Nelson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KM-00698-SCT Linked Case(s): 2010-KM-00698-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-25-2011 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: DUI first offense - Jurisdiction - URCCC 12.02 - Reinstate appeal - Lack of notice - Double jeopardy Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph and Pierce, JJ. Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J. Dissent Joined By : Dickinson, P.J., and King, J. Lamar, J., Joins In Part Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - MISDEMEANOR |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-30-2010 Appealed from: Rankin County Circuit Court Judge: Samac Richardson Disposition: County court remanded back to municipal court where the DUI first charge was nolle prossed to allow for indictment. Case Number: 18386 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Rachel D. Nelson |
LANCE O’NEAL MIXON
VICTOR W. CARMODY, JR. |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | DUI first offense - Jurisdiction - URCCC 12.02 - Reinstate appeal - Lack of notice - Double jeopardy |
| Summary of the Facts: | On October 27, 2006, Rachel Nelson was involved in an automobile collision. The City of Richland charged her with driving under the influence, first offense. On November 15, 2006, Nelson pleaded nolo contendere in the Municipal Court of Richland. The court found Nelson guilty and imposed a sentence of forty-eight hours in jail, suspended, along with a $1,000 fine and $244 in assessments. On November 29, 2006, Nelson filed a notice of appeal. The trial date was set for April 2, 2007. On March 27, 2007, Nelson filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on writ of procedendo and return the cause of action to the Municipal Court of Richland for imposition of sentence. On the same day, the Rankin County Court granted Nelson’s motion. On March 30, 2007, a Richland city prosecutor filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal, to reinstate Nelson’s appeal, and to stay the proceedings. In this motion, the prosecutor argued that Nelson’s accident had caused serious injuries to Debra Easterling, but that the matter inadvertently had been presented in municipal court as a DUI first offense without court personnel or the prosecutor having had knowledge of the injuries. The prosecutor also argued that the county court had dismissed Nelson’s appeal with no notice to the State and that the county court had lacked the power to dismiss Nelson’s appeal without an agreement by the State. The prosecutor also asserted that no jeopardy had attached because Nelson had entered a “no contest” plea in the Municipal Court of Richland. The county court reinstated the appeal to hear the city’s response. The city moved to nolle prosequi the DUI-first charge, to enable its indictment of Nelson for the felony crime of DUI mayhem. The county court granted the motion and nolle prossed the DUI-first charge. Nelson filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Nelson appealed to circuit court which affirmed. Nelson appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jurisdiction Nelson argues that she had a right to dismiss her appeal voluntarily. She argues that the dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo deprived the county court of jurisdiction. According to Nelson, once her appeal was dismissed and the case remanded on writ of procedendo, the county court was unable to retake jurisdiction even for the limited purpose of considering whether to set aside the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo. URCCC 12.02 provides that an individual who has been adjudged guilty of a criminal offense by a justice or municipal court may appeal to county court or, if there is no county court having jurisdiction, then to circuit court for a trial de novo. Rule 12.02 expressly sets out three situations in which the trial court may dismiss the appeal with prejudice: if the defendant fails to post the required appearance bond or cash deposit; if the notice of appeal does not contain the information required by Rule 12.02(A)(2), and the court does not allow amendment; or if the defendant fails to appear at the time and place set by the court. A court to which an appeal has been taken for a trial de novo is empowered to: grant the defendant’s appropriately timed motion to dismiss the appeal and remand on writ of procedendo; and set aside the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo, upon a determination that the order of dismissal and remand was improper. In this case, the county court had jurisdiction to consider the motion to set aside the order of dismissal and remand. The county court determined that the order of dismissal and remand was improper because the city had lacked notice and an opportunity to respond to Nelson’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court reinstated the appeal, giving the State an opportunity to respond to Nelson’s motion to dismiss. The decision to hear the city’s arguments on the motion to dismiss in this case was within the county court’s sound discretion. Issue 2: Double jeopardy After setting aside the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo, the county court granted the State’s motion to nolle prosequi the DUI-first charge against Nelson. Nelson argues that, because she has been convicted of DUI-first and sentenced by the municipal court, double-jeopardy considerations prevent the State from obtaining a nolle prosequi on that charge with the intention of subsequently indicting her for felony DUI. Double jeopardy protects against a second prosecution after acquittal or conviction, as well as protecting against multiple punishments. The entry of a nolle prosequi does not bar another prosecution for the same offense under a new indictment. Nelson does not claim she has been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Rather, she contends that she may be prosecuted in the future for felony DUI. Therefore, the question of whether the municipal court proceedings would bar a subsequent prosecution under double-jeopardy considerations is not ripe for determination. |
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