McNabb v. L. T. Land & Gravel, LLC
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-01503-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-01503-COA |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-11-2011 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Reversed and rendered |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Misrepresentation - Breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose - Tried by consent - M.R.C.P. 15(b) - M.R.C.P. 8(a) - Section 75-2-315 Judge(s) Concurring: Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Russell, JJ. Dissenting Author : Lee, C.J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-16-2010 Appealed from: Marion County Circuit Court Judge: R. I. Prichard, III Disposition: ENTERED JUDGMENT FOR $8,461.08 FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE Case Number: 2009-0121P |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Jimmy McNabb |
GARLAND D. UPTON |
||
| Appellee: | L. T. Land & Gravel, LLC | DONOVAN MCCOMB |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Misrepresentation - Breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose - Tried by consent - M.R.C.P. 15(b) - M.R.C.P. 8(a) - Section 75-2-315 |
| Summary of the Facts: | L.T. Land and Gravel, LLC sued Jimmy McNabb for misrepresentation. L.T. Land alleged it paid McNabb $8,000 for a 1984 Mack truck, based on McNabb’s claim he had rebuilt the lower half of the engine—an engine L.T. Land quickly learned required a complete overhaul. The court denied the misrepresentation claim, finding L.T. Land failed to prove McNabb’s representations about his repairs were untrue. But the circuit court awarded L.T. Land $8,461.08 solely based on its finding that McNabb breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. McNabb appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The only basis for the circuit court’s award was its finding that L.T. Land breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. This specific warranty theory was not pled. Nor was it tried by implied consent under M.R.C.P. 15(b). Even under the liberal pleading requirements of M.R.C.P. 8(a), a plaintiff must set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory. Nowhere in L.T. Land’s complaint does it reference L.T. Land’s stated purpose for purchasing the truck, McNabb’s knowledge of this purpose, McNabb’s selection of a suitable truck, L.T. Land’s reliance on McNabb’s selection, or that the truck was particularly, as opposed to generally, unfit for the intended purpose. Thus, even under our relaxed notice-pleading standards, McNabb’s complaint did not plead breach of this implied warranty. With regard to implied consent under Rule 15(b), implied consent depends upon whether the parties recognize that a new issue was being litigated at trial. Here, the evidence about L.T. Land’s purpose for purchasing the truck to haul gravel and timber and reliance on McNabb’s statements about the work he had done to the truck and how the truck had been used since were relevant to L.T. Land’s misrepresentation claims. Accordingly, L.T. Land’s questions did not sufficiently notify McNabb that L.T. Land intended to introduce unpled implied-warranty claims. The warranty claims only became cognizable during L.T. Land’s closing argument. But, closing argument cannot form the basis for Rule 15(b) implied consent. Even if L.T. Land had pled breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the circuit court erred in finding this warranty arose and was breached. The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is codified in section 75-2-315. For L.T. Land to recover under the theory of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the evidence must have been sufficient for the special master to find (1) McNabb, at the time of the contracting, had reason to know the particular purpose for which the goods were required; (2) the reliance by L.T. Land as buyer upon the skill or judgment of McNabb to select suitable goods, and (3) the goods were unfit for the particular purpose. There is substantial evidence that McNabb had reason to know why L.T. Land was purchasing the truck—to haul timber and gravel. But substantial evidence does not support that L.T. Land specifically relied on McNabb to select a suitable truck for these intended purposes. Without selection by the seller, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose does not arise. Thus, the circuit court erred by awarding L.T. Land $8,461.08 based on a breach of this implied warranty. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
