Goforth v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-01341-SCT | |
| Oral Argument: | 05-12-2011 | |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-15-2011 Opinion Author: Waller, C.J. Holding: Reversed and rendered |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sexual battery - Right of confrontation - M.R.E. 803(5) - M.R.E. 403 - Lack of memory - Prior testimonial statement - Double jeopardy Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler, Pierce and King, JJ. Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-13-2010 Appealed from: Newton County Circuit Court Judge: Marcus D. Gordon Disposition: Convicted of two counts of sexual battery and aquitted of three counts of sexual battery. Case Number: 10-CR-040-NW-G |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Amanda Goforth |
CHARLES W. WRIGHT, JR.
L. BROOKS HOOPER |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS |
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| Topic: | Sexual battery - Right of confrontation - M.R.E. 803(5) - M.R.E. 403 - Lack of memory - Prior testimonial statement - Double jeopardy |
| Summary of the Facts: | Amanda Goforth, a former high-school teacher, was indicted on five counts of sexual battery involving one of her former students. She was convicted on two counts and acquitted on the remaining three. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Right to confrontation A written statement signed by Chase Rigdon, dated November 23, 2009, was admitted and read before the jury at trial. The State called Rigdon as a witness at trial. A January 2010 automobile accident had substantially impaired his physical and mental conditions. He was confined to a wheelchair, and he testified that he could not remember anything that had occurred two years prior to the wreck. He could not remember going to Goforth’s house, speaking to any officers about the alleged incident, or writing out a statement. He recognized his signature at the bottom of the statement, but he could only “guess” that the statement itself had been written by him. A deputy testified that he was present when Rigdon provided the statement. The State then sought to admit Rigdon’s statement under M.R.E. 803(5). Goforth objected on the basis that Rigdon was unavailable as a witness, that she had a constitutional right to cross-examine the witnesses against her, and that, under M.R.E. 403, the statement’s probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, the trial judge admitted Ridgdon’s statement. Goforth argues on appeal that the Confrontation Clauses in both the federal and state constitutions were violated because she was not able to confront Rigdon about his prior statement, because his complete memory loss rendered him essentially unavailable for cross-examination. Even if Rigdon’s statement was admissible under the “recorded recollection” hearsay exception of Rule 803(5), it is still subject to scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause. Many courts have found that a declarant’s appearance and subjection to cross-examination at trial are all that is necessary to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, even if his or her memory is faulty. If the Confrontation Clause requires solely that the declarant be physically present and subject to cross-examination, its demands were satisfied in this case. Without question, Rigdon physically appeared at trial and was subject to cross-examination. However, physical appearance alone is not necessarily dispositive. Rigdon, though physically present at trial, did not have the requisite, minimal ability or capacity to act. Significantly, no one here disputes that Rigdon’s total loss of memory was genuine. Nothing in the record indicates that Rigdon’s memory loss was feigned. He had no recollection of the underlying events surrounding his statement, and he could not even remember having known Goforth or the victim. It was, in his mind, as if the alleged events had never occurred. Additionally, he could not recall ever having spoken to police. This total lack of memory deprived Goforth any opportunity to inquire about potential bias or the circumstances surrounding Rigdon’s statement. Accordingly, the admission of Rigdon’s prior testimonial statement violated the Confrontation Clause in Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution. Because Rigdon’s prior testimonial statement was, perhaps, the most damaging evidence against Goforth, those violations were not harmless and constituted reversible error. Issue 2: Double jeopardy Goforth argues that her conviction and sentence must be reversed and rendered because any subsequent retrial would subject her to double jeopardy. She asserts that the indictment included five identical, sexual-battery counts, but that it failed to distinguish those counts in any way. The jury then returned a split verdict, acquitting her on three counts and finding her guilty on two counts. Because each of the five counts was identical, she maintains that there is no way to know which specific crimes she was convicted or acquitted on. An indictment must contain sufficient facts to enable a defendant to plead double jeopardy in the event of a future prosecution for the same offense. The multiple, identically worded counts in the indictment here failed to protect Goforth’s constitutional right against double jeopardy in the event of future prosecution. Neither the indictment nor the charging instruction differentiated among the five counts. Although the jury stated that it had found Goforth guilty on counts one and two, but not guilty on counts three through five, there is no identifiable basis for their distinction among the counts. As a result, the basis for the jury’s split verdict cannot be determined without conjecture. Should Goforth be retried, neither she nor anyone else would be able to determine on which specific charges she previously was acquitted or convicted. Accordingly, Goforth cannot be prosecuted again on these charges or for any same crimes that occurred during the time period set forth in her indictment. |
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