Hardin v. Hardin
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00947-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-23-2011 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contempt - Modification of child custody Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Russell, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Maxwell, J., concurs in part and in the result without separate written opinion Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-19-2010 Appealed from: Panola County Chancery Court Judge: Vicki Cobb Disposition: MODIFIED CUSTODY TO AWARD CUSTODY TO JONATHAN HARDIN AND FOUND RONNIE HARDIN IN CONTEMPT Case Number: B-08-06-280 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Ronnie Danielle (Davis) Hardin |
DARRIN JAY WESTFAUL |
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| Appellee: | Jonathan Kyle Hardin | ADAM A. PITTMAN | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Contempt - Modification of child custody |
| Summary of the Facts: | Ronnie and Jonathan Hardin obtained a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, and the chancery court awarded Ronnie primary physical custody of the couple’s minor child. Ronnie later filed a petition for modification of custody. Jonathan subsequently filed a counter-petition and a request for a finding of contempt against Ronnie. After a hearing on the petitions was conducted, the chancery court modified its previous order, awarding primary physical child custody to Jonathan. The chancery court also found Ronnie in contempt of various portions of the original custody order. Ronnie appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Contempt The chancellor found Ronnie to be in contempt for failure to abide by several requirements of the chancery court’s original order, and Jonathan was awarded a judgment of $4,800 as a result of one of the violations. However, the chancellor suspended any imposition of penalty if Ronnie paid Jonathan $100 per month toward the judgment owed to him, plus accrued interest, until satisfied. The original custody and property-settlement agreement stated: “The husband and wife agree that it is in the best interest of the minor child not to reside in the home of either or both of the maternal grandparents.” Two days after the divorce, Ronnie moved from Panola County to south Mississippi. The record shows that during this period, Ronnie and the child stayed with Ronnie’s parents for one week on two separate occasions. In her petition for modification, Ronnie requested that this clause be stricken from the custody agreement. The chancellor found Ronnie to be in contempt of this clause contained in the original order, noting that although the time spent at her parents’ home was brief, Ronnie and the child had no other residence during those periods. Since Ronnie and the child resided at her parents’ home before moving into another home, they could be considered residents during those brief periods. Accordingly, there was credible evidence that Ronnie violated the court’s order. The original custody agreement stated that Ronnie was “to maintain health, medical, dental, and optical insurance of the parties’ minor child.” The chancery court found Ronnie in contempt of this clause as Ronnie had enrolled the child in the Mississippi Children’s Health Insurance Program. Ronnie argues that she was in compliance with the order that she “maintain” insurance, even though she was not actually paying for the insurance. Ronnie enrolled the child in CHIPS in August 2008, but she did not lose her job with Regions Bank until March 2009. Thus, this was not a situation where Ronnie was attempting to obtain insurance for her daughter after losing her job. Rather, as the chancellor noted, Ronnie made a conscious decision to cancel the child’s insurance through Regions Bank and place her in the CHIPS program. As such, Ronnie was not “carrying the expense” for the child’s insurance and the chancellor did not err in finding her in contempt. The chancellor also found Ronnie to be in contempt of the clause in the order that required Ronnie to satisfy the indebtedness owed on her 2004 GMC Envoy and to hold harmless Jonathan from any indebtedness. Ronnie wrecked the vehicle in January 2009 and received insurance reimbursement, which left a deficit of approximately $4,200 on the loan. Ronnie claims that she was not given the opportunity to make alternative arrangements to repay the debt as Jonathan quickly paid the remaining balance. Ronnie was employed with Regions Bank, the holder of the vehicle’s lien, when the vehicle was damaged; however, Ronnie was fired from Regions in March 2009. Ronnie testified that she had received a two-month extension to pay the loan, but Jonathan paid the loan prior to the termination of the extension. Ronnie admitted in her testimony that she knew that Jonathan might have lost his job if the loan had not been paid. The chancellor’s finding of contempt is supported by the evidence. Ronnie willfully violated the court’s order to repay the indebtedness on the loan. This is evidenced by Ronnie’s statement to Jonathan that she did not have the money to pay the loan and that he should do “whatever.” Issue 2: Custody As the parties stipulated to a material change in circumstances, the chancery court properly proceeded to make an on-the-record detailed application of the Albright factors in determining that a modification in custody was warranted. Ronnie argues that the chancellor improperly conducted the analysis. Ronnie argues that she is the primary caregiver when the child is with her, while Jonathan relies on a various group of individuals to assist him with child care. However, the record shows that both parents attempted to split their time with the child equally after the divorce, which the chancellor noted was a decision that the two of them had made. Ronnie argues that the parenting skills factor should have favored her as she provides more care for the child, unlike Jonathan, whom she argues “shuffles the child around to whoever can sit with her.” The fact that Jonathan allows the child to be looked after by his parents, his fiancee, or a day care does not necessarily diminish his parenting skills. The record shows that he fixed meals for the child and took her to church when she was visiting. Ronnie claims that she should have been favored on the moral fitness factor as Jonathan lives with his nineteen-year-old fiancée. However, along with this fact, the chancellor weighed the fact that Ronnie was fired from her job at Regions for the illegal activity of investigating her ex-husband’s financial activities. This behavior is extremely relevant to the issue of Ronnie’s morality. With regard to the home, school and community record factor, the record supports the chancery court’s findings that the mother “has not shown consistency” by moving several times since the divorce, whereas Jonathan has remained in the same home. With regard to stability of home environment, testimony showed that at Jonathan’s home, the child experienced regular family meal times, went to bed at a regular time – complete with bedtime stories and prayers – and attended church during her visitation with Jonathan. The chancellor considered Jonathan’s cohabitation, yet she gave more weight to the stable and structured home environment attested to by Jonathan and his fiancee and to the fact that Ronnie had not shown the same level of stability. There is credible evidence to support the evaluation of this factor. Given these factors, there is no error in the chancery court’s modification of the custody order. |
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