Smith v. Waggoner's Trucking Corp., et al.


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2009-CA-01876-COA
Oral Argument: 04-12-2011
 

 

* This video is best viewed in the most current version of Google Chrome, Internet Explorer with Windows Media Player plug-in, or Safari (Mac Users).


Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 08-30-2011
Opinion Author: Maxwell, J.
Holding: Reversed and remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Duty of reasonable care - M.R.C.P. 56 - Section 63-3-805 - Section 63-3-807 - Section 63-3-903 - Comparative negligence - Section 63-3-619(1)
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Russell, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Carlton, J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 11-03-2009
Appealed from: Washington County Circuit Court
Judge: Richard Smith
Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TO DEFENDANTS
Case Number: CI-2007-232

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Suzette Smith




MICHAEL RICHARD BROWN THANDI WADE



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: The Waggoner's Trucking Corporation and Antonio Watson LEANN W. NEALEY ARTHUR D. SPRATLIN JR. JODY EDWARD OWENS II  

    Synopsis provided by:

    If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
    hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.

    Topic: Personal injury - Duty of reasonable care - M.R.C.P. 56 - Section 63-3-805 - Section 63-3-807 - Section 63-3-903 - Comparative negligence - Section 63-3-619(1)

    Summary of the Facts: Suzette Smith’s vehicle rear-ended a non-party’s Chevrolet Suburban. The Suburban was stopped on Highway 82 to allow Antonio Watson to complete a parking maneuver of a tractor-trailer. Smith sued Watson and his employer, Waggoners Trucking Corporation, alleging Watson’s negligence caused the injuries she sustained. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Watson and Waggoners. Smith appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Duty of reasonable care M.R.C.P. 56 does not permit trial courts to err on the side of the non-movant. To survive summary judgment, Smith did not have to present an irrefutable case of Watson’s negligence. She merely had to present a triable case. As the plaintiff in a negligence claim, Smith bears the duty to prove the elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. The circuit court held Smith failed to make a sufficient showing to establish the element of duty. “Duty” is conformity to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of others against the unreasonable risk of injury. Watson and Waggoners argue that Watson owed no duty to Smith because undisputed evidence proved he had the right of way. They argue that Watson had only a statutory duty, pursuant to sections 63-3-805 & -807, when entering Highway 82, to yield to cars that were an “immediate hazard.” And because Smith approached Watson after other cars had already stopped and yielded, she did not present an immediate hazard. Smith argues the circuit court erred in finding Watson owed no duty because: Watson owed a statutory duty under section 63-3-903, which prohibits leaving a vehicle on a highway for an unreasonable amount of time; a jury question exists whether Watson had the right-of-way under sections 63-3-805 and 807; and Watson’s duty was not limited to ensuring he had the right-of-way at the beginning of his parking maneuver. Section 63-3-903 only applies “outside of a business or residence district.” The section of Highway 82 where Watson was parking was between two businesses. Thus, the circuit court committed no error in dismissing Smith’s claim Watson owed her a duty under this statute. Smith’s second argument is not dispositive. However, the circuit court’s taking the “immediate hazard” question away from the jury is questionable since whether an approaching vehicle presents an “immediate hazard” is a question of fact. With regard to Smith’s third argument, Smith need not prove a statutory violation to establish duty because Watson, like all drivers, owed a general common-law duty of reasonable care. Therefore, even if Watson had the right-of-way, according to sections 63-3-805 and -807, when he pulled out onto Highway 82, he still owed a duty of reasonable care during the entire parking maneuver. Thus, the circuit court erred in determining the only duty Watson could have violated was his statutory duty to yield the right of way. Further, in finding Watson owed no duty under sections 63-3-805 and -807, the circuit court erroneously limited its focus to the moment Watson pulled out onto Highway 82. The circuit court should have considered whether the entire parking maneuver created a foreseeable risk to approaching drivers. The duration and time of the maneuver goes to the reasonableness of Watson’s parking attempt. That other vehicles stopped is a fact for the jury’s consideration when evaluating reasonableness, but it does not, as a matter of law, establish Watson owed no duty to Smith. Because the possibility of a collision with approaching cars was foreseeable, Watson owed the approaching vehicles the duty of reasonable care. Issue 2: Comparative negligence Mississippi is a pure comparative negligence state. Therefore, a plaintiff, like Smith, although likely highly negligent herself, may still recover from a defendant whose negligence contributed to her injuries. Under Mississippi’s comparative-negligence doctrine, juries are permitted to consider whether negligence by both parties is concurrent and contributes to injury. Even assuming Smith’s speeding was undisputed, the circuit court erred in deciding as a matter of law her speeding was the sole proximate cause of her injuries. Evidence of Smith’s speeding and her failure to brake sooner, along with her alleged violation of section 63-3-619(1), which prohibits tailgating, are facts for the jury to consider when determining whether Watson and/or Smith were negligent and, if so, in what proportion.


    Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court