Double Quick, Inc. v. Moore
| Docket Number: | 2010-IA-01963-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-03-2011 Opinion Author: King, J. Holding: Reversed and Rendered |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Premises liability - Proximate causation - Foreseeability - Intervening cause - Criminal act Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-23-2010 Appealed from: Bolivar County Circuit Court Judge: Al Smith Disposition: Denied Appellant's motion for summary judgment. Case Number: 2008-0072 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Double Quick, Inc. |
LONNIE D. BAILEY
MARC A. BIGGERS
CHARLES CAMERON AUERSWALD |
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| Appellee: | Dorothy Moore, As Administrator And On Behalf Of All Of The Wrongful Death Beneficiaries Of Mario Moore, Deceased | ANDREW M. W. WESTERFIELD WARREN BARKSDALE BELL | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Wrongful death - Premises liability - Proximate causation - Foreseeability - Intervening cause - Criminal act |
| Summary of the Facts: | Wytisha Jackson was an assistant store manager of a Double Quick convenience store. At approximately 7:30 p.m., George Ford, accompanied by his young son, entered Double Quick to make a purchase. Shortly afterward, Cassius Gallion entered the store. Ford and Gallion exchanged words. Gallion exited the store first. Then, Ford left the store to pump gas into his car. Because she was worried that Ford and Gallion would fight, Jackson accompanied Ford and helped Ford’s son into the car. At the gas pumps, Ford and Gallion again exchanged words. Then, Mario Moore, who had arrived at the Double Quick but had not yet been inside, approached Ford’s car, intervened in the argument, and threw a punch at Ford. Mario missed Ford, but struck Jackson, who then returned to the store and called the police. Ford then retrieved a pistol from the trunk of his car and shot Mario. Mario died as result of his injury. Dorothy Moore, as administrator of Mario’s estate, filed suit against Double Quick. Moore argued that Double Quick had neglected to protect Mario from injury and death while he was on the store’s premises. Double Quick filed a motion for summary judgment. Moore filed a response to Double Quick’s motion for summary judgment and a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court denied both motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted Double Quick’s petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Double Quick argues that it is entitled to summary judgment under the principles of premises-liability law. Premises liability is a theory of negligence that establishes the duty owed to someone injured on a landowner’s premises as a result of conditions or activities on the land. Moore argues that the instant case is not one of premises liability, but a basic negligence case against Jackson. Whether a cause of action falls under the general theory of negligence or a specific type of negligence warrants a review of the facts that gave rise to the claim. Here, Mario was not injured by the Double Quick employees; the Double Quick employees were not even aware of his presence on the premises. Because Mario’s injury was the result of an activity that occurred on Double Quick’s property, Moore’s claim is one of premises liability. To recover damages in a premises-liability action, Moore must show the duty owed to Mario by Double Quick; a breach of that duty; damages; and a causal connection between the breach and the damages, such that the breach is the proximate cause of Mario’s injuries. Generally, in order to determine the duty owed by the business owner, the status of the injured party must be determined. The parties disagree on Mario’s status, but Mario’s classification is irrelevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. The issue is not determinative, because even if Jackson and Double Quick owed Mario a higher duty of care, Moore failed to provide evidence that Jackson’s action or inaction was the proximate cause of Mario’s death. Generally, criminal acts can be intervening causes which break the causal connection with the defendant's negligent act, if the criminal act is not within the realm of reasonable foreseeability. Thus, in order to establish that Jackson’s behavior was the proximate cause of Mario’s injury, Moore would have to prove that Mario’s injury was reasonably foreseeable. In premises-liability cases, there are two ways to establish legal causation, or foreseeability, in cases of assault by a third person: the requisite “cause to anticipate” the assault may arise from actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature, or actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence exists on the premises. There was no suggestion within the record that Jackson had actual or constructive knowledge of Ford’s violent nature. Further, the record does not indicate that an atmosphere of violence existed on the premises of Double Quick. Accordingly, the trial judge should have granted Double Quick’s motion for summary judgment. |
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