Wales v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-00473-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-29-2011 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery & Aggravated assault - Trial in absentia - Section 99-17-9 - Sufficiency of evidence - Intent jury instructions Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens, Pierce and King, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-19-2009 Appealed from: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: Appellant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. Case Number: 09-853CRY |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Leo Wales |
OFFICE OF INDIGENT APPEALS: HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD |
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| Topic: | Armed robbery & Aggravated assault - Trial in absentia - Section 99-17-9 - Sufficiency of evidence - Intent jury instructions |
| Summary of the Facts: | Leo Wales was tried in absentia for two counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. The jury found Wales guilty on all counts. The court sentenced Wales for Count I, aggravated assault, to twenty years, to run concurrently with all counts; for Count II, armed robbery, to forty years, to run concurrently with all counts; for Count III, aggravated assault, to twenty years, to run consecutively to Count IV and concurrently with Counts I and II; and for Count IV, armed robbery, to forty years, to run consecutively to Count III and concurrently with Counts I and II. Also, the trial court sentenced Wales to an additional five years on each of the four counts, to run consecutively to all counts, pursuant to the firearm enhancement of section 97-37-37(1). Wales appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Trial in absentia Wales was released from jail on bond, and he failed to appear for trial. His attorney notified the trial court that he had communicated the trial date and time to Wales on two occasions in the previous week. Defense counsel also checked the courthouse for Wales and called the home where Wales lived with his grandmother, to no avail. The trial court continued the trial until the next day so that Wales could be located. The proceedings resumed two days later. Because Wales still had not been located, the prosecutor informed the trial court about the efforts that had been made to find him. Applying section 99-17-9, the trial court found that Wales had waived his right to be present at the trial and ordered the trial to proceed in his absence. Wales now argues that the trial court’s decision to try him in absentia was prejudicial and violated his constitutional right to be present at his trial. A waiver of a constitutional right is ordinarily valid only if there is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Section 99-17-9 allows the trial in absentia of a defendant in default for nonappearance on felony charges, in the trial court’s discretion. But this discretion necessarily must be limited by the fact that a felony defendant has a constitutional right to be present at trial. However, this right is subject to waiver if there is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege. A defendant who has committed willful, voluntary, and deliberate actions to avoid trial has waived the right to be present at trial and may be tried in absentia. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wales voluntarily had absented himself from the trial. There is no doubt that Wales knew the trial date, did not appear, and could not be located. In addition, a review of the record shows that Wales received a fair trial and suffered no prejudice from his willful absence. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence Wales challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction on Count I, the aggravated assault of one of the victims. Wales admits the evidence was sufficient to show that he and his co-defendant were armed with deadly weapons. But he argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he attempted to cause bodily injury to the victim with a deadly weapon because he aimed and fired his gun at the other victim. The evidence was sufficient to have enabled a rational juror to find Wales guilty of the aggravated assault of the victim beyond a reasonable doubt. Intent ordinarily must be inferred from the acts and conduct of the party and the facts and circumstances attending them. When Wales fired the gun into the car, he first stood at the driver’s side window, and then in front of the car, firing into the windshield. The victim was in the passenger seat. While it is impossible to know what actually was in Wales’s mind as he fired the gun, Wales’s intent to shoot the victim reasonably may be inferred from the fact that he fired shots into a car in which she was a passenger, and in her direction. Issue 3: Jury instructions The trial court gave two jury instructions on armed robbery. The instructions were identical, except for the names of the victims and the items which Wales took or attempted to take from them. Wales argues that, although the language of instruction his proposed instruction is not set out in the armed-robbery statute, it is a correct statement of the law, and its denial left the jury inadequately informed of the State’s burden of proof on the armed-robbery counts. He argues that caselaw requires that, in an armed-robbery case, the jury must be instructed that the State has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant took the personal property of another with the intent to permanently deprive that person of his property. The issue of felonious intent is for the jury, and the specific intent to steal must be proven in robbery cases. The jury must be instructed that felonious intent is the intent to deprive the person permanently of his or her property only when the evidence has raised an issue as to whether the defendant had the intent to permanently deprive the person of his or her property. In this case, there was no uncertainty that Wales intended to permanently deprive the victims of their personal property. Wales’s defense theory did not call into question his intent in taking the property. Thus, the jury instructions adequately instructed the jury on the element of felonious intent. |
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