Manning v. State


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Docket Number: 2001-DR-00230-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2001-DR-00230-SCT ; 2001-DR-00230-SCT ; 2001-DR-00230-SCT ; 2001-DR-00230-SCT ; 2001-DR-00230-SCT ; 2001-DR-00230-SCT ; 2001-DR-00230-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Date: 08-04-2005
Opinion Author: Carlson, J.
Holding: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Denied

Additional Case Information: Topic: Death penalty post-conviction relief - Exculpatory evidence - Polygraph evidence - Ineffective assistance of counsel
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Dickinson and Randolph, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, Easley and Graves, JJ.
Nature of the Case: PCR

Note: The motion for rehearing is granted. The original opinion is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor. Appellant's Motion to Amend Petition to Conform to Evidence Introduced by the State at Evidentiary Hearing is denied. Appellant's Objections to the Circuit Court's "Evidentiary Hearing Order" are denied.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Willie Jerome Manning a/k/a "Fly"








 

Appellee: State of Mississippi  

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Topic: Death penalty post-conviction relief - Exculpatory evidence - Polygraph evidence - Ineffective assistance of counsel

Summary of the Facts: The motion for rehearing is granted, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. Willie Manning was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Manning’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court. Manning has now filed a petition to proceed in the trial court on post-conviction relief.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Exculpatory evidence Manning argues that the State presented testimony from a witness that included numerous lies and misrepresentations; that the State knew or should have known that the witness was lying; and, that despite exercising due diligence defense counsel was not able to uncover impeachment material. For exculpatory material to mandate a new trial, the defendant must prove that the State possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. In this case, defense counsel was given every opportunity to listen to the tapes and view the transcripts, as all evidence was made available to defense counsel, and no evidence was intentionally withheld by the State. Additionally, when applying the four-part test, the trial court finding on this issue is supported by the record. Issue 2: Polygraph evidence The court allowed the State to question a witness about his volunteering to take the polygraph, and Manning argues that questioning a witness about his or her willingness to take a polygraph is improper. Manning also argues that he had no opportunity to rebut this evidence and that he was denied his full right to discovery about the polygraph test. At the time of Manning’s 1994 trial, the trial court properly followed case precedent in allowing the State to attempt to rehabilitate a witness by questioning him regarding his agreement to take a polygraph test, and this was upheld on direct appeal. Since that time, the Supreme Court has held that testimony pertaining to a witness’s offer to take a polygraph, whether it be a witness for the State or the defense, is not admissible at trial. Because this new rule was a procedural rule and it did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure, its holding may not be retroactively applied to Manning’s case which was final on direct review. Issue 3: Ineffective assistance of counsel Manning argues that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to properly impeach a witness (jailhouse informant) and failing to cross-examine him about certain details of his testimony and any deal that may have been struck with the State in exchange for the testimony and for failing to uncover evidence to impeach another jailhouse informant. The transcript indicates that the defense counsel cross-examined the witness and attempted to discredit his testimony. Manning’s defense counsel’s performance was not deficient merely because he did not conduct the cross-examination of the witness in every regard as the post-conviction counsel asserts he should have done. Manning argues that defense counsel had a conflict of interest because he had previously represented one of the State’s key witnesses on bad check charges. The attorney’s representation was completely unrelated to the events and charges of the Manning case. This issue has been litigated and is barred as a basis for post-conviction relief, and alternatively, upon consideration, it is also without merit. Manning also argues that his attorney failed to take steps to establish the falsity of the testimony of this witness about his representation of her and he failed to impeach her with the vast number of bad checks that she had written since she first began giving statements to the sheriff. Defense counsel conducted a full cross-examination of the witness and while she did make comments as to defense counsel’s past representation of her, it was not in such a way as to prejudice Manning’s defense or cause counsel to be ineffective. Manning argues that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to develop more substantial evidence in support of his alibi. Manning fails to establish that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient where counsel produced several witnesses placing Manning at a nightclub on the night of the murder. Manning argues that trial counsel had a duty to uncover all relevant mitigating evidence and to conduct a thorough investigation into possible mitigating evidence. Manning’s defense attorney did in fact present a case in mitigation for the jury to consider. Furthermore, this claim was raised on direct appeal and the Court found that Manning failed to show prejudice related to the trial counsel’s failure to call other witnesses. Manning argues that because of the lack of investigation and preparation for the penalty phase of trial, the defense counsel had nothing substantial to present in his closing argument. On direct appeal, the Court found that trial counsel’s closing argument was coherent and not a poor strategic choice. Manning argues that the prosecutor’s remark during the State’s closing argument improperly elaborated on religious themes and violated his constitutional right to a reliable determination of his sentence. This claim is barred for failure to raise it on direct appeal. In addition, Biblical or scriptural references in closing arguments are within the broad latitude afforded at trial.


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