Ball v. Ashley Furniture Indus., et al.
| Docket Number: | 2010-WC-01627-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-11-2011 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Workers' compensation - Medical treatments - Preexisting condition - Medical testimony - Exclusion of evidence - Commission Procedural Rule 9 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Roberts, Carlton and Russell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Maxwell, J. Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WORKERS' COMPENSATION |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-23-2010 Appealed from: Pontotoc County Circuit Court Judge: James L. Roberts Case Number: CV09-000015-PO-R |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Sandy Ball |
LAWRENCE J. HAKIM, CHARLIE BAGLAN |
|
|
| Appellee: | Ashley Furniture Industries and Employee Insurance of Wausau | GINGER M. ROBEY | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Workers' compensation - Medical treatments - Preexisting condition - Medical testimony - Exclusion of evidence - Commission Procedural Rule 9 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Sandy Ball slipped and fell while working for her employer, Ashley Furniture Industries. Ball filed a petition to controvert with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission against Ashley Furniture Industries and its carrier, Employee Insurance of Wausau, claiming injuries to her chest and right knee that she sustained from her fall. Ball filed for workers’ compensation benefits to cover a requested surgery to her right knee. Ashley Furniture denied the benefits, and Ball asked that the Commission compel Ashley Furniture to pay for the surgery and rehabilitation for her knee. Ashley Furniture contested the motion, claiming that Ball suffered from a preexisting, degenerative condition which was temporarily aggravated by her fall in October 2003, but the aggravation ceased in December 2003. The AJ determined that Ball had a preexisting, degenerative condition in her right knee that was temporarily aggravated by her fall. The AJ further determined that Ball’s work-related injury ceased in December 2003, and Ashley Furniture was not responsible for treatment of Ball’s injury after December 2003. The Commission affirmed the AJ’s decision, and Ball appealed to circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s findings, and Ball appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Medical treatments Ball argues that the Commission was clearly erroneous in affirming the AJ’s finding that Ashley Furniture was no longer responsible for Ball’s medical treatments after December 23, 2003, and in ruling that Ball had suffered a temporary aggravation of a preexisting, degenerative condition. Ball’s treating physician determined that Ball suffered from a preexisting, degenerative condition in her right knee. In her order, the AJ conducted an extensive analysis of Ball’s medical records and the treating doctor’s opinions. Because the AJ based her decision on the strong evidence of Ball’s treating physician’s remarks and Ball’s medical records, the Commission was not clearly erroneous in affirming the AJ’s findings. Issue 2: Preexisting condition Ball argues that the Commission erred by upholding the AJ’s decision because the decision was improperly based on Rathborne, Hair & Ridgeway Box Co. v. Green, 237 Miss. 588, 115 So. 2d 674 (1959), and should have been based on Hedge v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 641 So. 2d 9 (Miss. 1994). Ball asserts that Rathborne’s applicability is “based upon whether or not the injured worker is able to return to work following recovery from the work injury,” pursuant to M.T. Reed Const. Co. v. Garrett, 249 Miss. 892, 164 So. 2d 476 (1964). However, the AJ did not err in applying Rathborne to Ball’s case. While it is important to determine a claimant’s ability to work after recovery from an injury, the treating physician’s opinion clearly indicates that Ball was fully able to return to work on December 23, 2003, with a zero percent-impairment rating. Issue 3: Medical testimony Ball argues that the AJ failed to resolve any doubt or ambiguity in the medical testimony in favor of Ball because her physician purportedly did not completely rule out Ball’s work injury as a contribution to her current condition. However, a thorough review of the record supports the AJ’s conclusion that the medical evidence fully supported a finding that Ball’s disability in her right knee is not causally related to her fall at work. The treating physician stated in clear unequivocal terms that Ball suffers from a preexisting, degenerative condition which was only temporarily aggravated by her fall at work and which was resolved as of December 23, 2003. Issue 4: Exclusion of evidence Ball argues that the AJ’s exclusion of another doctor’s handwritten medical opinion and his medical records on Ball was erroneous. The Commission’s Procedural Rule 9 outlines several requirements that a party must fulfill in order to admit medical evidence, including medical opinions and medical records. In particular, Procedural Rule 9(1),(3)-(4) demands that a party moving to admit medical evidence is required to give the opposing party written notice at least thirty days prior to a scheduled hearing, and the moving party must attach a sworn statement from either the physician or the physician’s medical records custodian stating that the requisite-attached medical record is a true and correct copy of a medical record kept in the regular course of the physician’s practice. Here, Ball blatantly failed to meet the requirements of Procedural Rule 9 in her attempted admission of new medical evidence. Ball’s counsel sought to introduce the new medical evidence well after the parties’ initially scheduled hearing. In fact, Ball failed to disclose the mere existence of medical evidence at the prehearing conference. Additionally, Ball did not include a sworn statement from either the doctor or his medical-records custodian affirming that the opinion and the records were true and correct copies of medical records kept in the regular course of the doctor’s practice. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
