7-3(1)(f)

Summary of the Facts: Derrick Williams was convicted of capital murder, armed robbery, and theft of a motor vehicle. For his armed robbery conviction, the circuit court sentenced Williams to twenty years. For capital murder, the circuit court sentenced Williams to life without the possibility of parole or probation. The circuit court ordered Williams’s sentence for armed robbery to run concurrently with Williams’s sentence for capital murder. For theft of a motor vehicle, Williams was sentenced to ten years, with the sentence to run consecutively to his sentences for armed robbery and capital murder. Williams appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Williams argues that his attorney failed to investigate the case and summon all witnesses who could have given critical testimony from personal knowledge of the events. However, Williams fails to name one witness that he asked his attorney to call. Similarly, Williams fails to discuss how any such witness would have aided his case. Williams’s claim would require his trial attorney’s explanation as to whether Williams informed him that there were witnesses who could aid his defense. In the event that Williams did inform his trial attorney of witnesses on his behalf, Williams’s trial attorney should have an opportunity to explain his reasoning as to why he chose not to call those witnesses. Williams’s trial attorney has not had either opportunity. Accordingly, the record is not adequate to adjudicate Williams’s claim on direct appeal. Issue 2: Defective indictment Williams argues the capital-murder indictment was defective because it did not list the underlying elements of armed robbery under that count. All of the essential elements comprising an armed robbery need not be elaborated upon in an indictment charging capital murder because, unlike burglary, armed robbery does not include an essential element of an intent to commit some other crime. Issue 3: Double jeopardy Williams argues his conviction for both armed robbery and capital murder violate his Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy because armed robbery was the underlying felony that elevated the murder charge to capital murder. Williams did not raise this issue at trial. Even so, the prohibition against double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional right that may be excepted from procedural bars which would otherwise prohibit their consideration. An initial conviction and sentence for both felony murder and the underlying felony violates the third aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the protection against multiple punishments for the same offense imposed in a single proceeding. The indictment against Williams accused him of murdering the victim “while engaged in the commission of the felony crime of [a]rmed [r]obbery.” Because Williams was also convicted of and sentenced to twenty years for armed robbery – the underlying felony that elevated the murder charge to capital murder – Williams has been subjected to a double jeopardy violation. The proper remedy is to vacate Williams’s conviction and sentence for armed robbery while leaving his conviction and sentence for capital murder intact. Issue 4: Sufficiency of evidence Williams argues there is insufficient evidence to convict him of capital murder because the co-defendant testified that they did not plan to kill the victim. Malice is not a necessary element of capital murder as set forth in section 97-3-19(2)(e). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury heard testimony that Williams and the co-defendant needed money to return to Chicago because they no longer had any place to live in Meridian. The co-defendant testified that they went to the BP gas station to try to get money so they could return to Chicago. The video-surveillance footage showed Williams removing a pistol from a bag that he had brought into the BP gas station. The jury saw Williams hit the victim with that pistol. Williams then went behind the counter and used the pistol to hit the victim two more times. Williams dragged the victim to the restroom, while the co-defendant locked the doors to the BP gas station and took the money out of the cash register. The video-surveillance footage also showed Williams rifling through the area of the cash register. After Williams and the co-defendant left in the victim’s car, the victim bled to death in the restroom. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, reasonable people could certainly conclude that the prosecution proved every necessary element beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Williams of capital murder because he killed the victim during the commission of an armed robbery. Issue 5: Jury instructions According to Williams, he was not allowed to submit one single jury instruction setting out his theory of the case. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. The circuit court refused Williams proffered jury instruction designated as D-1 because it was a peremptory instruction. The court gave three of Williams’s instructions. The circuit court refused proffered jury instruction D-5 because it attempted to define reasonable doubt. It is a long-standing rule that defining ‘reasonable doubt’ for the jury is improper. The circuit court refused proffered jury instruction D-16 because it was cumulative of jury instruction D-4. The circuit court also refused proffered jury instruction D-26 because it was cumulative of other jury instructions that were given. It was within the circuit court’s discretion to refuse a jury instruction that was covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions. Issue 6: Sentencing Williams argues the circuit court erred when it sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole without first conducting a sentencing hearing. Section 47-7-3(1)(f) sets forth that “[n]o person shall be eligible for parole who is charged, tried, convicted[,] and sentenced to life imprisonment under the provisions of [s]ection 99-19-101.” In this case, the prosecution did not seek the death penalty. If the State is not seeking the death penalty, the only possible sentence for conviction of capital murder committed after July 1, 1994, the effective date of section 47-7-3, is life without parole.


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