Hobbs Automotive, Inc. v. Dorsey


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Docket Number: 2003-CA-02654-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2003-CA-02654-SCT ; 2003-CA-02654-SCT ; 2003-CA-02654-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-15-2005
Opinion Author: Smith, C.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Jurisdiction - Section 9-9-21 - M.R.C.P. 13(h) - Spot-delivery transaction - Reforming jury verdict
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, P.J., Easley, Carlson and Randolph, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J.
Dissenting Author : Dickinson, J.
Dissent Joined By : Cobb, P.J.
Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-02-2003
Appealed from: Jones County Circuit Court
Judge: Billy Joe Landrum
Disposition: The Dealership moved to dismiss its complaint, which the court granted. A jury trial was conducted on August 16-17, 2001, regarding the Dorseys’ counterclaim, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Dorseys in the amount of $100,000.
Case Number: 2002-156-CV5

Note: The motion for rehearing filed by James and Shelia Dorsey is granted. The prior opinion is withdrawn, and these opinions are substituted therefor. Motion of Pitts Swabbing Service, Inc. for Leave to File an Amicus Brief is denied. Motion filed by Hobbs Automotive, Inc., to Strike Motion of Pitts Swabbing Service, Inc., for Leave to FIle an Amicus Brief is denied as moot.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Hobbs Automotive, Inc., d/b/a Kim's Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Toyota




MARCUS DOUGLAS EVANS, ROBERT D. GHOLSON, THOMAS T. BUCHANAN



 

Appellee: Shelia S. Dorsey and James Dorsey LAWRENCE E. ABERNATHY, III  

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Topic: Contract - Jurisdiction - Section 9-9-21 - M.R.C.P. 13(h) - Spot-delivery transaction - Reforming jury verdict

Summary of the Facts: The motion for rehearing is granted, and these opinions are substituted for the original opinions. James and Shelia Dorsey purchased a vehicle from Hobbs Automotive, Inc., d/b/a Kim’s Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Toyota. A dispute arose regarding the sale of the vehicle and its financing which resulted in the Dealership filing a complaint for replevin against the Dorseys in the County Court of Jones County. The Dorseys filed an answer and a counterclaim, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and fraudulent inducement. The Dorseys’ counterclaim sought compensatory damages in an amount not to exceed $100,000 and punitive damages of an unspecified amount. The Dealership moved to dismiss its complaint, which the court granted. A jury trial was conducted regarding the Dorseys’ counterclaim, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Dorseys in the amount of $100,000. The Dealership appealed to the Jones County Circuit Court, which affirmed the judgment. The Dealership appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Jurisdiction At the time of the suit, section 9-9-21 stated that counterclaims could not exceed $75,000; moreover, if this amount was exceeded, then upon the parties’ notice, the county court was required to transfer the case to either circuit or chancery court which would then exercise jurisdiction over the matter. The 1974 amendment to the statute specifically allowed counterclaims that exceeded the original jurisdictional authority of the county courts. Stated another way, this amendment kept lawsuits in county court even if the setoff, counterclaims, or cross-claims requested an amount exceeding the jurisdictional limits of the county courts. According to the 1974 amendment, if the case was to be transferred to the circuit court it must be done upon motion of all parties. Moreover, absent a joinder of all parties to the motion, the case should remain in county court. M.R.C.P. 13(h) is controlling. Issue 2: Spot-delivery transaction The Dealership argues that the Dorsey transaction was a spot-delivery and the conditional language in the purchase order was a condition precedent to its obligation to sell the car. The Dealership also argues that by excluding testimony regarding the conditional nature of the contract, the court prevented it from presenting its primary defense. The judge’s ruling was not error. The language of the purchase order relied upon by the Dealership is not a condition precedent. The provision merely provides that the Dealership is not obligated to sell until the approval of the terms is given by a bank or finance company. Further, the Dealership’s obligation to sell suspends until the requirements of the provision are met. However, not being under an obligation to sell the automobile did not prevent the Dealership from selling to the Dorseys. Therefore, the question then becomes whether the Dealership chose to do that which it was not obligated to do. Based upon the considerable evidence supporting a sale and the dearth of any evidence to the contrary, the trial court was not in error in finding that the transaction with the Dorseys was a sale. Issue 3: Reforming jury verdict After deliberating for almost two hours, the jury returned a verdict in an unusual form. The jury determined that the Dorseys were entitled to “$100,000 for fraud.” The trial court recognized that the jury’s verdict was “a kind of special verdict”, nevertheless the trial court also commented that “it is clear what they mean.” Subsequently, the court reformed the unusual verdict and entered a final judgement for the plaintiffs in the amount of $100,000. Admittedly, the better procedure would have been for the trial judge to review the form of the verdict in the presence of the lawyers and note that it did not conform to the specific instruction given as to form of the verdict and then, direct that the jury should return to the jury room, tell the jury that they had already been properly instructed regarding the form of the verdict, read carefully the proper form of the verdict which had been submitted to them in the existing jury instructions and for them to write their verdict following the exact language of that instruction. This procedure was not followed by the trial judge. The jury’s intent is unambiguous; it awarded Dorsey $100,000 as compensation for fraud. Further, the record clearly shows that the allegations of fraud were pled and proved at trial and damages were properly awarded to the Dorseys. Accordingly, the verdict of the jury and the decision of the trial judge to reform the verdict is affirmed.


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