Stewart v. City of Jackson, et al.
| Docket Number: | 1999-IA-01527-SCT Linked Case(s): 1999-IA-01527-SCT ; 1999-IA-01527-SCT ; 1999-IA-01527-SCT ; 1999-IA-01527-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-12-2005 Opinion Author: Dickinson, J. Holding: Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Rendered in Part; and Reversed and Remanded in Part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Breach of implied contract - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-3(1) - Separate theories of recovery - Proof of damages - Foreseeability - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., and Carlson, J. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Graves, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Easley, J., Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part Without Separate Written Opinion Concurs in Result Only: Randolph, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-01-1999 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: James E. Graves, Jr. Disposition: Found both the City and the Hospital liable to the Appellee. Case Number: 98816CIV |
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| Consolidated: Consolidated with 2003-CA-01413-SCT City of Jackson, Mississippi and University of Mississippi Medical Center v. The Estate of Otha Stewart, Deceased, by and through its Administrator, Emma Womack; Hinds Circuit Court 1st District; LC Case #: 251-98-816-CIV; Ruling Date: 04/01/2003; Ruling Judge: Winston Kidd | ||
| Note: | MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 05/26/2005; DENIED AND OPINION MODIFIED AT ¶ ¶ 38, 39, 40, 43, 48, 49, 51, 55, 59, 61, 62 & 63 - 08/04/2005 | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Otha Stewart, by and through Emma Womack, her Daughter and Conservator of Her Person and Her Estate |
SHARON DIANE GIPSON, PIETER JOHN TEEUWISSEN, LANNY R. PACE, CORRIE SCHULER |
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| Appellee: | City of Jackson, Mississippi, and Doris B. Spiller | JAMES A. BOBO, MARK C. BAKER, SR., BERNARD C. JONES, JR. |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Breach of implied contract - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-3(1) - Separate theories of recovery - Proof of damages - Foreseeability - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Mrs. Otha Stewart suffered a stroke in 1978 which resulted in paralysis to the right side of her body. In 1993, she began attending an adult day care center in the city. To get to and from the day care center, she used a van service operated by the City of Jackson. One day, after exiting the van and before entering the day care center operated by the University of Mississippi Medical Center, she fell. Stewart sued the City, Spiller (the van driver), and the Hospital. Her daughter, Emma Womack, after being appointed conservator of the person and estate of Mrs. Stewart, was substituted as the plaintiff. The Hospital, the City, and Spiller filed motions for summary judgment. The court denied the Hospital’s motion and granted summary judgment to the City and Spiller. The plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal of the summary judgment granted to the City and Spiller. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding that the City was obligated under its contract to provide safe delivery of patrons to the day care center, and that Mrs. Stewart was a third-party beneficiary of that contractual obligation. The court awarded Mrs. Stewart’s Estate $500,000 on the tort claim, and $500,000 on the breach of contract claim. The court added these two sums together to reach a final verdict for Mrs. Stewart in the amount of $1,000,000. The Hospital and the City appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Breach of contract Section 11-46-3(1) of the Tort Claims Act provides that the state and its political subdivisions are immune from suit at law or in equity on account of any wrongful or tortious act or omission or breach of implied term or condition of any warranty or contract. The phrase “breach of implied term or condition of any warranty or contract” was added in the Legislature’s Special Session of 1992. There are two possible interpretations of the language in the statute. The statute either grants sovereign immunity for a “wrongful or tortious act or omission” and also grants sovereign immunity for “breach of implied term or condition of any warranty or contract,” or grants sovereign immunity for wrongful or tortious acts, and for wrongful or tortious omissions, and for wrongful or tortious breach of implied contract. The former interpretation is in complete harmony with the text of the statute. Furthermore, by granting sovereign immunity for claims of breach of implied contract, the statute does no violence to the reasoning in prior decisions which refused to allow the state and its political subdivisions to invoke sovereign immunity to escape its written contractual obligations. There is nothing in the language of the statute leading to the conclusion that a “breach of an implied term or condition of any warranty or contract” must be tortious. Therefore, section 11-46-3 grants immunity to the state and its political subdivisions for “breach of implied term or condition of any warranty or contract.” To the extent that several cases conflict with this holding, they are overruled. Thus, although Mrs. Stewart was indeed a third-party beneficiary of the written contract between the City and CMPDD, her estate may not pursue claims of breach of implied terms of that contract against the City or its political subdivisions. Whether there are claims for the estate to pursue for breach of express provisions of the contract must be addressed by the court upon remand. Both of Mrs. Stewart’s causes of action arise from the same set of operative facts, and they allege the same damage. Plaintiff argues that it was permissible for her to bring suit under both causes of action. The court correctly held that the maximum recovery against the City for Mrs. Stewart’s tort claim was $250,000. Her maximum recovery under her claim for breach of implied contract is also the same $250,000. However, these are the same damages awarded under two separate theories of recovery. As such, Mrs. Stewart’s estate is entitled to only one recovery. Thus, she may recover no more than $250,000, whether for negligence, breach of contract, or both. Issue 2: Proof of damages The Estate argues that Mrs. Stewart’s fall resulted in a stroke, and much evidence was admitted to establish an amount of compensation for the stroke. In order to recover damages related to the stroke, however, the Estate must show not only that the stroke resulted from the fall and that the fall resulted from a defendant’s negligence, but also that a stroke is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the alleged negligent act. Because the unchallenged expert testimony at trial established that stroke is not a foreseeable consequence of the alleged negligence which led to Mrs. Stewart’s fall, the estate may not recover damages related to the stroke, whether or not it was caused by the fall. Issue 3: Expert testimony Mrs. Stewart called a witness to testify as an expert and tendered him as an expert in administrating programs with a component of transporting the elderly and infirm. At the time of trial, the witness was the director of the Association for Retarded Citizens Programs in Warren County. None of his programs dealt specifically with the transportation of elderly citizens. The court allowed the expert to testify about numerous contracts, policies, regulations and forms including specific contract provisions, how they interacted, what standard of care they provided and who was bound by them. Matters of contract interpretation were clearly outside the tendered expertise of this witness. An expert may not offer so-called expert testimony in other areas in which he not even remotely meets the M.R.E. 702 criteria. Therefore, the court abused its discretion by allowing the witness to testify to integral contract matters without any expertise in contract interpretation. |
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