Q. A. v. Pearl Pub. Sch. Dist.
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-01610-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-01610-COA ; 2010-CT-01610-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-08-2011 Opinion Author: Roberts, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9 - Supervision of parking lot - After-school activity - Discretionary duty - Section 37-9-69 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Ishee, Carlton and Russell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Maxwell, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-09-2010 Appealed from: Rankin County Circuit Court Judge: William E. Chapman, III Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED Case Number: 2009-4 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Q. A., a Minor, By and Through D. W. and S. W., his Grandparents and Guardians, as Next Friend |
CARROLL RHODES |
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| Appellee: | Pearl Public School District | ROY A. SMITH JR., STEVEN JAMES GRIFFIN |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9 - Supervision of parking lot - After-school activity - Discretionary duty - Section 37-9-69 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Through his grandparents and guardians, Q.A. sued the Pearl Public School District after Q.A. was injured during an after-school activity. The circuit court granted PPSD’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that PPSD was immune from suit by virtue of the discretionary-function provision of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Q.A. appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | A governmental entity is not liable under section 11-46-9 of the Tort Claims Act when a governmental entity and its employees, acting within the course and scope of their employment, have a claim against them based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee whether or not the discretion be abused. There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the decision to supervise the parking lot at issue in this case involved an element of choice or judgment. As PPSD notes, no Mississippi statute mandates that a school district monitor a parking lot more than an hour after school. Similarly, no Mississippi statute requires that a school district assume that students leaving an after-school activity are behaving in a disorderly manner when there are no reports of such behavior. There is no evidence that PPSD ignored reports that ROTC students engaged in disorderly conduct after being dismissed from ROTC meetings. In fact, there is no evidence in the record to contradict the conclusion that Q.A.’s injury was the first such report of any conduct that could be described as disorderly. Q.A. argues that PPSD’s duty to supervise students was ministerial, based on section 37-9-69 which requires superintendents, principals, and teachers to “hold the pupils to strict account for disorderly conduct at school, on the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, and during recess.” However, section 37-9-69 does not require administrators and teachers to guarantee that no students will be injured due to unforeseeable disorderly conduct. Thus, the discretionary-function provision of the MTCA provides PPSD with immunity from Q.A.’s claim. |
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