Dillard's, Inc. v. Johnson
| Docket Number: | 2003-IA-02723-SCT Linked Case(s): 2003-IA-02723-SCT ; 2003-IA-02723-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-05-2005 Opinion Author: Randolph, J. Holding: REVERSED AND REMANDED; WRIT OF PROHIBITION DENIED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Venue - M.R.C.P. 20(a) - Recusal of judge Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Carlson and Dickinson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Easley and Graves, JJ., Concur in Part and Dissent in Part Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-16-2003 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Tomie Green Disposition: Denied a Petition for Writ of Prohibition seeking the recusal of Judge Green and a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal of orders related to joinder. Case Number: 251-01-981-CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Dillard's, Inc. f/k/a Dillard Department Stores, Inc. |
DANIEL P. JORDAN, CHRISTY D. JONES, ROBERT L. JOHNSON |
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| Appellee: | Africia Johnson | DENNIS C. SWEET, OMAR LAMONT NELSON, DALE DANKS, JR., PIETER JOHN TEEUWISSEN |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Venue - M.R.C.P. 20(a) - Recusal of judge |
| Summary of the Facts: | Multiple plaintiffs allege that Dillard’s engaged in a scheme of racial discrimination or racial profiling resulting in the wrongful detention, harassment, and mistreatment of Dillard’s customers and employees at numerous Dillard’s store locations. The allegations of both complaints include diverse claims of false imprisonment, assault and battery, negligence, negligent control of servants, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, gross negligence and malice, as well as alter ego. Twenty-three plaintiffs filed the original complaint. Dillard’s moved to sever and dismiss the out-of-state claims. The motion was denied. Dillard’s filed a Notice of Removal, and the case was subsequently remanded back to the state court. The plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the first amended complaint to add thirteen additional plaintiffs. This motion was subsequently granted although plaintiffs never filed an amended complaint. Dillard’s filed a motion to recuse Circuit Court Judge Tomie Green. The motion was denied. The defendants then filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition seeking the recusal of Judge Green and a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal of the orders related to joinder. The Supreme Court granted Dillard’s permission to appeal both the joinder and recusal issues. A second case was consolidated with the first case. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Venue Dillard’s argues that the court abused its discretion when it failed to sever factually distinct claims against it and that the joinder of these claims into a single mass action exceeds the scope of permissible joinder under M.R.C.P. 20(a). The appropriateness of joinder decreases as the need for additional proof increases. If plaintiffs allege a single, primary wrongful act, the proof will be common to all plaintiffs; however separate proof will be required where there are several wrongful acts by several different actors. The need for separate proof is lessened only where the different wrongful acts are similar in type and character, and occur close in time and/or place. When an act or omission of a defendant does not affect all plaintiffs in much the same way, then there is probably not a distinct litigable event. These cases involve over seventy plaintiffs with over fifty diverse factual allegations that occurred in thirty-two separate stores, involving a multitude of different employees and witnesses, and occurred over a seven year time period. The claims allege incidents in ten separate states. Only one plaintiff alleges that a tort occurred in Hinds County, and she is the only plaintiff who has sued a Hinds County resident. The complaints cover a broad spectrum of issues, with a multitude of facts unique to individual plaintiffs. The majority, if not all of the claims will assuredly require separate witnesses to prove or disprove plaintiffs’ allegations and Dillard’s denials. Accordingly, the out-of-state plaintiffs with no connection to Mississippi and whose causes of action accrued out of state shall be dismissed without prejudice and all remaining cases without an independent basis for venue in Hinds County shall be severed and transferred to the appropriate jurisdiction where each plaintiff could have brought his or her claim without reliance on an improperly joined plaintiff. Issue 2: Recusal of judge Judge Tomie Green had accused the Jackson Police Department of racial profiling and harassment of her during a traffic stop. Dillard’s argues that the trial judge should be recused because Dillard’s uses off-duty police officers for security at its stores and because plaintiffs claim that the officers have a proclivity for racial profiling. A judge must disqualify when that judge's impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances including but not limited to instances where the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. Dillard’s has offered insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the trial judge is qualified and unbiased. Dillard’s did not take the necessary steps to insure that a record was made on the recusal hearing. Although the statements in the news broadcast that Judge Green accused the Jackson Police Department of racial profiling aroused suspicion by Dillard’s, the news broadcast along with the rulings of the trial court, do not constitute evidence of such sufficiency or weight that a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances would harbor doubts about Judge Green’s impartiality or that she will be biased or prejudiced in the cases. Dillard’s also argues that Judge Green’s rulings in the cases have been prejudicial and should be considered as evidence to support its motions for recusal. Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. Neither the refusal to sever nor the refusal to grant a stay are sufficient grounds for recusal. Judge Green’s decision was not contrary to established law at the time she made the decision and therefore does not warrant her recusal. |
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