Richardson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-00511-SCT Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-00511-SCT |
|
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 09-15-2011 Opinion Author: Carlson, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Capital murder & Felon in possession of firearm - Motion to suppress - Miranda rights - Severance of counts - Other crimes’ evidence - M.R.E. 404(b) - Photograph Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Dickinson, P.J., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler, Pierce and King, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-27-2010 Appealed from: Lowndes County Circuit Court Judge: James T. Kitchens, Jr. Disposition: Appellant was convicted of capital murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to life without parole for capital murder and ten years for the felony-possession-of-firearm conviction. District Attorney: Forrest Allgood Case Number: 2007-0184-CR1 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Michael Shane Richardson |
OFFICE OF INDIGENT APPEALS: LESLIE S. LEE |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOHN R. HENRY, JR. |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Capital murder & Felon in possession of firearm - Motion to suppress - Miranda rights - Severance of counts - Other crimes’ evidence - M.R.E. 404(b) - Photograph |
| Summary of the Facts: | Michael Richardson was convicted of capital murder and of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The State sought the death penalty at the sentencing phase, but the jury returned a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the capital murder charge. The trial judge sentenced Richardson to serve life without parole for the capital-murder conviction, and to serve ten years imprisonment for the felony-possession-of-firearm conviction. Richardson appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion to suppress Richardson argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, because the statement that he made to police is inadmissible under Miranda. He claims that his requests for counsel were not honored. A confession is admissible if the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s confession was voluntary by showing that such confession was not the product of promises, threats or inducement. The trial court was presented with contradicting testimony regarding the voluntariness of Richardson’s statements. On one side, Richardson consistently claimed that he had asked to speak with an attorney and that his requests had been ignored. On the other hand, two law-enforcement officers testified that Richardson never had made these requests and that he voluntarily had given the statement, signed a written statement, and signed a waiver of rights. When viewing all of the evidence as a whole from the record, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Richardson’s motion to suppress his statement. Issue 2: Severance of counts Richardson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever Counts I and II of his indictment because of the “explosive nature” of the capital-murder charge. He argues that the two crimes were separate and distinct and that the evidence needed to establish the second count of being a felon in possession of a firearm – specifically evidence of his prior aggravated-assault conviction – was unduly prejudicial. In trials concerning multi-count indictments, severance is unnecessary in Mississippi if the acts or transactions are connected together as part of a common scheme or plan and if the indictment was otherwise proper. When deciding whether a multicount indictment was proper, the trial court should consider the time period between the offenses, whether the evidence proving each count would be admissible to prove each of the other counts, and whether the crimes are interwoven. Richardson robbed the victim around 2:00 p.m. and purchased two guns later that same afternoon. Thus, the crimes occurred within a relatively short time period. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Richardson’s counts should be tried together, despite evidence being needed to prove each count that would not be admissible to prove the other count. The trial court recognized that there would be different witnesses and different evidence for the two crimes. Richardson was given the opportunity to stipulate before the jury to the prior felony conviction, without any reference to the nature of the offense (aggravated assault) for which Richardson was convicted, or any other details of the prior conviction, the defendant, through counsel, chose not to stipulate to the prior conviction for the purpose of proof of an element of the offense of felony firearm possession. Also, the trial court did instruct the jury that the two counts were separate offenses and should be considered separately. Richardson’s charges have a “common thread” – the money stolen from the victim. The underlying felony in Richardson’s murder charge is robbery. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Richardson’s two charges were interwoven. Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court in today’s case erred in denying Richardson’s motion to sever, the error was harmless and did not result in Richardson’s trial being fundamentally unfair. Issue 3: Other crimes’ evidence Richardson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of other crimes and bad acts – in particular, the purchase and use of cocaine and possession of firearms. Pursuant to M.R.E. 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith but may be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Evidence was presented at trial that, typically, Richardson did not carry large amounts of money, and that the victim had given Richardson financial help in the past. A witness testified that, after the murder and robbery, Richardson had stated to him that “he had robbed somebody and that he had some money to get some drugs.” Another witness testified that Richardson had given her a one-hundred-dollar bill to pay for gasoline and cigarettes and that Richardson had paid for the drugs she had used. This evidence, coupled with the testimony that Richardson had purchased the cocaine and guns shortly after he had robbed the victim, tends to show Richardson’s pecuniary motive. Also, evidence of Richardson’s actions after the crimes was relevant for the jury to hear “the whole story” to compare Richardson’s post-crime actions concerning how he used the money with his statement to law enforcement personnel that the money taken in the murder and robbery was to be distributed “to other people.” Issue 4: Photograph Richardson argues that the trial court erred in admitting a photograph of the victim’s brain. The photograph was taken during the autopsy and showed the victim’s brain after his scalp and part of his skull had been removed. Photographs have evidentiary value when they aid in describing the circumstances of the killing, describe the location of the body and cause of death, or supplement or clarify witness testimony. Here, the trial court found that the photograph was relevant because the victim had died approximately three and one half months after being hit in the head, and the photograph had helped to establish the age of the victim’s brain injury. The photograph was used to supplement Dr. Hayne’s testimony regarding the injury to the victim’s brain. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
