Walker v. State


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Docket Number: 2003-KA-00313-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 08-05-2004
Opinion Author: Waller, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Possession of precursor chemicals - Constitutionality of section 41-29-313(1)(a)(ii) - Investigatory stop - Illegal search - Other crimes’ evidence - Expert testimony - Entrapment instruction - Weight of evidence
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Cobb, P.J., Carlson, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J.
Dissenting Author : Graves, J.
Concurs in Result Only: Easley, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 01-30-2003
Appealed from: DeSoto County Circuit Court
Judge: George B. Ready
Disposition: Appellant was convicted of possession precursor chemicals to manufacture a controlled substance.
District Attorney: John W. Champion
Case Number: CR 2002-511-R(D)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: James Allen Walker




BOBBY TAYLOR VANCE



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOHN R. HENRY  

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Topic: Possession of precursor chemicals - Constitutionality of section 41-29-313(1)(a)(ii) - Investigatory stop - Illegal search - Other crimes’ evidence - Expert testimony - Entrapment instruction - Weight of evidence

Summary of the Facts: James Walker was convicted of possession of two precursor chemicals (pseudoephedrine and lithium), knowing that the precursor chemicals would be used to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance (methamphetamine). He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Constitutionality of section 41-29-313(1)(a)(ii) Walker argues that section 41-29-313(1)(a)(ii), the statute under which he was convicted and sentenced, is unconstitutionally vague. Walker has failed to overcome the presumption that the statute is constitutional. His argument that an ordinary person buying a box of decongestant would not know that he or she was committing a crime fails because the statute requires mens rea, i.e., either having known or should have reasonably known that the decongestant would be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance. Issue 2: Investigatory stop Walker argues that probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion did not exist to make an investigatory stop because the first officer on the scene began following Walker's truck before the officer was able to determine that Walker's appearance matched that of the description given. An investigative stop of a suspect may be made so long as an officer has a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person he encounters was involved in or is wanted in connection with a felony. In this case, the officer did have a reasonable suspicion to pick out Walker, to begin to follow him, and to make an investigatory stop. The officer knew that a white male had bought a large quantity of ephedrine. The officer reasonably opined that the person would be in the parking lot by the time the officer arrived. He saw Walker's truck with two white male passengers. At that point, it was reasonable to suspect that the white male who purchased the ephedrine could be one of the occupants of the truck. As the truck pulled out into traffic, the officer was able to see that the driver (Walker) of the truck had on a pullover shirt with three wide stripes, matching the description given by the Sam's employee. In addition, the truck did not have brake lights which was a traffic violation. Issue 3: Illegal search Walker argues that his consent to the search of his truck was tainted by the unlawful detention during which it was elicited and that his detention became unreasonable and unduly excessive when the officers shifted the focus of their investigation from the improper equipment to the possibility of locating contraband within the vehicle. When a driver voluntarily consents to a search of his or her vehicle, there is no need for a search warrant. If police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. Walker put on absolutely no evidence that he did not consent to the search. Since the investigatory stop was based on a reasonable suspicion, the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle after the ephedrine was seen in plain view. Issue 4: Other crimes’ evidence Walker argues that receipts found in the vehicle were inadmissible. The receipts were properly admissible because they were for items used in manufacturing methamphetamine and because the defense opened the door to the admission of the receipts. They tended to prove Walker's intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Issue 5: Expert testimony Walker argues that the court erred in admitting testimony from a witness testifying as an expert in the field of methamphetamine investigative procedures, because prior to trial, the State stipulated that Walker was not a methamphetamine manufacturer and that it would not introduce any evidence of manufacture in its case-in-chief. Walker was not charged with the manufacture of methamphetamine; he was charged with the possession of precursors with the intent that the precursors would be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. It is very relevant to the charge of possession of precursors that someone with expertise testify as to the manufacture of methamphetamine so that the precursors which were found in Walker's possession would be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Issue 6: Entrapment instruction Walker argues that the court erred in refusing to give an entrapment instruction. If the defendant already possessed the criminal intent, and the request or inducement merely gave the defendant the opportunity to commit what he or she was already predisposed to do, entrapment is not a defense. Walker is in essence claiming that he was entrapped because Sam's sold him an ordinary household product which happened to be a precursor for the manufacture of methamphetamine and because Sam's reported him to the police when he was merely doing what Sam's had induced him to do. Sam's is a business and its primary purpose is to make money by selling to consumers. It had the duty to report suspicious behavior. Therefore, the proposed entrapment jury instruction did not have a proper evidentiary foundation. Issue 7: Weight of evidence Walker argues that the verdict is against the weight of evidence. Through the use of the receipts, the State showed that Walker had bought several everyday household items that could be used for the manufacture of methamphetamine. He bought a few of these items at each of several different stores. At the time of the investigatory stop and search, he was in possession of boxes of ephedrine and several lithium batteries. All of this evidence shows that he was in possession of precursors to the manufacture of methamphetamine, with the intent that these products would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. This is ample evidence to support the verdict.


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