Wilson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-00139-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-00139-COA ; 2010-CT-00139-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-18-2011 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder & Arson - Sufficiency of evidence - Publicity - Juror misconduct - M.R.E. 606(b) - Prior conviction - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Hearsay - Victim's statement of mind - M.R.E. 804(b)(5) - M.R.E. 803(3) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving, P.J., Myers, Ishee, Roberts and Russell, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Griffis, P.J., Barnes and Maxwell, JJ., concur in part and in the result Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-28-2009 Appealed from: DeSoto County Circuit Court Judge: Robert P. Chamberlin Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, MURDER, AND SENTENCED TO LIFE, AND COUNT II, ARSON IN THE FIRST DEGREE, AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS, ALL AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION, WITH THE SENTENCE IN COUNT II TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I District Attorney: John W. Champion Case Number: CR2009-272CD |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | William Stanley Wilson, II |
GEORGE T. HOLMES |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BILLY L. GORE |
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| Topic: | Murder & Arson - Sufficiency of evidence - Publicity - Juror misconduct - M.R.E. 606(b) - Prior conviction - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Hearsay - Victim's statement of mind - M.R.E. 804(b)(5) - M.R.E. 803(3) |
| Summary of the Facts: | William Wilson II was convicted of Count I, murder, and Count II, arson in the first degree. The trial court sentenced Wilson as a habitual offender to life for the murder conviction, and to a consecutive term of twenty years for the arson conviction, without eligibility for parole or probation. Wilson appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Wilson argues that the case against him is entirely, and tenuously, circumstantial and fails to establish facts upon which he could be convicted. The sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions is shown through the following evidence: Fire Marshall White testified he investigated the fire and determined the fire to be arson; Detective Kimble testified she determined that Wilson lived in the room in the victim’s residence that caught on fire; Detective Logan located a hammer with blood and hair on its exterior hidden behind a piano in a “junk room” at the victim’s residence; Dr. Scales testified he performed tests on the hammer and determined the DNA found on the head of the hammer matched the victim’s DNA sample, and he recovered a mixture of DNA on the hammer handle and determined there were no genetic markers in the DNA mixture that could be attributed to anyone other than the DNA from the victim and Wilson; Dr. Li testified the victim received multiple blunt-force injuries, and some of her lacerations were consistent with injuries caused by a hammer; Detective Kimbell testified Wilson provided a handwritten statement that placed him at the scene of the crime; the victim’s neighbor testified she noticed three cars, including a tan car in the driveway next door, at 5:00 a.m. on the morning of the 23rd, but when she looked back outside at approximately 6:40 a.m. or 6:45 a.m., the victim’s mobile home was on fire, and the tan car was gone; Wilson testified he drove a gold Buick that could also be described as champagne or brown; the victim’s boyfriend testified the victim told him that she confronted Wilson on the day prior to her murder regarding the money she was missing and also told him that she intended to ask Wilson to move out of the residence; and Wilson’s testimony at trial demonstrated his concern over the possibility of having his ERS revoked. Considering this evidence, a rational fact finder might reasonably conclude that the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with guilt of the crime charged. Issue 2: Publicity After the jury returned its verdict, defense counsel notified the court of the jury’s possible exposure to an article that was on the front page of the DeSoto Times Tribune the day prior to the jury deliberations. The article reported Wilson was living with the victim, his aunt, as part of the terms of his probation related to a prior child kidnapping conviction in DeSoto County. Defense counsel requested that the jury be polled in reference to the article and moved for a mistrial. The trial judge questioned each juror individually about their knowledge of the newspaper article and of Wilson’s past. All but one juror denied having any knowledge of the article or on the subject. Pursuant to M.R.E. 606(b), once an allegation of juror misconduct arises, then the next step is to consider whether an investigation is warranted. In order for the duty to investigate to arise, the party contending there is misconduct must make an adequate showing to overcome the presumption in this state of jury impartiality. If the threshold showing is made, then the trial court should conduct a post-trial hearing. It is in violation of Rule 606(b), for any juror to be questioned with regard to whether or not the extraneous information actually altered his verdict. Wilson argues the trial court abused its discretion in not requiring a new trial because there is a clear possibility the juror in question was influenced by extraneous prejudicial, incorrect information. The record indicates that the juror did not discuss her knowledge of this information with any of the other jurors and that she possessed no knowledge of the details of Wilson’s past conviction, as evidenced by the testimony of the other eleven jurors that they did not have any knowledge of the newspaper article or of Wilson’s past. Moreover, as the trial judge acknowledged, the jury had already been informed of Wilson’s ERS status by stipulation between Wilson and the State, and Wilson testified as to his ERS status as his basis for initially providing false information to law-enforcement officers as to his whereabouts. After questioning the jurors, the trial court determined that while it was prejudicial for the juror to learn of Wilson’s prior conviction, which had been specifically kept out of evidence, the State correctly rebutted the prejudicial presumption. The record shows that the court did not abuse its discretion in making this determination. Issue 3: Prior conviction During the trial, the State and Wilson stipulated that Wilson was on earned-release supervision (ERS) from the MDOC on the day of the victim’s death, and if Wilson had been found to have violated the conditions of his ERS, he would have been subject to being sent to prison. Wilson argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use his prior conviction and ERS status against him in its case-in-chief. The two evidentiary rules at issue when determining whether to admit the evidence are M.R.E. 404(b) and 403. In this case, the trial court properly considered both rules in the admission of this evidence. The trial court found the evidence to be admissible to show motive, and it found the evidence to be more probative than prejudicial. Issue 4: Hearsay During the pretrial hearing, Wilson sought to prevent the State from using certain statements that the victim allegedly made to her boyfriend on the day and evening before she died, concerning her belief that Wilson had stolen money from her; she had confronted him about the missing money; and she intended to ask him to move out of the residence. The trial court deemed the statements admissible and stated that the statements would be admissible to the extent that they would show the victim’s state of mind as to intent, but the court determined that admission under the residual hearsay exception was more applicable in accord with M.R.E. 804(b)(5) under the same criterion as the Rule 803 residual clause. Wilson argues that the trial court erred because the boyfriend’s testimony, as to his conversations with the victim, constituted hearsay which was more prejudicial than probative of material issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the statements into evidence as evidence of motive under M.R.E. 803(3). With regard to Rule 804(b)(5), a review of the record shows that the trial court carefully analyzed all of the requirements to satisfy admission of evidence in accordance with Rule 804(b)(5). The trial judge provided thorough on-the-record findings for each requirement of Rule 804(b)(5) showing equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness. |
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