Riverside Traffic Sys., Inc., et al. v. Bostwick, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2009-CT-00710-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-00710-COA ; 2009-CA-00710-COA ; 2009-CT-00710-SCT ; 2009-CT-00710-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-17-2011 Opinion Author: Randolph, J. Holding: Court of Appeals vacated; Circuit court reinstated and affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Change in zoning designation - Notice - Section 17-1-17 - Equitable estoppel - Due process Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): King, J. Procedural History: Admin or Agency Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY Writ of Certiorari: Granted Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-28-2009 Appealed from: Union County Circuit Court Judge: Henry L. Lackey Disposition: FOUND IN FAVOR OF THE SURROUNDING PROPERTY OWNERS (APPELLEES HEREIN), HOLDING THAT PROPER NOTICE WAS NEVER ADEQUATELY GIVEN TO REZONE THE LAND Case Number: CV2008-280 |
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| Note: | The supreme court found that the trial court did not err in finding that the board of aldermen acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding that the Farr tract was properly rezoned for industrial use and in failing to provide notice of the rezoning. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Riverside Traffic Systems, Inc., Lehman-Roberts Company and David Boyd Farr, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Booker Farr, deceased |
KATHRYN H. HESTER
EDWARD PATRICK LANCASTER
ANTHONY RHETT WISE |
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| Appellee: | Robin Bostwick, Eric Frohn, Allen Maxwell, Herbert G. Rogers, III and Ray Tate | WILLIAM O. RUTLEDGE, III VALARIE BLYTHE HANCOCK LAURANCE NICHOLAS CHANDLER ROGERS |
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| Topic: | Real property - Change in zoning designation - Notice - Section 17-1-17 - Equitable estoppel - Due process |
| Summary of the Facts: | The land at issue, the Farr tract, was annexed into the City of New Albany in or around 1968. At that time, the City zoned the Farr tract for agricultural use. In 1996, the owner of a tract adjacent to the Farr tract applied for and received a zoning change, changing that tract’s zoning designation from agricultural to industrial. Following that zoning change, an asphalt plant was built on the adjacent tract. In 1997, the City of New Albany adopted a Comprehensive Zoning Plan, including a new zoning map. The 1997 zoning map erroneously showed the Farr tract as zoned for industrial use. In 1999 and 2000, the City undertook a round of property annexations. The City prepared a new City zoning map to include the newly annexed property, which once again erroneously shows the Farr tract as zoned industrial. In 2001, The New Albany Gazette published a front-page article describing the City of New Albany’s proposed zoning changes and a color-coded proposed zoning map. The City based its 2001 map on the 1997 zoning map, erroneously marking the Farr property as zoned for industrial use. In 2007, Booker Farr agreed to sell the Farr tract to Lehman-Roberts Company, an asphalt-paving company. Lehman-Roberts intended to build an asphalt plant on the Farr tract. Lehman-Roberts applied for a building permit from the City. Five days later, surrounding landowners Robin Bostwick, Eric Frohn, Allen Maxwell, Herbert G. Rogers III, and Ray Tate filed a petition with the New Albany Board of Aldermen to correct the City’s zoning map, which depicted the Farr tract as zoned industrial. The New Albany Board of Aldermen held a hearing and concluded that the Farr tract was zoned industrial. The Petitioners filed a Bill of Exceptions in circuit court appealing the New Albany Board of Aldermen’s decision. The circuit court found that the City’s action “declaring the Farr tract to be classified as Industrial rather than Agricultural is arbitrary and capricious and should be reversed.” Riverside; David Farr, executor of Booker Farr’s estate; and Lehman-Roberts appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s ruling. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Notice Under section 17-1-17, a city must provide notice before it may change a zoning designation. The required notice must set forth the pertinent information unambiguously so as to inform interested persons of the proposed action. The record provides no evidence that the City of New Albany provided any notice before putatively changing the zoning status of the Farr tract on its maps from agricultural to industrial. The article in The New Albany Gazette did not remedy the City’s failure to provide notice of the purported 1997 zoning change for the Farr tract. The article was published after the alleged change, did not comply with statutory notice requirements, and did not set forth the pertinent information unambiguously. Petitioners never had legal notice of a change in the Farr tract’s zoning designation, and the affected property was not used in a manner to alert surrounding landowners that a zoning change had occurred. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Petitioners are estopped from challenging the purported zoning change. Generally, for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply, Riverside must have relied on a misrepresentation by the Petitioners and not on a misrepresentation by some other individual or entity. At the very least, as an essential prerequisite to application of the doctrine of estoppel, the party to be estopped must have had knowledge of the situation. Riverside has not alleged that Petitioners ever misrepresented the zoning of the Farr tract as industrial, and the record reveals no evidence that Petitioners had any reason to know of the industrial zoning. Thus, the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it decided that the Farr tract had been legally rezoned for industrial use. Issue 2: Due process The essence of the due process rights is reasonable advance notice of the substance of the rezoning proposal together with the opportunity to be heard at all critical stages of the process. The record includes no evidence, and no party has argued, that Petitioners were given the statutorily required notice of a change in the Farr tract’s zoning designation. A newspaper article that was published four years after a purported zoning change occurred did not provide advance notice to satisfy due process. The City’s failure to provide any notice before reclassifying the Farr tract’s zoning from agricultural to industrial violated Petitioners’ due process rights, and thus, Petitioners were not estopped from contesting the reclassification. |
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