Hughes v. State
| Docket Number: | 2000-DR-00051-SCT Linked Case(s): 2000-DR-00051-SCT ; 2000-DR-00051-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-10-2004 Opinion Author: Waller, P.J. Holding: APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DENIED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Illegal search - Proof of innocence - Section 99-39-7(5) - Mental retardation - Appearance in shackles - Juror dishonesty Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., and Easley, J. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, Carlson, Graves and Randolph, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Dickinson, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Cobb, P.J. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: PCR |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-20-1996 Appealed from: Tate County Circuit Court Judge: George C. Carlson, Jr. Disposition: Appellant was convicted of kidnapping, rape and murder and sentenced to death. District Attorney: Robert L. Williams Case Number: CR9668 |
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| Note: | Pro Se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by William Ray Hughes is denied. Application for Leave to File Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by counsel for William Ray Hughes is denied. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | William Ray Hughes |
OFFICE OF CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL BY:
C. JACKSON WILLIAMS
TERRY L. MARROQUIN
DAVID P. VOISIN |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: MARVIN L. WHITE, JR. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Illegal search - Proof of innocence - Section 99-39-7(5) - Mental retardation - Appearance in shackles - Juror dishonesty |
| Summary of the Facts: | William Hughes was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Hughes has now filed his application for leave to seek postconviction relief. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Hughes argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to cross-examine adequately the State's pathologist and for failing to secure an independent expert to dispute the State's evidence concerning the time of death. In determining whether a defendant was denied a fair trial because of failure to appoint or allow funds for an expert, the court considers whether and to what degree the defendant had access to the State's experts, whether the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine those experts, and lack of prejudice or incompetence of the State's experts. Another factor to consider is to what extent the State's case depends upon the State's expert. In the present case, the State's case did not rise and fall on the evidence establishing the time of death. Although the State's case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence, the pathologist's testimony was not paramount. Therefore, defense counsel was not professionally negligent in failing to seek an independent expert in pathology. Hughes also argues that venue, and thus jurisdiction, was never properly established in Tate County. This issue was raised at trial and thoroughly discussed on direct appeal. Since venue was proper in Tate County, it cannot be said that trial counsel's overall performance was somehow professionally deficient in failing to challenge successfully the State's choice of venue. Hughes argues that the State's DNA evidence was scientifically unreliable. This issue was thoroughly litigated at both trial and on direct appeal. The underlying issue is procedurally barred, and Hughes may not recast the issue under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel. Hughes argues that counsel failed to call alibi witnesses. However, it is fair to say that trial counsel did their best under the circumstances. Hughes submits the affidavit of a psychologist who opines that Hughes should not have been allowed to testify because of his diminished mental capacity. Hughes is not mentally retarded, and the decision to have him testify must be regarded as strategic. Hughes argues that a prior conviction of rape was improperly introduced as an aggravating circumstance since it was not a crime of violence, and trial counsel was deficient in failing to object. Hughes was nineteen, and his victim was seven years old. Consent was not an issue, and Hughes' prior crime must be viewed as one of violence sufficient to be used as an aggravating circumstance. Hughes argues that the court erred in finding that he was a habitual offender and in instructing the jury that he would be sentenced to life without parole if the death penalty was not imposed. Hughes was a habitual offender. Also, a jury should be instructed that a defendant's habitual offender status makes him ineligible for parole. Hughes argues that trial counsel could have introduced more testimony in mitigation at the sentencing phase of the trial. There is nothing in the affidavits which Hughes now presents that seems at all likely to have changed the outcome at sentencing had it been presented to the jury in the form of live testimony. Hughes argues that the prosecution incorrectly told the jury that they (the jurors) could not exercise sympathy in their deliberations and that the prosecution improperly argued that he (Hughes) would get to ask for mercy whereas the victim's family would not, and trial counsel failed to object when these statements were made. Hughes has taken the prosecutor's remarks out of context. Trial counsel committed no professional error in failing to object during closing argument. Issue 2: Illegal search Hughes argues that no consent was given either for the search of his home or for the acquisition of DNA samples. This issue was raised and rejected at both trial and on direct appeal. Issue 3: Proof of innocence Hughes argue that, if he is allowed to conduct further discovery, there will be evidence and testimony to prove his innocence. Section 99-39-7(5) requires a petitioner for post-conviction relief to make a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right. This bald assertion of innocence fails to make such a showing. Issue 4: Mental retardation In order to obtain an evidentiary hearing before the trial court, the petitioner must present an affidavit from at least one qualified expert, who opines to a reasonable degree of certainty that: (1) the defendant has a combined Intelligence Quotient of 75 or below, and; in the opinion of the expert, there is a reasonable basis to believe that, upon further testing, the defendant will be found to be mentally retarded. Hughes presents the affidavit of Daniel H. Grant, Ed., a licensed psychologist in the State of Georgia. Grant concluded that all of Hughes' scores fell within the "mildly deficient" range and opines that Hughes is "mildly mentally retarded." Grant also asserts that Hughes lacks normal adaptive skills and that his condition set in prior to the age of 18 based on Hughes' failing grades in high school. The record shows that Hughes consistently received failing grades in high school before he dropped out. The record does not indicate that he was in special education classes. Further the record indicates that Hughes was a conscientious and reliable employee. Although Hughes has technically complied with the requirements for an evidentiary hearing, the evidence of record in this case overwhelmingly belies the assertions that Hughes is mentally retarded. Issue 5: Appearance in shackles Hughes argues that he was denied due process because he was seen at some point by jurors while still shackled. A brief and inadvertent exposure to jurors of defendants in handcuffs is not so inherently prejudicial as to require a mistrial. Issue 6: Juror dishonesty Hughes presents the affidavit of a third party who claims that one of the jurors heard another juror say that she had been raped as a child. The affidavit submitted by Hughes constitutes double hearsay and otherwise fails to make the required substantial showing of the denial of any right guaranteed by the state or federal constitutions. |
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