Miller v. State


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2010-KA-00901-COA
Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-00901-COA ; 2010-CT-00901-SCT ; 2010-CT-00901-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 11-22-2011
Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Aggravated assault & Forcible rape - Recusal of judge - Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(b) - Continuance - Suppression of statement - Discovery violations - Sufficiency of evidence
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Russell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Myers, J.
Dissenting Author : Carlton, J.
Dissent Joined By : Irving, P.J.
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Maxwell, J., concurs in part and in the result without separate written opinion.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-05-2010
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Malcolm Harrison
Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, FORCIBLE RAPE, AND SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS; AND COUNT II, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY
Case Number: 08-0519 1-2

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Matthew Miller




MARCIE TANNER SOUTHERLAND, BRANAN P. SOUTHERLAND



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD  

Synopsis provided by:

If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.

Topic: Aggravated assault & Forcible rape - Recusal of judge - Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(b) - Continuance - Suppression of statement - Discovery violations - Sufficiency of evidence

Summary of the Facts: Matthew Miller was convicted of the aggravated assault and forcible rape of his girlfriend’s sixteen-year-old daughter. Miller was sentenced to twenty years for the assault and thirty years for the rape. He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Recusal of judge Miller argues the trial judge erred in denying his ore tenus motion for the judge’s recusal, made four days before the trial. Miller claimed that the judge must recuse himself because, before his appointment to the circuit court, he had served as the Hinds County prosecuting attorney. In that capacity, the judge had appeared as a youth court prosecutor in the shelter hearing where the victim was removed from her mother’s care. The Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(b) states: “Judges should disqualify themselves in proceedings in which . . . the judge served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter[.]” Miller contends that the youth court action and Miller’s criminal prosecution were the same matter. The term ‘matter’ includes any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties. Thus, two cases are the “same matter” when they involve the same parties, the same issues, and the same concerns. The youth court action was initiated following the alleged assault and rape in the incident underlying Miller’s charges in the instant case. The shelter order recited that a shelter hearing had been held and that the judge had appeared as the youth court prosecutor, representing the State. Miller also produced an invoice for some of the victim’s medical records that had been billed to the judge, apparently when he was acting in his capacity as youth court prosecutor. The judge served as the county prosecutor for Hinds County at the time of Miller’s arrest and indictment. However, Miller’s criminal prosecution was handled by the district attorney’s office, not the county prosecutor. And while it is true that the judge did represent the State in the youth court proceedings, it has not been shown that this amounted to active participation in Miller’s prosecution. Miller argues that the judge’s service as youth court prosecutor at the shelter hearing would cause a reasonable person to doubt his objectivity when presiding over the criminal trial. A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality. The youth court shelter hearing is a civil action. The youth court prosecutor represents the State, not the victim; she was represented by her own attorney at the hearing. Miller was not a criminal defendant in the youth court, nor even a party. The hearing permitted relaxed rules of evidence, including hearsay; the shelter order reflects that the victim was not present at the hearing and did not testify there. Instead, it appears that testimony to advance the State’s case was offered by two DHS employees. The record is silent on the extent of the judge’s personal participation in the case. A presumption cannot be overcome by the absence of evidence, particularly where it results from the appellant’s failure to make a record. A trial judge cannot be disqualified by speculation. Thus, the judge’s denial of the disqualification motion has not been shown to be an abuse of discretion. Issue 2: Continuance Miller argues that the trial court erred in not granting a continuance for further testing of his mental capacity to voluntarily give a statement to the investigating officers. Miller has not argued – in the trial court or on appeal – that he was incompetent to stand trial. Instead, he sought a continuance so he could be evaluated by his own expert, to the ultimate end of showing that the statement was not given knowingly and voluntarily. Conclusory arguments alone are not sufficient to support a request for additional time; rather, it is incumbent on the defendant seeking a continuance to show concrete facts that demonstrate the particular prejudice to the defense that will necessarily arise if a delay is not granted. There are three major problems with Miller’s argument on this issue. The first two are interrelated: if Miller had been severely mentally retarded, it should have come to his attorneys’ attention sooner. Miller needed to show both that the continuance was necessary and that its denial was prejudicial. Moreover, the only specific instance of reduced capacity cited by Miller’s attorneys – that Miller denied giving a statement and later claimed not to remember it when confronted with an audio recording – is, to say the least, subject to another interpretation, particularly since Miller had no apparent difficulty discussing the interview and surrounding circumstances when he testified at trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Miller’s contentions unconvincing. The third problem with Miller’s argument also precludes reversal: Miller has not shown that the trial court’s denial of a continuance actually resulted in injustice to him. Issue 3: Suppression of statement Miller argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his incriminating statement, because the totality of circumstances showed that the statement was not voluntarily given. The State’s burden of proving that the defendant’s confession is voluntary is met by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Miller did not offer any testimony in support of the suppression motion. Instead, he relies on the circumstances surrounding the statement. Miller claims he is mentally retarded, but he offered no evidence to support this claim. Miller also contends that the detective did not read him the Miranda warnings, because she did not do so on the recording; but he cites no authority for the suggestion that Miranda warnings and waivers must be recorded. Miller points to his testimony at trial that he gave the statement because he had been denied a phone call and had been beaten by the other inmates. However, Miller did not offer this testimony in support of his motion to suppress. Miller’s challenge to the voluntariness of his statement fails because the trial court was entitled to rely on the testimony of the detective, the written waiver executed by Miller, and his own admissions in the recorded statement. Issue 4: Discovery violations Miller argues that the trial court erred in not sanctioning the State for various delays in producing discovery to the defense. At issue are the results of a DNA test on the board used in the assault (ultimately, no DNA was found), photographs of the victim and the crime scene taken shortly after the assault, and updated medical records of the victim that detailed follow-up treatment. The State stated that it had inadvertently overlooked the photographs and thought the board lost, preventing it from being more thoroughly tested. The trial judge found the State to be in contempt and excluded the medical records (which had no apparent evidentiary value) and the DNA-test results, but it allowed the photographs into evidence. Essentially, the only evidence Miller challenges is the photographs. Some were taken by the attending nurses as part of the rape kit, showing the injuries to the victim. The pictures of the crime scene were taken the day after the attack, showing the scene generally, as well as where law enforcement found the board used in the assault, blood on the ground, and the towel the victim used to clean herself after the rape. The trial court could potentially exclude late-produced evidence if deemed just under the circumstances, but the court is not required to do so. Instead, an accused’s remedy for tardy disclosure of that to which he is entitled in pre-trial discovery is a continuance to cure the prejudice resulting from the late disclosure. Failure to request a continuance waives the objection to the late disclosure entirely. Miller did not move for a continuance in response to the production of the photographs; he instead requested only the more severe sanction of exclusion. The fact that continuances had already been granted did not relieve Miller of his obligation to seek another one. Miller has made no showing that he was prejudiced by the late production of the photographs, much less prejudice that could not be cured by a continuance. Issue 5: Sufficiency of evidence Miller argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence of rape or aggravated assault. Miller details conflicting testimony, alleged contradictions in the evidence, and weaknesses in the State’s case against him to support this assignment of error. Miller’s argument is little more than a recitation of his theory of the case at trial. It is well established that the testimony of the victim in a rape case is sufficient to sustain a rape conviction. Here, the victim’s testimony was heavily corroborated, and sufficient evidence supports Miller’s convictions.


Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court