Brooks v. Purvis


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Docket Number: 2010-CA-00184-COA
Oral Argument: 06-30-2011
 

 

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Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-20-2011
Opinion Author: Carlton, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Opinion testimony - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 702 - Social security disability benefits - Collateral source rule - Damages
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Maxwell and Russell, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-15-2009
Appealed from: Perry County Circuit Court
Judge: Robert Helfrich
Disposition: JURY AWARDED KEITH BROOKS ZERO DAMAGES AND AWARDED SANDRA BROOKS $75,000
Case Number: 2004-0046 C1

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Keith Brooks and Sandra Brooks




MARTIN D. CRUMP LESLIE HANCOCK LANG



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Victor R. Purvis CECIL MAISON HEIDELBERG  

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    Topic: Personal injury - Opinion testimony - M.R.E. 701 - M.R.E. 702 - Social security disability benefits - Collateral source rule - Damages

    Summary of the Facts: Keith Brooks and Sandra Brooks sued Victor Purvis for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. A jury returned a verdict awarding Keith zero damages and awarding Sandra $75,000 in damages. The Brookses appeal.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Opinion testimony Purvis designated an officer with the Perry County Sheriff’s Department as an expert witness. The officer responded to the scene of the accident, and he completed an accident report. However, the officer was unavailable to attend the trial due to military deployment, so the parties deposed him by videotape for use at trial. After the videotaped deposition, the Brookses filed a motion in limine to exclude the officer’s testimony regarding his opinion of the point of impact of the accident and regarding the position of the vehicles at the moment of impact. The Brookses argue that the officer was neither qualified nor tendered as an expert witness at any point during the proceedings. They also claim that he lacked qualifications to render a conclusion about how other drivers normally drove down Sand Ridge Road, and the Brookses argue that the officer’s testimony and conclusions in the deposition constituted accident-reconstruction testimony. M.R.E. 701 provides that if the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are rationally based on the perception of the witness, helpful to the clear understanding of the testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Here, the officer’s deposition testimony was based on his observations at the scene of the accident — not on any scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Also, the record shows that the Brookses’ counsel opened the door to the officer’s testimony regarding the tire tracks on the road. Additionally, a police officer not qualified as an accident reconstructionist expert can testify to what he found and observed at the scene of the accident upon his arrival. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s admission of this testimony. Issue 2: Social security disability benefits The Brookses filed a motion in limine to preclude any evidence or testimony related to the fact that they were on social-security disability or received social-security disability benefits prior to the October 2001 accident. The Brookses argue that such information is irrelevant to causation and damages, and they claim that such testimony risked prejudicing the jury against them. They assert that they conceded their preexisting conditions. The Brookses’ preexisting conditions, as listed in their social-security applications, relate to the current complaint for injuries allegedly resulting from the accident at issue. Additionally, Keith testified that his medical bills from the Veterans Affairs hospital for preexisting conditions were combined with the bills for medical treatment sought after the accident at issue. Since the Brookses argue that the current accident caused limitations on their activities as well as limited mobility, Purvis argues that the circuit court did not err in allowing him to present evidence of the Brookses’ disability application and benefits. Purvis claims that one of the key issues in the case was causation pertaining specifically to whether the Brookses’ injuries were caused by the accident. Any evidence tending to show that any part of the plaintiff’s injury may have occurred as a result of some other cause is relevant. A defendant can only be liable for damages resulting from his negligence. The Brookses also argue that Purvis violated the collateral-source rule by offering the evidence related to the social-security benefits. The collateral-source rule states that compensation or indemnity for the loss received by plaintiff from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, as from insurance, cannot be set up by the defendant in mitigation or reduction of damages. However, the collateral-source rule applies only when the indemnity or compensation is for the same injury for which damages are sought. Here, the record shows that the Brookses applied for and received social-security-disability payments for injuries arising from a different incident that left Keith with chronic pain and lack of mobility. Additionally, the entries in the applications as to prior injuries and preexisting conditions show a progression in intensity over time, resulting in increased pain and a lack of physical mobility prior to the current accident. Significantly, Keith testified that his bills from the Veterans Affairs hospital for his preexisting injuries were combined with his bills resulting from the current accident, and he testified that even he could not distinguish between his different bills and treatments. Thus, this issue is without merit. Issue 3: Damages The Brookses argue that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury’s award of zero damages to Keith was inadequate. It is primarily the province of the jury to determine the amount of damages to be awarded; thus, the award will normally not be set aside unless so unreasonable in amount as to strike mankind at first blush as being beyond all measure, unreasonable in amount and outrageous. The record shows that Purvis presented evidence showing that Keith was living in “chronic pain” before the automobile accident and possessed numerous preexisting physical health conditions. As a result, the jury’s award of zero damages for Keith is supported by the evidence presented at trial.


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