Jones v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-02033-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-02033-COA ; 2009-CT-02033-SCT ; 2009-CT-02033-SCT ; 2009-CT-02033-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-23-2011 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Cruel and unusual punishment - Constitutionality of section 97-3-21 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Russell, JJ. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: PCR Writ of Certiorari: Granted Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-19-2009 Appealed from: Lee County Circuit Court Judge: Thomas J. Gardner Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DENIED Case Number: CV08-099(G)L |
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| Note: | On July 18, 2013, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeals’ judgment and the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court opinion can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO86412.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Brett Jones |
SYLVIA S. OWEN |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS, SCOTT STUART |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Cruel and unusual punishment - Constitutionality of section 97-3-21 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Brett Jones was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Jones leave to seek post-conviction relief in the trial court. Jones filed his motion which was denied. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Jones argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, because his attorneys failed to request a mistrial when two jurors received unredacted copies of Jones’s statement to police; failed to withdraw a motion to suppress his statement to police; failed to conduct a sufficient investigation; failed to call two witnesses (Jones’s grandmother and father); failed to discover during voir dire that two jurors were related to the victim’s family; stipulated to Dr. Hayne’s qualifications; failed to present expert testimony rebutting Dr. Hayne’s testimony; failed to object to the prosecutor’s statement during voir dire that “this is not a death penalty case”; and wrongfully advised Jones that his case would never go to trial. Jones’s attorneys’ decision not to seek a mistrial was a sound strategic decision. Further, Jones offered no proof that any jurors learned of the allegedly inadmissible content. From the record, it appears Jones’s attorneys’ decision to withdraw the motion to suppress his statement was a tactical one. In addition, Jones’s bare allegations in his post-trial affidavit with regard to his motion to suppress are legally insufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel. To the extent Jones challenges the voluntariness of his statement, that particular issue is procedurally barred since he did not raise it on direct appeal. With regard to his claim concerning the failure to call witnesses, Jones’s general allegation that his counsel should have conducted lengthier witness interviews does not suffice to show their ineffectiveness. In addition, the attorneys chose not to call either witness for strategic reasons. Jones suggests his trial counsel was ineffective for not determining during voir dire that two jurors had a “friendship and/or work relationship” with the victim’s daughter-in-law (also Jones’s aunt). However, Jones failed to present evidence at the PCR hearing to show that any juror knew the victim’s daughter-in-law. Jones argues his trial attorneys were ineffective for stipulating to Dr. Hayne’s qualifications and declining to voir dire him concerning his qualifications. The Supreme Court has consistently found Dr. Hayne qualified to render expert opinions in the field of forensic pathology in criminal cases. Here, Dr. Hayne testified about abrasions on the victim’s body consistent with it being dragged. He also deemed the cuts on the victim’s hand “defensive posturing injuries.” Jones makes no argument as to why this particular testimony is unreliable. Jones next claims deficient performance in his attorneys’ failure “to present any expert testimony to refute Dr. Hayne’s expert opinions.” But the mere fact that Dr. Hayne’s testimony was damaging to Jones’s case does not render his attorneys ineffective for not calling a rebuttal expert. He has not explained why his attorneys’ failure to call a rebuttal expert was incompetent, other than offering speculative and conclusory allegations. During voir dire at Jones’s trial, the prosecutor mentioned to the jury panel “this is not a death penalty case.” Jones’s attorney did not object, which Jones contends amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Whether to object is generally a matter of trial strategy. In addition, any arguable mistake by Jones’s counsel in failing to object was cured by the court’s instruction. Jones also contends his attorneys told him his case would not go to trial. Jones did not testify at the evidentiary hearing that this statement was even made, nor did his affidavit contain this allegation. Jones contends his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising certain issues on direct appeal, resulting in those issues being procedurally barred. Jones fails to show that had his appellate attorney raised these other issues he now identifies, his conviction would have been reversed. Issue 2: Cruel and unusual punishment Jones argues because he was fifteen years old at the time of the stabbing, his life sentence for murder violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. An appellate court generally will not disturb a sentence where it does not exceed the statutory maximum. But if a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, it may be reviewed on Eighth Amendment grounds. Jones was sentenced under section 97-3-21 which mandates that every person who shall be convicted of murder shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary. The statute affords the sentencing judge no discretion. To the extent Jones challenges the constitutionality of section 97-3-21 as applied categorically to juveniles, his argument has already been rejected. |
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