Taylor v. State


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Docket Number: 2009-KA-01717-COA
Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-01717-COA ; 2009-CT-01717-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 11-15-2011
Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Murder, Aggravated assault & Shooting into occupied dwelling - Jury instructions - Flight instruction - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Circumstantial evidence instruction - Voir dire - Challenge for cause - Exclusion of evidence - M.R.E. 401 - Reading the indictment
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving, P.J., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Maxwell and Russell, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 09-25-2009
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: W. Swan Yerger
Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, MURDER, AND SENTENCED TO LIFE; COUNT II, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS; COUNT IV, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS; COUNT V, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS; AND COUNT VI, SHOOTING INTO AN OCCUPIED DWELLING, AND SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS, WITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith
Case Number: 09-0-190CR(Y)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Charlie D. Taylor




DONALD W. BOYKIN



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND  

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Topic: Murder, Aggravated assault & Shooting into occupied dwelling - Jury instructions - Flight instruction - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Circumstantial evidence instruction - Voir dire - Challenge for cause - Exclusion of evidence - M.R.E. 401 - Reading the indictment

Summary of the Facts: Charlie Taylor was convicted of murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and one count of shooting into an occupied dwelling. Taylor was sentenced to life for murder, twenty years on each of the three convictions for aggravated assault, and ten years for shooting into an occupied dwelling, with all sentences ordered to run consecutively. He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Jury instructions Taylor argues that the circuit court improperly refused several of his proposed jury instructions and improperly granted several instructions proposed by the State. While a defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case, the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Taylor argues that the court erred in denying his proposed instruction regarding the intent required to be found guilty as an aider or abettor. Another instruction properly instructed the jury as to the intent required to convict Taylor as an aider or abettor under the current law; therefore, the circuit judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Taylor’s instruction. The court also refused an instruction on deliberate design. Taylor argues that the instruction does not define “deliberate design”; instead, it merely instructs the jury as to when the intent may be formed. However, the jury was properly instructed as to the elements of murder in the instructions as a whole. Thus, there was no error in refusing the instruction. The circuit court granted the State’s instruction concerning aiding and abetting, and Taylor argues that the instruction was confusing and repetitive. Taylor argues conversely that if two instructions given at trial are repetitious, the repetitious instructions are grounds for reversible error. That is not the case. While repetitious instructions are discouraged, such instructions do not constitute reversible error where they were not misleading to the jury. To the extent that the instructions in this case are repetitious, they should not have been given. However, any error was harmless since the jury would not have been misled by the repetition. Taylor argues that the circuit court should not have granted a flight instruction. Even though he did not testify, Taylor argues there is an obvious logical explanation why he fled the scene. Evidence of flight or escape is admissible as an exception to M.R.E. 404(b) in order to show guilty knowledge. None of Taylor’s assertions regarding the obvious reasons for his flight are supported by the evidence presented at trial. Taylor chose not to testify in his defense. Despite defense counsel’s best efforts, he was unable to illicit this testimony from any of the State’s witnesses. Thus, Taylor’s version of the reasons for his flight is not supported by the record. Because Taylor’s flight was unexplained and the evidence of his flight was weighed by the circuit judge under M.R.E. 403, there was no error in granting the flight instruction. Taylor argues his instruction on circumstantial evidence should have been given because there was no eyewitness testimony that he fired shots or aided or abetted the person who fired the shots. Where all the evidence tending to prove the guilt of the defendant is circumstantial, the trial court must grant a jury instruction that every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt must be excluded in order to convict. Eyewitness testimony constitutes direct evidence, and when the State presents direct evidence against a criminal defendant, a circumstantial-evidence instruction is not warranted. Here, there was ample eyewitness testimony that another person committed each element of the crimes charged. And there was also ample eyewitness testimony that Taylor had the intent to bring about such crimes. Such testimony was direct evidence of Taylor’s intent to commit the crimes charged. Issue 2: Voir dire Taylor argues that the circuit court improperly granted the State’s challenge for cause on two members of the venire. A potential juror is properly removed for cause where cause for challenge exists that would likely affect his competency or impartiality at trial. Taylor argues that the circuit court improperly struck a potential juror whom the State challenged for cause because of the juror’s concern for his job. The juror is in his first year working for the fire department and works twenty-four hour shifts. The State challenged the other potential juror for cause because of her relationship with Taylor’s family. She told the court that she had known Taylor’s mother and sister for twenty years and that she knew the family well. A defendant does not have a vested right to any particular juror but only the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. The defendant cannot complain of the exclusion of a particular juror if the end result is a jury composed of fair and impartial jurors. A defendant must present evidence to show that the jury was not fair and impartial, and thus prejudice resulted on the part of the defendant. Taylor does not argue that the jury was not fair or impartial. It was not an abuse of discretion by the circuit court judge to strike the fireman because of distraction or the other juror because of her conversation with Taylor’s mother during the jury selection proceedings. Taylor also argues that the circuit court improperly limited his voir dire by prohibiting him from asking the venire if they would be pressured to go home once they were in deliberations. A voir dire is presumed sufficient to ensure a fair and impartial jury. To overcome this presumption, a party must present evidence indicating that the jury was not fair and impartial and show that prejudice resulted from the circuit court’s handling of the voir dire. Taylor fails to assert that the jury impaneled at his trial was unfair, prejudiced, or biased against him or that he received an unfair trial. Taylor also fails to claim that he was prejudiced by the limitation imposed on his voir dire by the circuit court. Thus, his claim is without merit. Issue 3: Exclusion of evidence Taylor argues that the circuit judge improperly refused to admit evidence that a pistol had been found in the home where the incident occurred and that an SKS rifle had been found under an abandoned house next door. Pursuant to M.R.E. 401, relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Here, the circuit judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding certain evidence about the pistol and rifle, since neither gun had been linked to the shooting in any way. Issue 4: Reading the indictment Taylor argues that the circuit court erred when it allowed the indictment to be read to the venire and when it instructed the venire on the grand-jury process. While Taylor asserts a general claim of a violation of his due-process rights, he cites no legal authority in support thereof. Failure to cite legal authority in support of an issue is a procedural bar on appeal. Furthermore, the jury must be informed of the precise charge against the accused, and providing such information is a duty of the trial court.


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