Johnson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2003-KA-02139-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-16-2005 Opinion Author: Graves, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sale of cocaine within 1500 feet of church - Sufficiency of evidence - Pretrial identification - Admission of cocaine - M.R.E. 901(a) - Sentence - Reasonable doubt instruction Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-12-2003 Appealed from: Wayne Circuit Court Judge: Robert Bailey Disposition: John L. Johnson was convicted of the sale of cocaine within fifteen hundred feet of a church and was sentenced Johnson to a term of thirty years imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections without early release. Johnson timely appealed and charges the trial court with numerous errors. District Attorney: Bilbo Mitchell Case Number: 03-036-K |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | John L. Johnson a/k/a Johnny L. Johnson |
LESLIE D. ROUSELL, PRO SE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Sale of cocaine within 1500 feet of church - Sufficiency of evidence - Pretrial identification - Admission of cocaine - M.R.E. 901(a) - Sentence - Reasonable doubt instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | John Johnson was convicted of the sale of cocaine within fifteen hundred feet of a church and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Johnson argues that the discrepancies in the weight of the cocaine cannot support the conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the cocaine introduced against him in court is the same substance that the officers supposedly purchased from him. Johnson also argues that the State introduced insufficient evidence to prove that the alleged sale took place within 1,500 feet of a church. The State rebutted Johnson by introducing testimony of the officers who conducted the drug buy and a surveillance recording of the sale itself. While the officer Tolbert admitted that he did not make an actual measurement of the distance to the church, he approximated the distance as roughly thirty yards and testified that he drove from the spot of the sale to the church and that the distance was too short to even register one tenth of a mile on the odometer of his vehicle. Any conflicts in the evidence introduced at trial were resolved by the jury and such evidence was not so deficient that reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment could not conclude that Johnson was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue 2: Pretrial identification Johnson argues that the suggestive nature of the pre-court identification procedure used by the officers in this case constituted a denial of his fourteenth amendment right to due process of law. Factors for determining the reliability of an identification procedure where the confrontation was suggestive include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Here, the officer testified that he stood face to face from Johnson at a distance of a few feet, was in his presence for approximately two to three minutes, and held a conversation with him. The officer’s degree of attention can be considered to be at a high level because he did not view Johnson in passing or from a great distance; rather, he conducted the drug purchase with Johnson up close and over a period of three to four minutes. The officer’s prior description was accurate. The officer exhibited a high degree of certainty regarding his identification of Johnson, testifying that he was 100% sure that the person in the picture he was shown was the perpetrator. The officer testified that he was shown the photograph of Johnson about five days after the drug deal. Under these circumstances, there was little likelihood of misidentification. Johnson also argues that his due process rights were violated by the court’s admission of the booking photo from his arrest. While the State offered no specific reason for the photo’s introduction into evidence, after previously being introduced for identification purposes, the record does not establish that the photograph was prejudicial or suggestive of other crimes. Issue 3: Admission of cocaine Johnson objects to the judge’s admission of the crack cocaine introduced at trial, which he raises for the first time on appeal, based on an alleged break in the chain of custody. The State offered sufficient testimony from witnesses to satisfy the requirement of M.R.E. 901(a) for establishing a proper chain of custody for admission of the cocaine at trial. Moreover, the court specifically asked defense counsel if he had any objections to introduction of the cocaine either as an exhibit for identification purposes only or for admission into evidence and counsel did not object on either occasion which bars this issue from review. Issue 4: Sentence A sentence cannot be disturbed on appeal so long as it does not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute. A sentence of thirty years given to Johnson was well within the statutory limit. Issue 5: Reasonable doubt instruction Johnson argues that the court erred when it refused his reasonable doubt instruction. A trial judge may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is without foundation in the evidence, or is stated elsewhere in the instructions. Johnson’s proposed instruction does not attempt to state any theory of his case; rather, he merely attempts to define reasonable doubt. The instruction was cumulative of a more succinct instruction on reasonable doubt. |
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